Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & the Government Speech Doctrine by Andre, Steven J.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 2 Article 4
May 2014
Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & the Government
Speech Doctrine
Steven J. Andre
Lincoln Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven J. Andre, Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & the Government Speech Doctrine, 44 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 117 (2014).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/4
 
 
 
 
ANDRE, ANTI-SLAPP_CONFABULATION GOLDEN GATE LAW REVIEW   V.44 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANTI-SLAPP CONFABULATION AND 
THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
STEVEN J. ANDRÉ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 117	  
I. The	  Objective	  of	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Statutes	  –	  Protecting	  Critical	  First	  Amendment	  Rights 118	  
II. The	  Proper	  Statutory	  Balancing	  of	  Private	  Constitutional	  Rights	  Sought	  by	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Statutes 121	  
A. The	  Petition	  Right	  -­‐	  First	  Amendment	  Protection	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  File	  a	  Lawsuit 121	  
B. The	  General	  Petition	  Right	  -­‐	  Access	  to	  Justice	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Sue	  Government	  for 124	  
Redress	  of	  Grievances	  
C. Reconciling	  Christiansburg	  and	  Noerr-­‐Pennington:	  Retaining/Eliminating	  the	  Improper	  128	  
Purpose	  Prong	  for	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Fee	  Awards	  to	  Government	  Agents	  against	  Public	  Interest	  
Litigants	  
III. Divergent	  Judicial	  Approaches	  to	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Protection	  of	  Government	  Speech 129	  
	  
A. Theoretical	  Considerations 129 
B. Rise	  of	  the	  Abomination	   -­‐-­‐	  Development	  of	  Case	  Law	  Extending	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  
Protection	  to	  Government 132 
C. Confabulation	  of	  the	  Government	  Speech	  Doctrine	  with	  a	  “Right” 135 
D. One	  Source	  of	  Confusion	  is	  Replaced	  by	  Another	  –	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Protection	  for	  
Government	  Speech	  that	  “Sounds	  Like”	  Private	  Speech 137 
IV. The	  Burden	  on	  General	  Petitioning	  Imposed	  by	  Government	  Use	  of	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Statutes 139	  
Against	  Petitioning	  Citizens	  
A. Penalizing	  Unsuccessful	  Public	  Interest	  Litigation 139	  
B. Attorney’s	  Fees	  and	  the	  Historic	  Process	  of	  Unburdening	  the	  Petition	  Right 142	  
C. The	  Appropriate	  Level	  of	  Protection	  to	  be	  Accorded	  the	  Earnest	  but	  Errant	  Public 145	  
Interest	  Litigant	  
D. Vargas	  II	   -­‐	  	  	  Rejection	  of	  the	  Application	  of	  Noerr-­‐Pennington	  Immunity 146	  
1. A	  Fee	  by	  Any	  Other	  Name	  Still	  Smells	  like	  a	  Burden 147	  
2. Distinguishing	  Imposition	  of	  Costs	  from	  Burdens 150	  
3. The	  Petition	  Clause	  Protects	  Even	  Baseless	  Petitioning 151	  
V. The	  National	  Scope	  of	  the	  Problem 152	  
VI. The	  Proper	  Criteria	  for	  Balancing	  the	  Government	  Interest	  at	  Stake	  Against	  the	  Paramount	   155	  
Constitutionally	  Protected	  Right	  to	  Petition	  Government	  for	  Redress	  of	  Grievances	  
2. Narrow	  tailoring	  of	  the	  burden	  to	  achieving	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  objectives 164	  
3. The	  Vargas	  II	  Approach	  –	  Revisionism	  of	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Statutes’	  Objectives 165	  
a. The	  Government	  Interest	  in	  Advancing	  its	  Objectives	  through	  Speech 166	  
i 
A.	  The	  Undue	  Burden	  Standard 155  
B.	  Intermediate	  Standard 161 
1.	  The	  governmental	  objective	  in	  advancing	  its	  objectives	  through	  speech  162 
   
1
Andre: Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
b. The	  Governmental	  Objective	  in	  Recouping	  the	  Expense	  of 168	  
Entertaining	  Unsuccessful	  Citizen	  Petitions	  
C.	  	  Applying	  the	  True	  Purpose	  of	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Statutes	  Under	  the	  Narrow-­‐Tailoring 172	  
Requirement	  of	  the	  Test	  
VII. Analytic	  Difficulties	  with	  Bestowing	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Protection	  Upon	  Government	  Speech	  in 174	  
Light	  of	  the	  “Arising	  From”	  Requirement	  
A. The	  Evolution	  of	  Judicial	  Overbreadth 174	  
B. Judicial	  Analysis	  of	  the	  anti	  –SLAPP	  “Arising	  From”	  Prerequisite	  for	  Protected 175	  
Conduct	  Applied	  to	  Government	  Activity	  
1. California’s	  Judicial	  Application	  of	  the	  “Arising	  From”	  Requirement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to	  Lawsuits	  Based	  Upon	  Private	  Speech	  and	  Petitioning 180	  
a. Cotati	  &	  Navellier 180	  
b. Lower	  California	  Court	  Treatment	  of	  the	  Requirement	  that	  the	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cause	  of	   Action	  must	  “Arise	  From”	  First	  Amendment	  Activity 184	  
c. The	  Analogy	  to	  Cases	  Involving	  Attorneys 186	  
C. Judicial	  Application	  of	  the	  “Arising	  From”	  Requirement	  to	  Government	   Speech 191	  
1. Post-­‐Vargas	  “Arising	  From”	  Analysis	  of	  Govt.	  Speech—Confusion	  Compounded 193	  
2. Judicial	  Application	  of	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  Statutes	  to	  Government	  Speech	  in	  a 197	  
Post-­‐Vargas	  World	  Where	  Government	  Speech	  is	  Not	  Constitutionally	  Protected	  
a. The	  Literal	  Approach	  –	  All	  Governmental	  Statements	  are	  Protected 198	  
b. The	  Other	  Approach	  to	  Application	  of	  “Arising	  From”	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Post	  –Vargas	  I	  Courts 202	  
D. Why	  Application	  of	  the	  “Arising	  From”	  Requirement	  Does	  Not	  Permit	  anti-­‐SLAPP	  
Protection	  to	  Government	  Agents 206	  
Conclusion 210	  
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/4
ANDRE, ANTI-SLAPP_CONFABULATION GOLDEN GATE LAW REVIEW   V.44 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
ANTI-SLAPP CONFABULATION AND 
THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
STEVEN J. ANDRÉ∗ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a lawsuit filed by concerned citizens to challenge a 
religious monument erected by a public entity in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
the government’s ability to place such monuments, and to refuse others, 
is within its power as government speech.1 Now picture the same 
government agency, relying upon a statutory provision  granting 
protection for the exercise of free speech and petition rights, responds to 
the lawsuit with an anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation 
(“anti-SLAPP”) motion to strike. The basis for the motion is that the 
challenged government action is government speech protected pursuant 
to  a  State  anti-SLAPP  statute,  such  as  California’s  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure section 425.16.2 
Assuming the government speech is protected by the statute, the 
only  question  for  anti-SLAPP  purposes  is  the  second  prong  of  the 
 
 
 
 
∗ Adjunct Professor, Lincoln Law School, Attorney, Carmel, California, J.D. University of 
California, Hastings College of Law, 1987; B.A. Political Science, B.A. Legal Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1983. 
1 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
2 Establishment Clause cases typically involve statements by government agents: the 
erection of monuments, religious symbols and prayers—all of which would potentially qualify for 
protection under the literal wording of CAL. CODE CIV.PROC. § 425.16(e)(3) (“written or oral 
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue 
of public interest”) or CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(e)(4) (“conduct in furtherance of the exercise 
of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 
public issue or an issue of public interest.”). 
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analysis—whether the plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that a 
government violation exists.3 
So, let us go the next step. Imagine the government agency above 
prevailed on its motion to strike and obtained an award of its attorney’s 
fees: $15,000 in the trial court and an additional $45,000 after an appeal. 
Why stop there? Some state statutes allow a statutory penalty of $5,000 
against the losing plaintiffs and $10,000 more against their attorneys.4 
The illogic of such an extension of anti-SLAPP protection to 
government agencies should crystallize at this point. It renders every 
separation challenge subject to a government motion to strike and a 
potential award of fees against the public interest litigant seeking  to 
uphold the vital First Amendment distinction between church and state. 
The chilling effect upon litigants of facing an anti-SLAPP motion and 
potentially paying the government agency’s attorney’s fees and penalties 
is enormous. 
California was the first state to find judicial acceptance of the notion 
that government may avail itself of anti-SLAPP protections against 
private citizens who petition for redress of grievances. It is the purpose 
of this article to explore the judicial entrenchment of such a misguided 
balancing of government interests against constitutional rights, and to 
illustrate why it is shortsighted and a very harmful misinterpretation of 
otherwise very worthy and beneficial statutes. 
 
I. THE OBJECTIVE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES—PROTECTING 
CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
 
Over the course of the last century, First Amendment jurisprudence 
gradually came to accept a marketplace of ideas paradigm ennobling 
private speech and other First Amendment activity as critical to the 
functioning of the democratic process.5 Anti-SLAPP legislation has been 
enacted nationally to curtail abusive use of litigation to suppress such 
vital First Amendment activity. Anti-SLAPP laws were conceived to 
prevent misuse of the legal process as a weapon to discourage petitioning 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Anti-SLAPP motion analysis proceeds in two-prongs: The primary legal inquiry is 
whether the basis of the plaintiff’s lawsuit is activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The 
secondary legal inquiry is only reached after the first prong is satisfied. It shifts the burden to the 
plaintiff to establish probable cause for the cause of action. Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 712 
(Cal. 2007). 
4 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §4.24.525(6)(a) (requiring additional mandatory $10,000 
award plus sanctions on plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel). 
5 Steven J. Andre, The Transformation of Freedom of Speech: Unsnarling the Twisted Roots 
of Citizens United v. FEC, 44 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 69, 127 (2011). 
4
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activity.6 Twenty nine states have now enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.7 
These may be characterized as narrow, moderate and broad in the scope 
of  activity  protected.8       California’s  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  section 
425.169 is an example of a broad statute.10 Enacted in 1992, it was the 
first statute endeavoring to encompass non-petitioning activity within its 
protections. Its language and judicial treatment have served as models 
for the rest of the nation.11 
The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is its lack of merit.12 Defendants 
prevail on the merits in over 77% of SLAPP suits.13 A SLAPP  “is 
brought with goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen 
party by increasing the cost of litigation”, to weaken that defendant’s 
ability to engage in petitioning activity undesirable to the plaintiff, and to 
deter future activity. 14 
Since winning is not a primary motivation, “traditional safeguards 
against meritless actions, (suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process, and requests for sanctions) are inadequate to counter 
SLAPPs.”15         Anti-SLAPP  statutes  generally  seek  to  protect  those 
 
 
 
6 See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 3, 12 (1989) (“SLAPPs are . . . a counter-attack against petition-clause-protected activity.”); 
see also CAL. COD CIV. PROC. § 425.16(a) (Westlaw 2014) (“[P]articipation should not be chilled 
through abuse of the judicial process”) 
7 Carson Barylak, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 
847 n.8 (2010).  Since 2010, the District of Columbia and Texas have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. 
D.C. LAW 16-5501 et seq. (Westlaw 2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §27.001 et seq. (Westlaw 
2014). One territory, Guam, has an anti-SLAPP statute. 7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 17101-17109 
(2005). 
8 Shannon Hartzler, Protecting Informed Public Participation: Anti-SLAPP Law and the 
Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L.REV. 1235, 1238 (2007). 
9 Unless otherwise indicated, all further references are to the  California Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
10 See Barbara Arco, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment Rights of 
Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 594; see also James Devine, Rule 
11’s Big-Mouthed Little Brother: How a Federal Anti-SLAPP Statute Would Reproduce Rule 11’s 
Growing Pains, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 367, 375 (2011) (“The California statute departs significantly 
from Pring-Canan’s anti-SLAPP model. While California’s statute protects petitioning and speech 
rights, the Pring-Canan statute simply offers expressed immunity for those exercising their 
constitutional right to petition . . . .”). 
11 See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1055-1056 (Cal. 2006) (“Rusheen v. Cohen—to 
provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of 
constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); see also Tom Wyrwich, Comment, A Cure for a “Public 
Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WA. L. REV. 663, 671 (2011). 
12 U.S. ex.rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 
 
 
1994)). 
 
13 Pring, supra note 6, at 12. 
14 Newsham, 190 F.3d at 970-71. 
15 Id. at 971 (citing Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 
5
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engaging in First Amendment activity and deter abusive lawsuits by 
providing for early termination of the suit and award of the target 
defendant’s fees incurred in achieving early dismissal of the SLAPP.16 
Broad statutes, like California’s, protect activity beyond petitioning 
and potentially include activity that does not necessarily enjoy First 
Amendment protection. Narrower statutes involving only non- 
government officials (NGOs) as targets, and applied to retaliation for just 
the exercise of constitutional petition rights, have not raised 
constitutional concerns.17  Broad statutes are criticized for their potential 
to chill access to justice.18 The inhibiting effect of fee awards is 
especially of concern.19 
California’s hybrid statute, because it includes non-petitioning 
activity within its ambit, created a problem not contemplated by those 
who conceived of SLAPP defendants as limited to NGOs engaging in 
petitioning activity.20    For fairly obvious reasons, a government agency 
 
 
 
16 Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-Slapp Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on 
Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L.REV. 801, 801 (2000). 
17 George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT, 8-9, 
15 (TEMPLE U. PRESS 1996) (regarding government agents as enjoying sufficient protections in 
contrast to the greater vulnerability of private citizens). 
18 Arco, supra, 594-595,599-600,616; Alice Glover and Marcus Jimison, SLAPP Suits: A 
First Amendment Issue and Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 122, 141 (1995) (“[T]he California law 
possesses the inequity and imbalance of creating a chilling effect on one group’s exercise of a 
constitutional right in an attempt to remove the chilling effect on another group’s exercise of 
constitutional rights.”); LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007, 1021 (S. Ct. N.J. 2009) (“[C]ourts 
must be vigilant so as not to so zealously seek to deter SLAPP suits and those who file them that we 
unintentionally punish ‘the plaintiff who seeks redress in good faith for a genuine reputational wrong 
but whose case unfortunately resembles the paradigm SLAPP.’” (citations omitted)). Andrews, 
Motive Restrictions, supra at 722-723: LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007,1021 (S.Ct.N.J.2009) 
(“[C]ourts must be vigilant so as not to so zealously seek to deter SLAPP suits and those who file 
them that we unintentionally punish ‘the plaintiff who seeks redress in good faith for a genuine 
reputational wrong but whose case unfortunately resembles the paradigm SLAPP.’ [citation]”); 
Barylak, supra 871-872; Sobczak, Mark, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the 
Citizen Participation Act, 28 N.Ill.L.Rev. 559 (2008); Devine supra, 370; Stone, Michael and Marc 
Berger, Legal Defense Trust Training Bulletin: California Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies to Routine 
Administrative Mandamus Petitions: An Analysis of the Holding and Effect of Vergos v. McNeal, at, 
http://www.rcdsa.org/trainingbulletins2/2007/June2007.pdf. 
19 Thomas Walden, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Laws and in the Courts’ 
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1043-1044 (1992); Treiman, Robert, 
SLAPPed Down, Daily Journal p.5 (Dec. 9, 2008); Steven J. Andre, California Code of Civil 
Procedure  Section  425.16—An  Epitaph  to  the  Right  to  Petition  Government  for  Redress  of 
Grievances, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 155, 155 (2009); see also Graffiti Protective Coatings v. City of 
Pico Rivera, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 692, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he chilling effect . . . is of 
particular concern because a defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees.”). 
20 See George Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENV. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1989); see also Pring & Canan, supra note 17, at 8-9, 15. California appropriated the 
term to cover activity not included in the meaning “SLAPP” by the concept’s creators. Pring and 
Canan defined a SLAPP as suits filed against “non-government individuals and/or groups” and did 
6
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does not bother to petition itself. Thus, the problem of a government 
official utilizing an anti-SLAPP motion against an individual or group 
never would have occurred to anti-SLAPP laws’ progenitors. 
For the same reason, the notion of government responding to pure 
citizen petitioning activity with an anti-SLAPP motion would have 
seemed so incongruous as to have escaped the imagination of those 
conceiving of anti-SLAPP legislation.  California’s legislative extension 
of protection to other First Amendment conduct ironically created the 
anomaly of protections potentially afforded to government action 
counteracting individuals’ constitutionally protected right to petition 
government for redress of grievances. 
 
II. THE PROPER STATUTORY BALANCING OF PRIVATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SOUGHT BY ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTES 
 
A. THE PETITION RIGHT—FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF THE 
RIGHT TO FILE A LAWSUIT 
 
The statutory protection from meritless21 lawsuits afforded 
defendants by anti-SLAPP statutes runs up against the First Amendment 
petition right of a litigant to access to justice. The Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, evolved by the U.S. Supreme Court to protect petition rights, is 
applicable to petitioning in the form of a lawsuit.22 The doctrine 
establishes immunity, except where the lawsuit is demonstrated to be a 
“sham.”23      A sham  is  a  lawsuit  that is  both  objectively baseless  and 
 
 
 
not include free speech activity, limiting it to “communications to a government body, official, or the 
electorate.” See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. 
REV. 937, 946-47 (1992). 
21 Hall v. Time Warner, Inc., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“To 
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, the plaintiff must show that the complaint is 
legally sufficient and must present a prima facie showing of facts that, if believed by the trier of fact, 
would support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The plaintiff’s showing of facts must consist of 
evidence that would be admissible at trial. The court cannot weigh the evidence, but must determine 
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor as a matter of law, as 
on a motion for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)); see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg, 
107 Cal. App. 4th 568, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
22 See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
23 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). Petitioning 
has many manifestations. The fact that one form of petitioning may be a lawsuit should not obscure 
the critical inquiry as to whether it is, in actuality, a “sham.” If the petitioning did not involve a 
lawsuit, the question of whether “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the 
merits" (Professional Real Estate Investors Inc. v. Columbia Pictures (1993) 508  U.S.  49,  60 
(PREI)) would not come into play.  Instead, what is pertinent is whether the petitioner’s actions were 
7
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subjectively brought for an improper purpose.24 Thus, the sanction of 
early termination of a lawsuit—depriving a plaintiff of his or her day in 
court— may not be imposed absent a showing that the lawsuit  is  a 
“sham” under this standard.25 
California follows this standard for sanctioning litigation activity. 
Under California’s sanction statute, the courts have consistently regarded 
section 128.5 sanctions as involving both an objective and a subjective 
element.26 Therefore, any  conflict with the two-pronged “sham” 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been avoided. The 
California Supreme Court, in In Re Marriage of Flaherty, struck down 
an award of sanctions for maintaining a frivolous appeal and held that 
such an award for frivolous litigation required a showing that the appeal 
is both baseless and pursued in bad faith.27 The court applied such a 
standard to the term “frivolous” to avoid chilling litigants’ rights: 
 
[A]ny definition must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect 
on the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients 
have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is 
extremely unlikely that they will win on appeal.28 
 
What is less certain, and remains to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, is whether statutory fee-shifting in favor of government agencies 
and against  petitioning  citizens is  subject  to the  two-pronged “sham” 
standard. Outside the context of anti-SLAPP awards, cases are found 
involving statutory awards of fees to government entities against private 
persons.29   The leading case is Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C.30 
 
 
 
taken for an improper purpose such as a “predatory motive.” PREI at 55-56. This is aptly illustrated 
by considering Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 365 (Omni). Omni did 
not involve an underlying lawsuit. It instead involved a challenge to allegedly competitive efforts to 
lobby and curry favor with government agencies. The Court engaged in no objective analysis. It 
stated the operative concern for ascertaining a “sham” to be solely a subjective inquiry. Id. 380. 
24 Id. 
25 BE & K Constr. Co. v. Nat’l. Labor Relations Bd., 536 U.S. 516, 526-27 (2002). 
26 See, e.g., Dolan v. Buena Eng’rs, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1505-1506 (Cal Ct. App. 
1994); Abbett Elec. Corp. v. Sullwold, 193 Cal. App. 3d 708 (Cal Ct. App. 1987), 712; Corbett v. 
Hayward Dodge, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 915, 921 (Cal Ct. App. 2004). 
27 In Re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 649-650 (Cal. 1982). 
28 Id. at 650. 
29 See Salazar v. Upland Police Dept., 116 Cal. App. 4th 934, 949 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(construing the language of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1021.7 disjunctively to allow fee-shifting to a 
government agency where either the objective or subjective component is not demonstrated by the 
losing plaintiff); see also Kobzoff v. Los Angeles Cnty. Harbor/UCLA Medical Center, 19 Cal. 4th 
851, 853 (1998) (construing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1038 to allow a government agency to recover 
fees where the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate either reasonable cause or good faith). These 
decisions interpreted the statutes’ plain language (Kobzoff at 863) without contemplating Petition 
Clause and Noerr-Penningtion considerations. 
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Christiansburg held that a fee award should not be allowed in favor of a 
prevailing government defendant in an action to enforce Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 without a showing that the action was 
“frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.”31 
In so holding, the Court did not consider the question of petition 
rights, but instead looked at congressional intent behind allowing fees to 
defendants under the Civil Rights Act.32 The Court relied upon 
Congress’s primary objective in encouraging such lawsuits as a matter of 
public policy and in promoting private prosecution of those violating the 
law.33 It regarded the congressional objective in making the provision 
mutual as one merely designed to discourage suits that were frivolous, 
groundless, or unreasonable.34 The same rule would later be applied to 
other federal attorneys fee provisions.35 The dual standard is not applied 
mechanically, but instead applied in view of the objectives sought to be 
achieved by a fee-shifting scheme.36 
A determination that a suit is a SLAPP merely finds that the lawsuit 
implicates protected activity and that the plaintiff is unable to muster a 
showing of probable cause. Because this is not a determination that the 
lawsuit meets either objective or subjective aspects of a “sham”, the 
SLAPP plaintiff’s right to litigate should enjoy First Amendment 
protection.37 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in BE & K 
Construction v. NLRB, “the genuineness of a grievance does not turn on 
whether it succeeds.”38 
Thus, protecting citizens against SLAPPs pits the interest in 
preventing imposition upon their First Amendment rights against  the 
access to justice rights of those who sue.39    The Rhode Island Supreme 
 
 
 
30 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n., 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
31 Id. at 422. 
32 Id. at 420 (emphasis added). 
33 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420. 
34 Id. at 420-422. 
35 E.g. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 6-7 (1980). 
36 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523-524 (1994). 
37 Neither the subjective inquiry into the plaintiff’s motive (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer 
Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 66-67 (Cal. 2002) (holding that no “intent to chill” requirement is 
needed)), nor the objective inquiry (see Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60 
(recognizing standard that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits”)) 
is the same inquiry involved in finding a “probability” of prevailing (§425.16(b)(3) ). 
38 BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532. 
39 See, Pring & Canan, supra note 17, at 12, 17-19; Carol Andrews, Motive Restrictions on 
Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 722 (2000); Arco, supra note 
10, at 617. Anti-SLAPP statutes stand as a barrier to access to the courts by providing an early 
penalty to claimants who seek judicial redress. In both theory and practical judicial application, anti- 
SLAPP statutes involve a careful balancing recognizing the tension between the First Amendment 
9
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Court recognized this clash of First Amendment interests in Palazzo v. 
Alves: 
 
By the nature of their subject matter, anti-SLAPP statutes require 
meticulous drafting. On the one hand, it is desirable to seek to shield 
citizens from improper intimidation when exercising their 
constitutional right to be heard with respect to issues of public 
concern. On the other hand, it is important that such statutes be limited 
in scope lest the constitutional right of access to the courts . . . be 
improperly thwarted. There is a genuine double-edged challenge to 
those who legislate in this area.40 
 
The court warned, “courts should give careful consideration to the 
negative effect that such filings can have on the right of access to the 
courts . . . .  Great caution should be the watchword in this area.”41 
 
B. THE GENERAL PETITION RIGHT—ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE 
RIGHT TO SUE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court observed that, “the right to petition 
extends to all departments of the Government [,] [t]he right of access to 
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”42 A lawsuit 
challenging government action involves that particular aspect of the right 
to   petition—the   right   to   invoke   the   judicial   process.43 More 
significantly, it also involves the right to invoke that process against the 
government. 
The right of access forbids governmental conduct that unduly 
obstructs persons who seek to present complaints to the  State’s 
adjudicatory authorities. Solicitude for access to justice concerns is not 
of recent genesis. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court explained “[t]he 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws . . . [and o]ne of the first 
duties of government is to afford that protection . . . .”44 
The access to justice aspect of the right is different in nature and 
protects different constitutional concerns than other aspects of the First 
 
 
 
rights of litigants to have their day in court and the rights of citizens to be free from retaliatory 
lawsuits targeting exercise of speech or petitioning rights. 
40 Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150 (R.I. 2008). 
41 Palazzo, 944 A.2d at 150 n.10. 
42 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
43 See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. Nat’l. Labor Relations Bd., 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) 
(“. . . going to a judicial body for redress of alleged wrongs . . . stands apart from other forms of 
action directed at the alleged wrongdoer.” (citing Peddie Bldgs., 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973)). 
44 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) 
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Amendment and the petition right itself. The access right emanates from 
both the First Amendment and  the Due  Process Clause, and protects 
access to state prescribed processes.45 It is among the rights protected by 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.46 
The access right is never purely private because it invokes a public 
process which may announce or apply the law in ways that govern the 
future conduct of others. The access component of the Petition Clause 
protects admittance to state prescribed processes in which persons can 
address “violated rights and interests” and obtain “the psychological 
benefits of vindication [and the] public airing of disputed facts.”47 The 
availability of a dispute resolution process that operates neutrally and 
dispenses justice as “the alternative of force” in private disputes has been 
recognized as “the right conservative of all other rights.”48 This rationale 
has even greater salience when citizens use the judicial process to 
petition their government using prescribed processes to challenge the 
manner in which government conducts its affairs. The latter process 
involves something in which the public always has an interest beyond 
mere announcement of rules of law.  Accordingly, access to that process 
is the alternative of revolution and entails exercise of a right conservative 
of our participatory form of government. 
The application of the anti-SLAPP statute to suits brought by 
citizens against their government implicates the most basic concerns of 
the access component of the Petition Clause. In BE & K, the  U.S. 
Supreme Court characterized “this right to petition as one of ‘the most 
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.’”49 Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court continues to selectively filter foisting the Bill of 
Rights upon states through a narrow portal since the Slaughter-House 
Cases,50 the general Petition right is regarded as secured under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.51 
 
 
 
 
45 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (“The Due Process Clause also requires 
states to afford certain civil litigants a ‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by removing obstacles to 
their full participation in judicial proceedings.” (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 
(1971) ; M.L.B. v. S.L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 (1996)); Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343, 362-63; 
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors (1985) 473 U.S. 305, 335. 
46 See Blake v. McLung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898) (stating that privileges and immunities of 
citizens include the right “to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state[.]”). 
47 Bill Johnson’s Rests., 461 U.S. at 743. 
48 Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
49 BE & K, 536 U.S. at 525 (citing Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 
(1967)). 
50 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1872). 
51 McDonald  v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029 (2010) (“. . . the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protects such things as the right ‘to come to the seat of government to assert any 
11
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The special level of protection required for petitioning in the form 
of suits against government is apparent not just from the language of the 
First Amendment, but from the origins of the Petition Clause itself.52 
Suits against government deserve  greater  protection  because  they 
embody two preferred aspects of the Petition right: 
 
First, suits against any governmental agency actually comprise two 
petitions—one general and one judicial—combined into one, and 
thereby concurrently serve the two primary interests of petitioning. 
Second, a suit against the government, unlike other general petitions, 
triggers a governmental duty to respond to petitions ........... 53 
The historic development of petition rights is consistent with the 
substantially greater judicial protection accorded petitioning by a citizen 
to the government than is accorded private action that is not genuinely 
aimed at procuring favorable government action. Historically, petitions 
were all addressed to the King.54 Laws were initially the product of 
petitions granted by the King, not parliamentary legislation.55  Petitions 
on private matters—such as legal disputes—were similarly addressed to 
the monarch.56 With the passage of time, courts emerged to handle the 
private disputes and Parliament took on the exclusive power to enact 
laws.57 This separation of the two types of petitioning “led to separation 
of the legislative and judicial powers from each other and from royal 
prerogative.”58 The distinction has not fallen into desuetude. The U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged the difference between “direct” and 
“indirect” petitioning of governmental officials.59     Lesser protection is 
 
 
 
 
 
claim [a citizen] may have upon that government’ “ (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80 
(1872)). 
52 See Carol Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 596-598; 613-615 (1999); see also James 
Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue 
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 961-62 (1997); see also Gregory 
A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2174 (1986). 
53 Harvard Law Review, Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government: 
Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1118 (1993). 
54 See Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, 
But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 - 1156 (1986). 
55 Id. at 1156. 
56 Id. at 1155. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988). 
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afforded  interaction  with  government  of  an  indirect,  private,  or  non- 
political nature.60 
Outside the anti-SLAPP context, California courts have consistently 
recognized that something more is at stake when it comes to the 
combined judicial and general petition.61 The contrast of judicial with 
general petitioning as yielding immunity from claims for litigation 
expenses incurred by government was recognized by the California 
Supreme Court in City of Long Beach v. Bozek (Bozek).62 Bozek held 
that private citizens enjoyed Petition Clause immunity from a city’s 
attempt to recoup fees expended defending  against  an  allegedly 
malicious lawsuit. To extend common law malicious prosecution 
liability to allow government entities to recoup fees from citizen litigants 
would impose an unconstitutional burden upon petition rights. Bozek 
observed the distinction between actions brought by private citizens and 
malicious prosecution actions brought by  government  against  citizens 
who petition it for redress of grievances.63 In dicta, the court essentially 
stated that should the Legislature determine to allow such recovery, 
Noerr-Pennington immunity requires the lawsuit must be shown to be a 
“sham” to avoid an unconstitutional burden upon petition rights.64 
60 Id. at 506 - 507. 
61 Other than in the anti-SLAPP context the courts addressing burdens upon petitioning have 
steadfastly resisted efforts to water down the “sham” exception and permit a lesser showing to 
overcome the immunity attaching to petition rights. See, PG&E v. Bear Stearns; Ludwig v. Superior 
Court (City of Barstow) (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8; Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir (9th  Cir.2011)      
F.3d     . 
In Wolfgram, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 53 (citing Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 530), the Court of 
Appeal characterized Bozek as holding that “a suit by a subject against the government occupies a 
preferred status over a suit invoking the judicial power of government against another subject.” 
Wolfgram further held that the historical right to petition involves “the right to complain about and 
complain to the government.” Id. at 50. Quoting Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833) § 
998, p. 707, Wolfgram stated that such historical right “embraces dissent.”  Id. at 50-51. 
Other California courts have recognized that the right of petition includes the right to sue 
the government. See California Teachers Assn. v. State of California, 20 Cal. 4th 327, 338-39 
(1999) (holding that Education Code § 44944(e)’s requirement that teachers unsuccessfully suing the 
state pay one-half of the administrative law judge’s salary was unconstitutional because “the 
importance of free access to the courts” is “an aspect of the First Amendment right of petition”); 
Smith v. Silvey, 149 Cal. App. 3d 400, 407 (1983) (filing of mandamus action against board of 
supervisors was an exercise of the right to petition the judicial branch of the government). 
62 31 Cal. 3d 527 (1982), re-affirmed, 33 Cal. 3d 727 (1983). Cate v. Oldham, 450 So. 2d 
224, 226 (Fla. 1984) (following Bozek and holding that “[t]he presentation of a complaint to 
government concerning its conduct is now expressly held central to the right to petition that 
government for the redress of grievances against it”). 
63 Id. n. 9; See also, Padres L.P. v. Henderson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 495,510.The distinction 
was aptly stated by the court in Padres L.P.. That court found no discord with Bozek in allowing 
exactly such a fee award to a private actor arising from a judicial petition. While the municipality in 
Padres could not recover its attorney’s fees from the lawsuit (since that would have involved a 
burden upon general petitioning activity), there was no such impediment to private defendants 
recovering their fees (because as to them the lawsuit was merely a judicial petition). 
64   The  court  referenced  then  recent  legislation  enacting  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  §128.5 
(providing for sanctions for “actions not based on good faith which are frivolous or which cause 
unnecessary  delay.”  –  which  requires  an  element  of  subjective  bad  faith)  and  Code  of  Civil 
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In   contrast,   Equilon   Enterprises   v.   Consumer   Cause,   Inc.65 
subsequently held that shifting attorney’s fees between private litigants 
pursuant to an anti-SLAPP statute did not implicate the constitutional 
protections involved in the exercise of the judicial petition rights 
involved there. Equilon did not address the constitutionality of an award 
of fees in a situation involving an exercise of general petition rights. 
Equilon is entirely consistent with Bozek’s differential treatment of 
government efforts to recoup expenses incurred in responding to citizen 
petitioning in the form of lawsuits. A lawsuit directed to government 
and seeking governmental change rises to a more rarefied level than a 
legal action over a private contract issue that indirectly may achieve new 
precedent or a change in governmental behavior. Thus, an incursion 
upon such an exercise of First Amendment rights must be justified by a 
most significant right or extremely compelling government interest on 
the other side of the scale. 
 
C. RECONCILING CHRISTIANSBURG AND NOERR-PENNINGTON: 
RETAINING/ELIMINATING THE IMPROPER PURPOSE PRONG FOR 
ANTI-SLAPP FEE AWARDS TO GOVERNMENT AGENTS AGAINST 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANTS 
 
Christiansburg, in spite of  Noerr-Pennington  requirements, 
suggested that a single objective prong standard may be used to gauge 
whether an award of fees to a government agency may impinge upon a 
citizen’s petition rights in bringing a lawsuit against government.66 
Accepting such a standard would overlook the distinction between 
general and judicial petition rights. The objective aspect of the exception 
to Noerr-Pennington—that the suit be without any merit from the 
perspective of a reasonable attorney—applies to judicial petitions. A 
general petition, meanwhile, may not involve a lawsuit, but may be 
brought for an improper purpose.67 Thus, the more essential (or 
minimal) prong for evaluating combined petitions must be the subjective 
 
 
Procedure §1021.7 (allowing fee shifting to a law enforcement defendant where an action is not 
“filed or maintained in good faith and with reasonable cause."), concluding in language indicating 
that lack of merit (the objective factor) alone cannot overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity and 
provide a basis for fee recovery: “governmental entities may not maintain actions for malicious 
prosecution against those who have previously sued such entities without success.” Id. at 538-39. 
But see, note 29, supra, observing subsequent cases interpreting the language of §1021.7 as 
disjunctive (allowing a fee award based upon either a subjective or objective finding). 
65   (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53. 
66 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 413 (allowing fee-shifting without distinguishing awards in 
favor of government agencies where a lawsuit is objectively baseless, did not consider Petition 
rights and Noerr-Pennington issues.) 
67 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that a petition for purpose of 
defamation is not subject to absolute immunity from liability). 
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(improper purpose) inquiry.68 Since a lawsuit  may  be  entirely 
meritorious, but brought for an improper purpose, both prongs of Noerr- 
Pennington’s “sham” exception need to be considered to evaluate 
whether combined petition rights can be burdened. 
In terms of divining a comprehensible standard from the existing 
body of authority, a more consistent approach to the fee award problem 
does emerge. The standard would be to subject civil rights, qui tam, and 
other public interest actions against private entities to the Christiansburg 
objective lack of merit standard. Lawsuits challenging government 
conduct (involving general petitioning) would fall under the Noerr- 
Pennington requirement that a “sham” must be established—requiring 
both the subjective and the objective showing—to allow an award of fees 
to a prevailing government defendant. General petitioning activity not 
involving a lawsuit would be subject to the improper purpose aspect of 
the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington to  allow  fees  to  any 
defendant. 
In any event, the improper purpose requirement of Noerr- 
Pennington is not comprehended by the two-prong anti-SLAPP inquiry69 
and the probable cause anti-SLAPP standard is not the same as the 
objective standard for frivolous suits under Noerr-Pennington. 
 
III. DIVERGENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ANTI-SLAPP 
PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT ACTORS 
 
A. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Where government agents use statutory anti-SLAPP protections 
against private citizens the interests balanced cannot be  accorded the 
same weights involved in statutory fee-shifting between private litigants. 
The use of an anti-SLAPP statute by government does not  merely 
involve a barrier to access to justice, but a burden upon a person’s right 
to petition government.70     This additional burden is not imposed based 
 
 
 
68 See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380  (1991)  (applying  a 
standard that looked simply at whether a defendant’s activities are “not genuinely aimed at procuring 
favorable government action”); see also Hi-Top Steel Corp. v. Lehrer, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 651 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
69 See Equilon Enter’s v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 690-691 (Cal. 2002). 
70 The general petition in the form of litigation has the same political significance in terms of 
achieving social change as other general petitioning activity. The U.S. Supreme Court in Borough of 
Duryea, supra, observed: 
Individuals may also ‘engag[e] in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and 
association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.’ In re 
Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 431 (1978). Litigation on matters of public concern may facilitate the 
informed public participation that is a cornerstone of democratic society. It also allows 
individuals to pursue desired ends by direct appeal to government officials charged with 
applying the law. 
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upon a need to protect certain essential rights, but to  advance 
government’s interest in sanctioning and deterring unsuccessful, non- 
frivolous, petitions.71 
Unquestionably, sometimes certain government conduct – 
specifically, government speech – can be very important. The national 
security considerations at issue in the Pentagon Papers case72 were 
certainly significant. However, not all government speech is so 
important; and it may even be innocuous. As the Pentagon Papers case 
demonstrates, even speech that is so important may not warrant 
suppression of First Amendment rights.73 
Identifying the constitutionally required manner in which 
individual First Amendment rights are to be balanced against 
government interests has been an evolutionary process. From the days of 
the “bad tendency” test to Brandenburg v. Ohio74, the United States 
Supreme Court has moved away from  allowing  generalized 
governmental interests to trump First Amendment rights. Judicial 
willingness to countenance suppression of speech hampering general 
governmental agendas dwindled with ascending appreciation of the 
importance of protecting individual rights - accepting the logic that 
"speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government." 75 
The Supreme Court has not carved out a constitutional niche for 
government interests alongside First Amendment or other rights in the 
constitutional constellation. Government may act to bolster protection of 
individual rights against encroachments by  others  who  are  exercising 
their rights. For example, the Court recognized that an ordinance may 
properly restrict picketing from  interfering  with  persons’  privacy 
interests in their homes.76 Government may also act to protect an 
individual privacy interest in being free from offensive mail.77 Content 
neutral regulation preventing picketing from intruding upon family 
memorial services may be proper.78 But even where government is acting 
to bolster some citizen rights against other private rights, its role is 
circumscribed. 
Government’s judgments relating to the balance  struck in 
protecting some individual rights vis á vis others’ rights have not been 
 
 
 
Therefore, its value in any judicial balancing of that right against governmental interests should be 
accorded the same weight. 
71 Infra, p. 172. 
72 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
73 Id. at 718-719. 
74 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
75 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64,74-75 (1964). 
76 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484-486 (1988). 
77 Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728,738 (1970). 
78   Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (U.S. 2011). n.5 (and preceding text) 
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acceded broad deference by the court which has emphasized that this 
scope is limited: “Our holding today is narrow. . . As we have noted, ‘the 
sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between 
First Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited 
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the 
instant case.’[Citation].” 79 In other words, it is not for the legislative 
branch to decide what constitutional rights deserve greater or  lesser 
weight on balance against other constitutional rights. 
Likewise, in Burson v. Freeman80, the court addressed ad hoc 
such a clash between rights involving a direct restriction upon political 
expression within 100 feet of a polling place. The court gave no special 
deference to the judgment of the Tennessee Legislature and recognized, 
“This case presents us with a particularly difficult reconciliation: the 
accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse with the right 
to vote - a right at the heart of our democracy.”81 The Court required a 
compelling state interest to permit the infringement upon the First 
Amendment rights involved.82 It held that the state had a “compelling 
interest in securing the right to vote freely and effectively”.83 
An anti-SLAPP application  that not only  protects government 
from the exercise of First Amendment rights, but also imposes 
government’s fees upon unsuccessful litigants who challenge perceived 
government wrongdoing, vastly departs from the trepidatious balancing 
of rights recognized as essential in Palazzo. It does not involve balancing 
respective individual rights at all. Even if it did, the legislative balancing 
of rights against government interests is suspect where protections of 
statutory rights go beyond reasonable time, place and manner 
considerations and serve instead to prevent or inhibit citizen expression 
and interaction with elected officials and the marketplace of ideas, or to 
insulate government agents from citizen input and accountability. 
The Supreme Court recognized in Noerr, courts should not 
lightly impute to the Legislature the intent to infringe upon petition 
rights.84 In this regard, anti-SLAPP statutes, short of being found 
unconstitutional, can - consistent with their purpose and history - be 
construed to comply with the First Amendment’s petition clause.85     A 
 
 
79 Id at 1220. 
80 (1992) 504 U.S. 191. 
81 Id. at 198. 
82 The Court identified the implication of three First Amendment concerns: “regulation of 
political speech, regulation of speech in a public forum, and regulation based on the content of the 
speech.”   Id. 196-198. 
83 Id. at 208. 
84 Id. at 137-138. 
85 The canon of constitutional avoidance would prevent such an outcome: “[W]here an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court 
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
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judicial determination that anti-SLAPP protection does not apply to any 
or all government activity literally described by the statute’s terms or that 
anti-SLAPP statutes do not permit fee awards and other sanctions in 
favor of government, should not require dismantling of other, socially 
beneficial aspects of an anti-SLAPP law.86 
 
B. RISE OF THE ABOMINATION—DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW 
EXTENDING ANTI-SLAPP PROTECTION TO GOVERNMENT 
 
Prior to Vargas v. City of Salinas (Vargas I) a peculiar body of 
California authority had emerged that improperly treated government 
activity as enjoying First Amendment protection without giving due 
consideration to whether government has rights or to the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine. 87 Nadel v. Regents of University of California, a 
defamation case against a government agent, was the first case to imply 
the First Amendment lends protection to government speech.88 
Subsequently, the Second District, Division Six, in Bradbury v. 
Superior Court, relying on Nadel, was the first case to hold governments 
are “persons” who could use the anti-SLAPP statute.89 Bradbury also 
relied   upon   Nizam-Aldine   v.   City   of   Oakland90     for   the   dubious 
 
 
 
intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council 
(1988) 485 U.S. 568, 575; see also, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi. (1979) 440 
U..S. 490, 499-501; Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529 
U.S. 765, 787; People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667. 
86 Courts have not always followed the doctrine of constitutional avoidance with regard to anti- 
SLAPP procedures conflicting with constitutional rights. In addressing an anti-SLAPP conflict with 
the constitutional right to have factual determinations made by a jury, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire invalidated that state's law: "A solution cannot strengthen the constitutional rights of one 
group of citizens by infringing upon the rights of another group." Opinion of the Justices (N.H. 
1994) 641 A.2d 1012, 1015. 
87 Vargas v. City of Salinas, 46 Cal. 4th 1 (Cal. 2009) [hereinafter Vargas I]. 
88 Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). Nadel, in 
actuality, did not hold anything more than that because an employee was entitled to the First 
Amendment protections outlined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), the 
employee’s public agency employer should likewise enjoy comparable protections. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court sensitively balanced competing interests involving citizen rights and 
government power in that limited scenario.  Id. at 1268-1269.  The New York Times rationale does 
not warrant extending First Amendment protection to government defendants. New York Times 
protected criticism of government officials, not the officials themselves. It did so, in part, because 
government agents enjoy privileges against liability. Nadel’s “primary concern” was its second 
ground—i.e., protecting government employees’ rights. Yet this rationale  was  undermined  by 
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 547 U.S. 410, 426, and subsequent cases recognizing that speech by 
employees in their individual capacity is protected by the First Amendment, but speech in their 
official capacity is not.  E.g., Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2007). 
89 Bradbury v. Super. Ct, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
90 Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 47 Cal. App. 4th 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
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proposition  that  the  First  Amendment  protects  government  speech  in 
respondeat superior situations.91 
The same panel of the Second District that decided Bradbury then 
decided Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara.92 
Mission Oaks concerned a property developer’s suit against a county for 
wrongfully denying a development permit, and found that First 
Amendment protection was afforded to a government agency as well as 
its contractors under section 425.16.93 Neither case engaged in any 
substantive consideration of whether constitutional protection is properly 
afforded to government entities, nor considered the impact of fee awards 
in favor of government agents upon petition rights. 
Schroeder v. City of Irvine was the only published case that came 
close to confronting the issue of whether general petition rights are 
impaired by an anti-SLAPP fee award to government.94  Schroeder 
reached a conclusion regarding the imposition on petition rights that is 
contrary to Bozek and the Noerr-Pennington line of cases. Schroeder did 
not determine that the importance of petition rights pales in comparison 
to the objectives of section 425.16; rather, the court accepted a curious 
concession that the First Amendment protected the government conduct 
at issue.95 In effect, the court treated the petitioning activity as in conflict 
with the constitutional rights of another citizen. 
Consequently, given  this odd twist, the Schroeder Court  did not 
regard the activity as immune.96 It, therefore, did not evaluate the 
burdening of petitioning conduct in terms of the treatment afforded 
general petitioning in Bozek. In terms of weighing governmental 
interests against petition rights, the scale was not loaded properly. 
Constitutional rights of equivalent dimension sat on both sides of the 
scale and the court did not need to undertake the “sham” analysis, or 
consider whether a compelling state interest was involved.97 The court 
was simply weighing coequal private constitutional rights in terms of a 
government regulation incidentally interfering with one right in order to 
protect the other right. 
 
 
 
 
91 See Bradbury, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1115 -1116 (reasoning “Petitioners had a First 
Amendment right to keep the public informed, issue the report, respond to media questions, and ask 
other law enforcement agencies to conduct their own investigation.”). 
92 Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998).  
93 Id. at 729. 
94 Schroeder v. City of Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
95 Id. at 183 n.3; San Ramon Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n, 
125 Cal. App. 4th 343, 356 (125 Cal. App. 4th 2004). 
96 Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 197. 
97 Id. at 196-197. 
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For this reason, Schroeder evaluated the rights of the petitioners in 
light of the standard adopted in Simpson v. Municipal Court.98 Simpson 
pitted the rights of picketers against the interest of the state legislature to 
ensure the quality of its deliberative process and the right of others to 
avoid an oppressive atmosphere that would chill their speech.99   In light 
of the countervailing rights at stake, the court in Simpson (as recounted 
in Schroeder) declined to enforce the picketers’ “‘freedom of speech in 
disregard of the rights of others.’”100 
With regard to gauging the narrowness of the anti-SLAPP statute’s 
tailoring, the court in Schroeder did not depart from this countervailing 
rights approach: 
 
Simpson upheld the law because it banned all picketers equally and 
without regard to the content of their message, was narrowly tailored 
to achieve legitimate and substantial governmental interests, and 
banned only a narrow type of picketing while omitting other forms of 
picketing from its ambit. The same analysis convinces us that section 
425.16, subdivision (c) is valid. The attorney fee clause applies to all 
unmeritorious lawsuits premised on acts taken in furtherance of the 
defendant’s constitutional rights of petition or free speech, regardless 
of the point of view espoused by the plaintiff. It applies only to that 
narrow category of lawsuits against governmental entities that are 
premised on acts taken in furtherance of the defendant’s rights of 
speech,  and  leaves  untouched  any  other  type  of  lawsuit  against 
governmental  entities.101 
 
Thus, Schroeder must be limited to its unusual facts where a 
government entity was qua citizen, exercising a constitutionally, rather 
than a statutorily protected speech right. Schroeder skipped the essential 
Noerr-Pennington “sham” analysis and overlooked the significant fact 
that fee awards to government defendants discourage the exercise of 
general petition rights. 102    The decision did not analyze the narrowness 
of the tailoring of the statute in terms of the feasibility of narrow drafting 
of the anti-SLAPP statute—whether it could have accomplished its 
purpose without burdening petition rights. It did not analyze whether 
allowing use of the statute by or a fee award in favor of a government 
entity was valid or essential to fulfilling anti-SLAPP purposes. 
 
 
 
98 Id.; see also Simpson v. Mun. Ct., 14 Cal.App.3d 591 (1971). 
99 Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 196. 
100 Id. at 196-197 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 
941 (Cal. 1970). 
101 Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 197 (emphasis and italics supplied) (citation omitted). 
102 Id. 
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Relying upon Bradbury, other California courts propped up a 
precarious house of cards by stating that government entities are entitled 
to First Amendment protections and are, therefore, entitled to proceed 
under section 425.16.103 
 
C.CONFABULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE WITH 
A “RIGHT” 
 
Post-Bradbury, there was a judicial muddling of the First 
Amendment protected right to free speech and the government speech 
doctrine that pervaded the reasoning of some of the cases that followed. 
The two concepts are separate. Confounding them is a result of their 
similarity inasmuch as they both involve expression. There is no textual 
support for a government “right” to free speech from the  First 
Amendment, which speaks in terms of forbidding the State from 
abridging speech rights.104 Framing the First Amendment in terms of 
listener interests, which might permit the bootstrapping of government 
speech, is likewise not supported by the language of the Bill of Rights, 
because those rights are cast as possessed by speakers, not listeners.105 
In addition, the notion runs against the grain of basic Constitutional 
principles. The Constitution speaks in terms of powers and rights. 
Conceptually, people have rights and relinquish them to grant powers to 
government. Rights run in favor of persons, citizens, and states, and 
protect against encroachments by the federal government and (after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment) by non-federal governmental 
agencies. In contrast are powers that are vested  in  government  and 
limited by rights and structural checks and balances. The correct 
conceptualization of the constitutional source of government speech is 
that it is a power, not a right.106   Because the constitutional basis for 
 
 
 
103 See e. g. Santa Barbara Cnty. Coalition Against Auto. Subsidies v. Santa Barbara Cnty. 
Assn. of Gov’ts, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), (citing Bradbury, 49 Cal. App. 
4th at 1114 (holding “government agencies and  their  representatives  have  First  Amendment 
rights . . .”)); see also, Visher v. City of Malibu, 126 Cal.App.4th 364 fn.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); 
Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1247-1248 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Rather 
than addressing the basic paradox in extending rights-based protection to government actions and 
considering the ramifications for general petition rights, the cases, like an echo-chamber, simply 
bolstered their conclusions by mere citation to Bradbury and the cases relying upon it. 
104 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
1637, 1641 (2006) (“Courts and commentators alike have long dismissed the notion that the Speech 
Clause could serve as a source of constitutional protection for government speech.”). 
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . .”). 
106 Confusion is perhaps exacerbated by ill-chosen judicial verbiage referencing government’s 
power to speak as a “freedom” or “right” (E.g, “Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government 
could function if it lacked this freedom. “( Summum. at         ) ; “A government entity has the right to 
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allowing government speech is not the First Amendment, the underlying 
principles are not the same.107 
This is not to say that government has no constitutional ability to 
speak.108 The government  speech doctrine recognizes that, consistent 
with principles of popular sovereignty, government agents are able to 
promote policies that are a product of the electorate’s choice—including 
social, economic, political, and other agendas109.  But this does not entail 
a First Amendment right.110 
 
D. ONE SOURCE OF CONFUSION IS REPLACED BY ANOTHER—ANTI- 
SLAPP PROTECTION FOR GOVERNMENT SPEECH THAT “SOUNDS 
LIKE” PRIVATE SPEECH 
 
In 2009, the California supreme court in Vargas I undid much of the 
damage wrought by Bradbury and its misconceived progeny. It pulled 
away the premise that government’s conduct at issue involved the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. It did so by holding that  the 
language of the anti-SLAPP statute applies to government agents 
engaging in activities listed in subsection (e) of the statute irrespective of 
whether government entities have First Amendment rights.111 In 
addition, the court declined to lend protection to all governmental 
activity within the penumbra of subsection (e).112 
 
 
 
“speak for itself.” (Summum at 
529 U. S. 217, 229 (2000) ). 
, citing Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 
107 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (holding 
that, compared to the speech of private speakers, a government agency’s own speech is “controlled 
by [very] different principles.”). 
108 In this regard, speech is no different than any other governmental ability to promote 
policies. For the states, the ability derives from the police power. For the federal government—at 
least since 1937—this comes from the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3.) as amplified 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause (U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.18; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. 316 (1819).). 
109 Just as government “as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or 
other exactions binding on protesting parties,” it follows that, “Within this broader principle it seems 
inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to 
advocate and defend its policies.”  Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217, 229 (2000). 
110 Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n, 863 F.2d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Muir v. 
Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (“While the first 
amendment does not protect government speech, it ‘does not prohibit the government, itself, from 
speaking, nor require the government to speak. Similarly, the first amendment does not preclude the 
government from exercising editorial control over its own medium of expression.’ “ (citation 
omitted))). 
111 Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 17. 
112 Id. (recognizing section 425.16’s protection for statements and writings of governmental 
agents “on matters of public interest and concern” when protection would exist where “such 
statements were made by a private individual or entity.” (emphasis added)). 
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The Vargas I court recognized the anti-SLAPP statute’s ambiguity 
with regard to the failure to differentiate “between (1) statements by 
private individuals or entities that are made in the designated contexts or 
with respect to the specified subjects, and (2) statements by 
governmental entities or public officials acting in their official capacity 
that are made in these same contexts or with respect to these same 
subjects.”113 The court declined to examine the legislative history of 
section 425.16 when it was enacted in 1997, to resolve the ambiguity as 
to whether the Legislature sought to bestow anti-SLAPP protection on 
government agents and the extent of that protection.114 
The Vargas I court sought to resolve the difficulty by construing 
subsection (e) to cover such statements “without regard to whether the 
statements are made by private individuals or by governmental entities or 
officials.”115 This was not exactly taking the bull by the horns. It is 
questionable whether the answer is not more ambiguous than the 
ambiguity it “resolved.” Here is why: If private individuals’ speech 
potentially constitutes an exercise of rights protected by section 425.16 
while government speech does not, their statements cannot be treated 
alike in terms of the First Amendment balance. 
 
 
 
 
113 Id. at 18. 
114 Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 18-19, n.9. Such examination would follow the statutory 
interpretive technique identified by the state supreme Court: “'If the language permits more than one 
reasonable interpretation . . . the court looks ‘to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible 
objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a 
part.’[Citations omitted].” Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
309, 316. It is apparent that the Legislature never initially contemplated making Section 425.16 
available to government. In reality, this was a leap made by the judiciary in Bradbury, supra.  Such 
an expansive application of use of the anti-SLAPP motion to strike – beyond that contemplated by 
its progenitors (Supra, n.20) – would certainly have evidenced some indication the Legislature gave 
this notion serious consideration. Yet there is nothing to suggest this occurred and every indication 
instead that the Legislature did not imagine it might be allowing government agents to use the 
procedure against citizens. The court in Vargas I noted that legislation occurring after courts had 
ruled that government entities could avail themselves of the anti-SLAPP statute reflected the 
Legislature’s acknowledgment that courts had already extended section 425.16’s protection to 
government. The enactment of section 425.18 occurred in 2005. The 1997 amendment to section 
425.16 was designed to specifically include pleadings besides a complaint; to specifically include 
conduct as well as words; and to counteract the narrow construction of the act given by some courts. 
(See, Zhou v. Wong (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1114; Briggs v. Eden Council, etc. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 
1237) However, the Legislature’s expression of intent behind the 1997 amendment indicates its 
insertion of a broad construction to be given the anti-SLAPP provisions was for the purpose of 
furthering constitutional rights, not all manner of other conduct without constitutional significance. 
SB 1296 states that Chapter 271, enacted in August 1997, was an act to revise the statement of 
legislative intent to “specify that the section is applicable to any conduct in furtherance of the 
constitutional right of petition or of speech in connection with a public issue.” (emphasis added). 
115 Id. at 18. 
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Without engaging in any analysis, the court cautiously limited the 
protection afforded government to that commensurate with the protection 
enjoyed by citizens: 
 
[W]e believe it is clear, in light of both the language and purpose of 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, that the statutory remedy afforded by 
section 425.16 extends to statements and writings of governmental 
entities and public officials on matters of public interest and concern 
that would fall within the scope of the statute if such statements were 
made by a private individual or entity.116 
 
How this approach should work is an enigma. The court provided no 
explanation other than the facts in Vargas I itself.117 In effect, the court 
seemed to limit the anti-SLAPP protection afforded governmental 
activities to the  same situations affording  protection to  statements  by 
private actors.118   Thus, perfunctory government activity that would not 
be performed by a private individual—government doing what 
government does—would  not seem to be covered.119 
Ostensibly, Vargas I pulled First Amendment protection out from 
under government speech while simultaneously holding that government 
conduct is covered by section 425.16. Understanding the inherent 
contradiction in the problematic methodology for judicial application of 
this fuzzy pronouncement is illuminated through the lens of the “arising 
from” language of the statute. At the point Vargas I was decided, a well 
developed and consistent body of decisions had elaborated the manner in 
which courts were to analyze this prong one question requiring that the 
 
 
116 Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
117 Id. at 40. The Vargas I facts are far from illuminating in terms of how to ascertain when a 
governmental statement would be protected if made by a private citizen. The case involved a 
lawsuit challenging allegedly improper government expenditures to favor one side on a ballot issue. 
Id. at 36. Under the formula provided in Cotati and Navellier, that should have been the underlying 
basis for liability. The Court instead focused upon the fact that the pre-election expenditures were 
for government speech via a city newsletter, website and leaflets. Id. at 37. Had  the  city’s 
expenditures been devoid of communication—involving directly providing public  resources  or 
money to one faction in the election—presumably §425.16 would not apply. In terms of the 
communications being “made by a private individual,” it is hard to say how the Court was applying 
this approach to the website and other communications involved. It is one thing to say a private 
citizen might maintain a website or distribute a leaflet opining upon an election issue. It is another 
matter to go beyond the similarities in form and to say that a private citizen’s exercise of rights is 
substantively the same as that involved in government speech. This is especially so when the 
operative wrong is the use of public funds for government speech to counter private speech. 
118 See Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 17. 
119 This would be comparable to the treatment accorded bureaucratic conduct by private 
sector actors – reports, claims, investigations, administrative proceedings, hiring decisions and 
communications and advertisements – which is not covered by §425.16. See notes 273 and 295, 
supra (compiling private bureaucratic function cases not covered because no First Amendment 
activity is implicated.) 
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plaintiff’s claim arise from First Amendment  activity.  The  question 
which will be explored in part VII of this article, is whether application 
of the “arising from” methodology provides any focal aid in figuring out 
when, if ever, government actions, bereft of First Amendment stature, 
have anti-SLAPP protection. 
 
IV. THE BURDEN ON GENERAL PETITIONING IMPOSED BY 
GOVERNMENT USE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AGAINST 
PETITIONING CITIZENS 
 
A. PENALIZING UNSUCCESSFUL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
 
In terms of public interest litigation the chill upon general 
petitioning from government use of anti-SLAPP statutes is  especially 
harsh and inimical to fundamental constitutional values. Critical public 
interest legal success is generally only achieved after arduous appellate 
litigation. Whether the potential burden of a fee award and/or other 
sanctions is $30,000 or $1,000,000, the effect upon a private citizen with 
average income or a struggling grassroots organization is identical – the 
prospect dampens, if not drowns, civic spirit and deters socially 
beneficial litigation. 
Challenges to established legal doctrine often depend upon the body 
of law into which litigants venture, resting on shifting  sands.  The 
zealous advocacy required of120 public interest attorneys to challenge and 
overturn stale doctrine is nullified by a standard that subjects counsel and 
clients to a challenged government agency’s fees and penalties.121   Public 
 
 
 
 
120 People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal.3d 616, 631 (1983). (“When statutory provisions have not yet 
been interpreted in a definitive way, principled advocacy is to be prized, not punished.”); Jerman v. 
Carlisle, McNellie, 559 U.S. 597 (2010) (Kennedy J., dissenting). Uncertainty means that those 
desiring to test the bounds of government compliance with such a statute within the bounds of 
zealous advocacy—a margin set at “frivolous” under ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 3.1 (2009), not “meritless” —are deterred from doing so. 
121 In this light, the following handful of significant public interest lawsuits should be 
considered: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (challenging laws adopted during 
official legislative proceedings enacting a “separate but equal” policy for public schools); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (challenging an official statement (loyalty oath) required by California 
for a veteran to be eligible for a tax exemption); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (challenging 
state sanctioned recitation of a prayer in public schools); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (challenging a state law requiring the reading of biblical  passages  in  public 
schools); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (challenging a federal statute requiring 
the post office to not deliver and to destroy mail containing statements deemed communist 
propaganda); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393, U.S. 503 (1969) (challenging a 
school district’s ban on armbands in a public school); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
(challenging government statutes criminalizing desecration of the flag); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (challenging a statute banning display of any symbol “that arouses anger, alarm 
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
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interest litigants who may be able to assess whether a lawsuit passes 
muster as non-frivolous under the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity cannot evaluate in advance the likelihood of  judicial 
acceptance of the legal merits of a cutting-edge lawsuit. Important cases 
would have certainly been severely discouraged and likely would never 
have been brought had litigants willing to take the risk of challenging the 
government action in question also faced the additional risk of an Anti- 
SLAPP motion and the burden of a fee award in favor of the government 
agency involved.122 
Encouraging public interest litigation is the legislatively sanctioned 
public policy objective. The California Legislature has enacted  a 
plethora of statutes designed specifically to promote and protect citizen 
petitioning in the form of litigation challenging government conduct.123 
Such statutes exemplify the acceptance of a policy embracing the 
significance of public interest litigation. A two-faced scheme of 
promoting such activity by rewarding citizens who succeed in advancing 
 
 
 
U.S. 577 (1992) (challenging prayers led by religious figures at public school graduation 
ceremonies); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (challenging a local ordinance 
prohibiting yard signs); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 514 U.S. 573 (1995) (challenging a 
government required statement (loyalty oath) required as a condition of employment in the public 
schools); Legal Svcs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 535 (2001) (challenging a legislatively adopted 
restriction upon the speech of legal services attorneys). 
122   Qualifying cases, like those recited in the foregoing footnote, involve government 
statements in the form of laws, religious endorsements or counter-speech policies made in the course 
of legislative or other official proceedings or concerning public issues or matters of public interest. 
In each of the recited cases, the government had an interest in promoting its policies by means of 
making statements or by suppression of speech critical to those policies. Each government statement 
would fall within the protected activities covered by California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. (Code 
Civ.Proc. §425.16(e).) 
123 One of California’s legislative efforts to rein in abusive use of its anti-SLAPP statute was a 
provision exempting some public interest litigation. (Cal.Code Civ.Proc. §425.17) It may have zero 
application to actions targeting government defendants. In Vargas I, the exemption was raised. The 
trial court ruled that since anything government does is "political" the government expenditure 
involved in Vargas I fell under an exception to the public interest exemption for "political works." 
The court of appeal affirmed - basically holding for all intents and purposes that section 425.17 is 
never going to apply to a lawsuit against government because government's work is "political." On 
appeal, the state supreme court completely ignored section 425.17, although it was clearly raised as 
an issue and briefed. In Vargas II, section 425.17 was again raised – this time as to the anti-SLAPP 
fee award question. Although the Supreme Court’s grant of review in Vargas I had vacated the court 
of appeal’s earlier decision and did not even address the section 425.17 question, the court of appeal 
held the section 425.17 defense was "law of the case" and did not recant, reconsider or reiterate its 
earlier ruling that the political exception to the public interest exemption prevented public interest 
litigants from relying upon section 425.17 in a motion to strike brought by a government agency.  Id. 
at 1341. The point of all this is that Vargas I, Vargas II and Peninsula Guardians, Inc. v. Peninsula 
Health Care Dist., 200 Cal.App.4th 1108 (2011 Cal.), now stand for the unsettling proposition that 
§425.17 does not preclude government agencies from using section 425.16 against public interest 
litigants or from obtaining fee awards against them. Compare, City of Carmel v. Bd. of Supervisors, 
183 Cal. App. 3d 229 (1986 Cal.) (recognizing that Section 1021.5, providing for private attorney 
general fee awards “applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities” Id. at 254- 
256). 
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an important public interest through litigation, but punishing efforts that 
fail, ultimately discourages such litigation.124 Certainly, it departs from 
the dual standard approach esteemed by the U.S. Supreme Court after 
Christiansburg. 
California has consistently treated expansively the remedy afforded 
the public by taxpayer litigation such as suits challenging  perceived 
misuse of public funds.125 The California Supreme Court unanimously 
recognized the importance of taxpayer challenges to government action 
in Blair v. Pitchess, stating that the primary purpose of section 526(a) “is 
‘to enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action 
which would otherwise go unchallenged in  the courts because of the 
standing requirement.’”126 It is essential to encourage such litigation, not 
discourage it. 127 
The significance of public interest litigation is tied to basic 
functional considerations of constitutional governance in as much as it is 
a plain device for ensuring government accountability to the citizenry. 
 
B. ATTORNEYS FEES AND THE HISTORIC PROCESS OF UNBURDENING 
THE PETITION RIGHT 
 
The concern with imposition of penalties for petitioning activity is 
one of the paramount features in the history of the emergence of the 
petition right, and predates the Norman conquest.   In his article on the 
 
 
 
124  Whether imposition of fees upon the public interest litigant occurs via a separate lawsuit or 
a motion in the initial litigation, the “chilling effect” (Bozek at 538) upon petitioning is the same. 
The secondary effect of malpractice suits against the SLAPP plaintiff’s counsel is no differrent. 
Moneer, James, Two SLAPPs Don’t Make A Right (2007) 20 Cal. Litigation No.1,16,20-21. The 
same basic access to justice considerations recognized in Bozek apply to both fee-shifting and 
malicious prosecution awards of fees: “Access to the courts would be illusory if plaintiffs were 
denied counsel of their choice because attorneys feared being held liable as insurers of the quality of 
their clients’ cases. Few attorneys would be willing to prosecute close and difficult matters and 
virtually none would dare challenge the propriety of established legal doctrines.” 1 Mallen & Smith, 
Legal Malpractice (1996 4th ed.) §6.9, pp.416-417. 
125 See Ronald K. L. Collins and Robert M. Myers, The Public Interest Litigant in California: 
Observations on Taxpayers’ Actions, 10 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329, 336 (1977). 
126 Blair  v.  Pitchess, 5 Cal.  3d 258, 267-268 (Cal.  1971) (citation  omitted). See,  also., 
Humane Society of the United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 152 Cal. App. 4th 349, 355 (Cal 
Ct. App. 2007) (citing Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 79 Cal. 
App. 4th 1223, 1240. (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)) 
127 Collins & Myers, supra note 122, at 355. (“In a very real sense, the success or failure of 
modern democratic government depends in part on the existence of such public-minded citizens. As 
public guardians they help ensure that the rule of law will be preserved . . . The time, effort, and 
potential expense of public interest litigation all render it particularly unappealing to the fanciful 
dabbler in social causes. On the other hand, legal barriers in areas such as standing, remedial relief, 
and attorney’s fees may create a wall too high for even the public-minded to scale . . . our state laws 
should continue to encourage social input from the public interest litigant so that once litigated the 
best interests of the public may prevail.”). 
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Petition Clause, Norman Smith relates that the earliest petition in 
recorded Anglo-American history was the nobles’ petition to Aethelred 
the Unready in 1013.128 The King responded by promising  not  to 
retaliate against the petitioners and to remedy their grievances.129 The 
article goes on to chronicle in detail the emergence of the petition right 
and the efforts to protect it from being burdened.130 
Early in Anglo-American judicial history, the losing party to a 
lawsuit paid the penalty of losing their tongue upon the view that false 
swearing—an aggravated form  of defamation—was  a  wrong  meriting 
that sanction.131 Gradually,  English law replaced that burden  with  a 
fine.132 Later still, the loser paid compensation to the winner, not to the 
King.133 In 1278, only the  victorious  plaintiff  could  recover  fees.134 
After another two centuries, a defendant could recover fees in certain 
instances.135 Only by 1607 could the defendant recover fees on the same 
basis as the plaintiff—the present English rule.136 
Fee-shifting statutes represent a legislative determination to 
encourage or discourage certain litigation.  At times such statutes permit 
a certain level of equitable discretion by the trial court in making such 
awards. Other times the award is mandatory, as is the case with section 
425.16. The development of fee-shifting practices in the American 
colonies was strongly colored by colonial distaste for lawyers.137 This 
was reflected in a resultant legislative bent towards restricting fees, both 
the fees an attorney could charge a client and the fees that could be 
recovered from another party.138 In short, the colonial attitude perceived 
fees as a burden on citizens’ access to justice and regarded it as 
appropriate to prevent or limit them in order to enhance that freedom. 
The American Rule disfavoring fee-shifting was framed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in terms of a national policy choice to avoid burdening 
 
 
 
128 Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . ..”: An Analysis of the Neglected, 
But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1986). 
129 Id. at 1154-1155 (“[W]hether petitioners will be punished for their statements, and whether 
petitioners have the prerogative of instructing or commanding action of the government – have been 
the central features of the history of petitioning. Over the course of time, the former has been 
resolved in petitioners’ favor, and the latter against them.”). 
130 Id. at 1158-1167, 1170-1177. 
131 Carol Rice Andrews, After BE&K: The “Difficult Constitutional Question” of Defining the 
First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUST. L. REV. 1299, 1350 (2003). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1350-1351 
134 Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 853 (1929) 
135 Id. 
136 Andrews, supra note 128, at 1350-1351. 
137 Id. at 1351 n.292 
138 Id. 
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access to justice through the courts. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp.v. 
Maier Brewing Co., the Court spoke in terms of the uncertainty of 
litigation, and stated that “the poor might be unjustly discouraged from 
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing 
included the fees of opposing counsel.”139 
The flipside to the American Rule, generally eschewing the burden 
imposed upon access to justice created by awarding fees, is that some 
litigation is favored by the Legislature. Chief among such  favored 
lawsuits is public interest litigation. Eight years after Fleischman, in 
Alyeska Pipeline Svc. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y.,140 the Court reaffirmed 
the American Rule and held that the power to depart from the rule and 
determine fee-shifting was that of the Legislature.141 The Court 
addressed an environmental group that brought suit to prevent issuance 
of permits to build an Alaskan pipeline.142 As a result of the 
organization’s litigation efforts, Congress stepped in and changed the 
law.143 Lo and behold, the legislative change embodied the very relief 
sought by the environmental public interest activists, but also mooted the 
issues of the lawsuit.144 
In applying the American Rule and deferring to the Legislative 
branch, the Court in Alyeska held that it could not award fees absent 
statutory authority.145 It refused to fashion an equitable remedy  by 
allowing the environmentalists to obtain an award of fees for the 
achievements obtained as a direct product of their lawsuit.146 
 
 
 
139 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
140 Alyeska Pipeline Svc. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
141 Id. at 270-271. 
142 Id. at 242-243. 
143 Id. at 244. 
144 Id. at 245. 
145 Id. at 269-270 
146 Id. Congress then responded to Alyeska by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Award Acts. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. While the purpose of the Act was to allow a party to recover fees 
without formally obtaining an award of relief (see, S. REP. 94-1011, 5, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 
5912; HR Rep. 94-1558 (1976) at 7) this was all for naught (see, Buckhannon Board and Care 
Home, Inc. v. West (2001) 532 U.S. 598). Buckhannon presented a situation analogous to Alyeska. A 
pending lawsuit prompted a state legislature to repeal a disputed law. The plaintiff sought fees now 
armed with the new law. But the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the “impact” or “catalyst” approach 
and held there could be no fee award unless there is a judicial sanction. In doing so, the Court relied 
upon a legalistic understanding of “prevailing” rather than the common comprehension that 
prevailing means one who achieves their objective.  In California, however, the state Supreme Court 
in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2005) 34 Cal.4th 553, rejected the legalistic/formalistic 
approach of Buckhannon and accepted an impact / catalyst approach. The Court stated that the rule 
as to prevailing under that state’s statute is not one of who obtained relief or a favorable judgment, 
but one involving assessment of the broader social implications of a party’s accomplishment from 
the litigation. 
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Statutory fee-shifting between private litigants raises no 
constitutional problem because the parties can expect to pay the winner’s 
fees as an ordinary incident of certain litigation. A dual standard for 
awarding fees designed to promote certain worthy litigation also presents 
no problem after Christiansburg. On the other side of the scale from the 
statutory right to fees in Alyeska was the judicial petition, not the 
paramount general petition right. 
Government use of anti-SLAPP statutes against challenges to its 
actions, however, presents a different balance and involves a different 
level of deference to legislative judgment. As revealed  by  Snyder147 
courts have no duty to cow tow to legislative assessments of the relative 
worth of individual rights in relation to governmental interests. They do 
have a constitutional duty, recognized in Marbury v. Madison to act to 
prevent legislative actions that impinge upon constitutional rights. 
 
C. THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION TO BE ACCORDED THE 
EARNEST BUT ERRANT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANT 
 
With litigation between private parties, we are just talking about 
shifting costs. In constitutional terms, petitioning government is 
fundamentally different from suing someone for a contractual breach or a 
tort.148 It is not typical, nor appropriate, to saddle an aggrieved citizen 
with government’s fees just because the citizen is doing exactly what we 
want to encourage them to do—earnestly challenging a questionable 
governmental action—even though the citizen litigant happens to be a bit 
off-base, gauged by judicial considerations. 149 
The California Supreme Court in Bozek indicated it would defer to 
the legislative branch in the case of legal disputes between private 
litigants.150 But when it came to a prevailing government party, it would 
only defer up to the point tolerated by the constitutional “sham” 
exception to general petition immunity.151 Where an anti-SLAPP 
statute’s objective is protection of individual constitutional rights, not the 
protection of government activity from citizen scrutiny, this protection of 
 
 
147 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (U.S. 2011). 
148 This is not to say that government cannot act in the same manner as a private citizen in 
terms of contracting, for example as an employer. It is just that causes of action arising out of such 
private relations do not involve the participatory conduct sought to be protected by anti-SLAPP 
statutes. 
149   White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing, citizens should not be 
penalized for “doing what citizens should be encouraged to do, taking an active role in the decisions of 
government." (citation omitted)). 
150 City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 538 (Cal. 1982), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983), opinion reiterated, City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 33 Cal. 3d 727, 
728, (Cal. 1983). 
151 Id. 
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constitutional rights enshrined by the First Amendment may also weigh 
in favor of the fee-shifting. However, government agents have no rights, 
instead they have powers and can only claim statutory protection under 
anti-SLAPP statutes. Where the litigant challenging government action 
has guaranteed Constitutional rights the balancing is simple: the 
individual’s rights must prevail over the governmental interests.  Absent 
a “sham” or a compelling interest, plaintiffs should be immune from any 
burden upon their right to seek redress from their government. 
Courts have not unequivocally regarded the burden imposed by fee- 
shifting in favor of a government defendant as warranting Noerr- 
Pennington immunity. Christiansburg’s analysis of the burden imposed 
by fee-shifting to government turned upon congressional intent in 
seeking to encourage public interest litigation.152 The Court’s approach 
did not entail both subjective and objective components of the “sham” 
exception to Noerr-Pennington to allow a fee award  to  stand. 
Subsequent lower court cases applying the dual standard, however, 
invoked an access to justice analysis tethered to petition rights 
considerations of the “chilling effect” upon such activity.153 The dual 
standard is accepted in California as well to achieve “the avoidance of 
undue chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’  rights.”154  But  a 
petition rights analysis applying the Noerr-Pennington standard to fee 
awards after BE & K is not found. 
Legislative and social policy objectives encourage and reward 
public interest litigation, and protect petition rights from being chilled. 
A position that anti-SLAPP statutes should discourage public interest 
litigation by imposing a fee-shifting scheme awarding fees against 
unsuccessful public interest litigants is inconsistent with such objectives, 
departing from the well–accepted approach that has prevailed since 
Christiansburg. A scheme of promoting such activity by  rewarding 
citizens who succeed in advancing an important public interest through 
litigation, but punishing such efforts that fail, ultimately discourages 
socially beneficial litigation. 
 
 
 
152 Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 420. 
153 See, e.g., Stenseth v. Greater Fort Worth, 673 F.2d 842,848-849 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding 
courts are reluctant to award attorney’s fees against plaintiffs undertaking to enforce their 
constitutional rights); see also U.S. Steel v. U.S., 519 F.2d 359, 364-365 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that 
a routine allowance of attorney fees to successful defendants in discrimination suits might 
effectively discourage suits in all but the clearest cases, and inhibit earnest advocacy on undecided 
issues); see also Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717, 720 (N. D. Cal. 1979) (“This Court is mindful of 
the possibly chilling effect an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant may have upon 
other potential plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their civil rights.”). 
154 Benson v. Greitzer, 220 Cal. App. 3d 11, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); see also Bach v. Cnty. 
of Butte, 215 Cal. App. 3d 294, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
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D. VARGAS II –REJECTION OF THE APPLICATION OF NOERR- 
PENNINGTON IMMUNITY 
 
Notwithstanding the decision in Schroeder, no appellate court had 
addressed the  burden  upon  petition rights imposed  by interpreting an 
anti-SLAPP statute as protecting the activity of government actors until 
Vargas v. City of Salinas [hereinafter Vargas II].155 Vargas II ensued 
from a city’s fee motion after the California Supreme Court upheld the 
city’s use of section 425.16 against concerned citizens who sued to 
challenge the city’s expenditures to promote defeat of a tax revenue 
reduction  ballot  measure.156  Although  the  plaintiffs  successfully 
defeated the city’s “express advocacy” policy for expending funds on 
electioneering, and clarified the legal standard applicable to the propriety 
of the expenditures, the court held that plaintiffs had failed to establish a 
probability of prevailing on the merits even under  the  clarified 
standard.157 
On remand, the city was awarded over $225,000 in fees against the 
two private citizens.158 The public interest litigants had likely saved city 
and state taxpayers millions of dollars and advanced the integrity of the 
electoral process by preventing government expenditures to distort the 
fair and unimpaired decision of voters at the polls. The plaintiffs 
appealed, asserting use of the anti-SLAPP statute to impose the burden of 
the government agency’s fees chills the constitutional right to petition.159 
The court rejected the petition rights immunity challenge.160 
The court’s holding that a Noerr-Pennington analysis was 
inapplicable deserves scrutiny. The court acknowledged that the fee- 
shifting at issue potentially discourages petitioning activity.161 However, 
the court reasoned that imposing “costs of a suit” is not the same as 
imposing “civil liability” for bringing suit.162 The decision analogizes 
the burden involved in charging private citizens who lose their public 
interest lawsuits against government agents to the foreseeable expenses 
 
 
 
 
 
155 Vargas v. City of Salinas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1331 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 424 (2012) [hereinafter Vargas II]. 
156 Vargas I, 46 Cal. 4th at 8 (reaffirming the standard identified in Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.3d 
206 (1976), holding that based upon their style, timing and tenor, government expenditures relating 
to election contests may be unlawful).. 
157 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1337 
158 Id. at 1338. 
159 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1338. 
160 Id. at 1350. 
161 Id. at 1345. 
162 Id. at 1344. 
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involved in litigation amongst private parties.163 The appropriateness of 
this analogy should depend upon the nature of the right impacted and 
upon the significance of the government interest being advanced. 
 
1. A Fee by Any Other Name Still Smells Like a Burden 
 
The cornerstone of the Vargas II court’s reasoning in rejecting 
application of Noerr-Pennington immunity for  the  petitioning  activity 
was its treatment of the fee award as “costs” rather than “damages.” The 
decision sought to reconcile Bozek with Equilon on the basis that fee- 
shifting statutes—unlike malicious prosecution  judgments—do  not 
impose civil liability.164 Bozek was an action seeking “damages” for 
malicious prosecution.165 Fee-shifting statutes, meanwhile,  impose 
“costs” incurred by a prevailing party in a lawsuit.166 
The petition rights problem with allowing government to seek its 
fees via malicious prosecution lawsuits against its citizens was identified 
by the California Supreme Court in Bozek: 
 
[T]he institution of legitimate as well as baseless legal claims will be 
discouraged . . . .  Allowing cities to  sue for malicious prosecution 
against unsuccessful former plaintiffs would provide the 
municipalities with a sharp tool for retaliation against those who 
pursue legal actions against them. Indeed, it is not unlikely that even 
good faith claimants would forego suit in order to avoid the possibility 
of having to defend against a subsequent malicious prosecution action 
should their action against the city prove unsuccessful.167 
 
The identical concerns with chilling well-founded litigation are entirely 
applicable to government fees awarded by means of a motion. 
Malicious prosecution suits have long been recognized as having a 
chilling effect upon a citizen’s willingness to bring a dispute to court.168 
For this reason the tort is a disfavored cause of action.169 The primary 
objective of abuse of process and malicious prosecution lawsuits is also a 
major  objective  of  one  utilizing  an  anti-SLAPP  statute—to  recover 
 
 
 
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 1345. 
165 Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 530. 
166 Vargas II,  200 Cal. App. 4th at 1344. 
167 Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 535-36. 
168 Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 872 (Cal. 1989) 
169 Id.; Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E.J. Gallo, 76 Cal. App. 4th 970, 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); 
Sebastian v. Crowley, 38 Cal. App. 2d 194, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940). 
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attorney fees and costs racked up as a result of the SLAPP bringer’s 
efforts to sap the financial resources of the SLAPP target.170 
The distinction drawn between damages and costs is relevant in 
other contexts: Malicious prosecution judgments, for example, impose 
civil liability.171 Fee-shifting statutes, meanwhile, impose “costs.” The 
distinction is germane to whether a prevailing defendant may recover 
fees as costs or must bring an independent action seeking them as 
damages. The purpose of damages is compensatory.  Statutory shifting 
of fees as costs can represent a legislative assessment concerning fairness 
and the need to encourage or discourage certain types of litigation.172 
In terms of petition rights, drawing a distinction between costs and 
damages elevates form over substance and misdirects inquiry away from 
the pertinent First Amendment question—whether petitioning is 
burdened. In the First Amendment context, courts must “look through 
forms to the substance” of government conduct.173 
Fee awards are distinguishable from routine cost awards for 
purposes of constitutional analysis. The neutral flat charge for filing a 
lawsuit, like the sales tax in Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of 
Equalization, is “a nominal fee imposed” “to defray the expenses” 
involved in processing judicial petitioning activity.174 It can readily be 
differentiated from the burden on First Amendment freedoms imposed 
by a charge for unsuccessful general petitioning which operates  “to 
inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”175 The latter 
charge is a discriminatory tax upon actual exercise of some persons’— 
but not others’—right to petition government itself. 176 
For Noerr-Pennington analysis, it does not suffice to say that the 
identical burden is constitutionally valid when imposed by the method of 
cost-shifting but not when imposed as a liability. The  distinction 
between “damages” and “costs” is one without a difference in terms of 
result. Neither the appellation nor the means by which the fees are 
imposed makes the burden on rights any less. Whether imposition of 
fees upon the public interest litigant occurs via a separate lawsuit or a 
motion  in  the  initial  litigation,  the  chilling  effect  upon  petitioning  is 
 
 
 
170 See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs 26 
LOY. L. REV. 395, 440–445 (1993) (considering the unusual situations where recovery of other 
economic losses, emotional distress damages and punitive damages occurs in anti-SLAPP lawsuits). 
171 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee-shifting: A Critical Overview, 
1982 Duke L. Journal  651, 659 (1982). 
172 Id. at 652 
173 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963). 
174 Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 387 (1990). 
175 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963). 
176 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
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identical such that there is no constitutionally cognizable difference 
between the two modes of imposing fees upon the citizen litigant. If 
anything, the contrary is true because the protection afforded the litigant 
is reduced when fees are sought via a motion to strike. 177 
Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was developed in the 
context of prosecutions seeking to impose liability for petitioning, the 
First Amendment’s language is plainly not so narrowly drawn.  It applies 
to all laws abridging that right.178 Thus, it includes governmental action 
other than efforts to impose liability. Accordingly, “any impairment of 
the right to petition, including any penalty exacted after the fact, must be 
narrowly drawn.”179Thus, imposition of a fee to address a municipal 
council or to submit a letter to an elected official or government agency 
expressing concerns over a proposed project would be subject to scrutiny 
under Noerr-Pennington, just as the burden of a poll tax would fall under 
similar scrutiny.180 
 
2. Distinguishing Imposition of Costs from Burdens 
 
There is a difference between the cost of exercising a right – the 
expense of printing a leaflet or the gas needed to drive to the voting 
booth – and a burden on a right – the imposition of a franchise tax or a 
prerequisite fee to allow circulation of a leaflet or a charge for crowd 
control to address hostility engendered by one’s message.  For example, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that an indigent person has a 
fundamental right to counsel at trial, but that the cost of a discretionary 
appeal must be borne by the appellant regardless of financial 
wherewithal.181 Likewise, the fact that the Constitution may protect a 
woman’s right to have an abortion does not mean she does not have to 
 
 
 
 
177 There is greater protection afforded a petitioning citizen facing a government lawsuit to 
recoup fees than he or she receives from a motion under an anti-SLAPP statute. There is no 
requirement of malice or improper purpose for an award of fees after an anti-SLAPP motion to strike 
and the protections of a trial, such as the right to a jury, are absent. 
178 The First Amendment is not framed in terms of liability at all. It speaks in terms of 
governmental action that inhibits the exercise of the right. It provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.” U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. I. 
179 Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal. App. 4th 43, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
180 The discriminatory imposition of a fee upon just those who are unsuccessful in their 
endeavors to persuade government officials would effectively discriminate and chill impecunious 
and economically disadvantaged would-be petitioners. The Supreme Court held, “wealth or fee 
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too 
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.” Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
670 (1966). 
181 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 600 (1974). 
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pay for the medical expense involved in exercising that right.182 The 
exercise of the Constitutional right to confront one’s accusers or to a jury 
trial in a criminal proceeding  involves no expense for the defendant, 
while a civil trial may require the party exercising the right to deposit 
jury fees.183 The exercise of rights of constitutional stature, including the 
assertion of First Amendment rights, may not be conditioned by a state 
upon “the exaction of a price” or “punishment” or “threat of criminal or 
civil sanctions”184 The former payments for appellate counsel  and 
medical bills are not imposed by and paid to the State, whereas the latter 
exactions, like anti-SLAPP fees to government defendants, are levied by 
the government as a price for the exercise of fundamental rights. 
The California Supreme Court has distinguished between the costs 
of exercising rights and the burdens imposed on rights on the basis of 
whether a party should reasonably anticipate the expense associated with 
the exercise of a right.  In In re Marriage of Flaherty, the court reversed 
a sanction award and—citing access to justice considerations— 
recognized that a party faced with the usual risks and uncertainties 
entailed in any litigation should not also have to deal with the “‘fear of 
suffering a penalty more severe than that typically imposed on defeated 
parties.’”185 While the right to sue someone else may not be fundamental 
and the cost of the other party’s litigation expenses may - unlike the 
sanction in Flaherty - be reasonably contemplated as  an  incident  of 
losing a lawsuit, the right to petition government is fundamental and 
should involve no such unanticipated downside. The litigant should not 
be apprehensive of such awards.186 
Imposition of fees against the citizen petitioning his or her 
government is not properly characterized as merely a shifting of costs. 
Unlike routine filing fees and ordinary litigation expenses, this is not the 
 
 
182 Harris v. Macrae, 448 U.S. 297, 297 (1980). 
183 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631. 
184 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (“There are rights of constitutional 
stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution 
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern 
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 
“chills” speech, prior restraint “freezes” it at least for the time.”). 
185 In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d at 648 (citation omitted). 
186  This is because the immunity attaching to an exercise of general petition rights is not 
subject to the same considerations relative to allocating litigation costs involved in invoking judicial 
processes. Attaching to the exercise of general petitioning the possibility of paying an indeterminate 
sum of money to the government agency addressed by the petition is a sanction. It is not an 
expected part of mustering a challenge to government. Such a burden is in its effect no different than 
forbidding the exercise of the right altogether. This allows government “to ‘produce a result which 
[it] could not command directly.’ [citation] Such interference with constitutional rights is 
impermissible.”  Perry v. Sinderman (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 597. 
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sort of expense Jane Q. Public would reasonably expect is involved in 
the exercise of her constitutional right. 
 
3. The Petition Clause Protects Even Baseless Petitioning 
 
The Vargas II court also reasoned that Noerr-Pennington immunity 
should not apply since the plaintiffs’ lawsuit did not amount to legitimate 
First Amendment activity because it was baseless.187 However, it is 
significant that in BE & K, the U.S. Supreme Court distanced itself from 
dicta contained in an earlier case relied upon by the Vargas II Court, Bill 
Johnson’s Rests. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.188 The Court in Bill 
Johnson’s Rests. indicated that “baseless litigation is not immunized by 
the First Amendment right to petition”.189 In BE & K, the Court qualified 
that statement by stating that even baseless litigation may not be 
“completely unprotected.”190 
BE & K, therefore, recognized that baseless suits should be 
protected just as false statements are. While false statements may be 
unprotected for their own sake, “[t]he First Amendment requires that we 
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”191 The 
Court observed the need to provide First Amendment rights with 
“breathing space” and continued, “[a]n example of such ‘breathing 
space’ protection is the requirement that a public official seeking 
compensatory damages for defamation prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that false statements were made with knowledge or reckless 
disregard of their falsity.”192 
The Vargas II decision effectively created a new, disfavored class 
of general petitioners inserted somewhere between those who bring 
“sham” lawsuits and those who pursue meritorious legal action. This 
raises a vital Petition right question not reached by BE & K – whether 
imposing early termination and an award of fees to a government agency 
requires a higher threshold than that a plaintiff be unable to demonstrate 
a probability of prevailing at a pre-discovery phase of litigation.193 
 
 
187 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1348. 
188 Bill Johnson’s Rests., 461 U.S. at 731. 
189 Id. at 743; Schroeder, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 195. 
190 BE & K, 536 U.S. at 531. 
191 Id.  (citation omitted). 
192 Id.; see New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-280, 285. 
193 BE & K at least litigated its case beyond an early termination motion. The Court 
analogized: “For even if a suit could be seen as a kind of provable statement, the fact that it loses 
does not mean it is false. At most it means the plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving its truth.” 
BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532-533. Anti-SLAPP statutes, like California’s require the plaintiff to 
demonstrate a probability of prevailing 60 days after service and without benefit of discovery. CAL. 
CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(f),(g). 
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V. THE NATIONAL SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The problem of an improper balancing is of national concern. 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is not alone in its susceptibility to an 
interpretation that government activity is covered by its terms.194 It is 
also not alone in potentially awarding government onerous fees and other 
sanctions against private citizens or groups, and their attorneys, who 
petition it.195 
California’s interpretation of its anti-SLAPP  statute  as protecting 
government actors has not always been accepted elsewhere.196 
Washington’s Supreme Court, addressing similar statutory language in 
its state’s statute, held: 
 
 
 
 
 
194 This stems from anti-SLAPP statutory language being descriptive of activities protected, 
and therefore inclusive of all manner of speech and other interactions involving government, instead 
of who is doing that interacting. With respect to the representatively expansive wording  of 
Missouri’s statute, it is observed that “[t]he Missouri anti-SLAPP statute’s coverage is very broad.” 
Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New anti-SLAPP Law, 61 J. MO. BAR 124, 125 (2005) (footnote 
omitted). “ ‘The “in connection with” text of the statute protects citizen activity outside of public 
hearings [and] meetings. . . .’”  Id. 
More specifically, there is the potential for statutory interpretation lending government agents 
protection against citizen lawsuits: 
The Missouri anti-SLAPP statute provides coverage to a person. While this clearly covers an 
individual citizen, a question arises as to how broad is the coverage. Does it apply to public 
officials, such as planning commissioners, city council members, etc.? . . . There is no 
definition of “person” . . . and its plain meaning would argue for expansive coverage. 
Id. at 129. For this reason, 24 states, districts, and territories have anti-SLAPP statutory language 
potentially encompassing and protecting government activity from legal challenges by  private 
persons and organizations. The specific code sections are: 
ARK. CODE § 16-63-501 et seq.; DEL. CODE. ANN. § 8136 et seq.; D. C. LAW § 16-5501 et 
seq.; GA. CODE § 9-11-11.1; 7 GUAM CODE §17101 et seq.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 634 (F-1) et 
seq.); ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 et seq.; IND. CODE § 34-7-7-1 et seq.; LA. Code. Civ. Proc. § 
971; ME. REV. STAT. § 556; MD. CODE. ANN. CTS & JUD. PROC. §5-807; MASS. GEN. LAWS. 
§ 59(H); MINN. STAT. § 54.01 et seq.; MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 
241 et seq.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.635 et seq.; NEW MEXICO N. M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1; 
NEW YORK N.Y. CIV. RTS. § 70-a, § 76-a; OR. REV. STAT. § 31.150 et seq.; R. I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 9-33-2; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-21-1001 et seq.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001 et 
seq.; VERMONT VT. STAT. ANN. § 1041; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.500 et seq. 
195 All the anti-SLAPP laws cited above, save Maryland’s, provide for fee awards to a 
prevailing defendant without omitting government defendants. E.g. HAW. REV. STAT. § 634 F-2(8) 
(requiring minimum mandatory sanction of $5,000 and allowing additional sanctions against the 
plaintiff’ and plaintiff’s attorney); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(6)(a) (requiring additional 
mandatory $10,000 award plus sanctions on plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel); and TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE §27.009 (providing for mandatory award of sanctions against the plaintiff). 
196 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (observing “the often- 
expressed understanding that ‘in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, 
[and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’” (citations omitted)). 
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The purpose of the statute is to protect the exercise of individuals’ 
First Amendment rights . . . A government agency does not have free 
speech rights. It makes little sense to interpret “person” here so that an 
immunity, which the legislature enacted to protect one’s free speech 
rights, extends to a government agency that has no such rights to 
protect.197 
 
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected a city clerk’s 
reliance on an anti-SLAPP statute to protect statements made in  an 
official capacity as petitioning activity, and held “the statute is designed 
to protect overtures to the government by parties  petitioning  in  their 
status as citizens.”198 
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
engaged in no discussion of the constitutional propriety of government 
using anti-SLAPP statutes against petitioning individuals.199 The 
individuals brought suit to enjoin public officials from discussing a 
contract between a private landowner and  FEMA.200  Although 
Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute is modeled on California’s, the court did 
not draw from California law or scrutinize how the statutory language 
applied to government officials. The court simply concluded that the 
motion to strike “was proper.”201 In another case, the Louisiana court 
addressed the question of whether a town is a “person” for purposes of 
enjoying anti-SLAPP protection and concluded that a town is a “juridical 
person”, and could use the anti-SLAPP statute.202 
A Nevada case similarly involved an employment dispute and 
treated a government employer as a “person” entitled to anti-SLAPP 
protection. In John v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., the Nevada supreme 
court considered a school district’s anti-SLAPP motion directed at a fired 
employee who sued it on various civil rights and other grounds. 203 The 
court found “communications by school employees and the DCSD 
regarding the plaintiff’s inappropriate behavior at work and the resulting 
investigations were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute”.204 In 
construing the statute, the court relied upon California precedent, 
observing, “Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted in 1993, shortly 
 
 
 
197 Segaline v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 238 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Wa. 2010). 
198 Moriarty v. Mayor of Holyoke, 883 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Mass. 2008). (citing Kobrin v. 
Gastrfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Mass. 2005). 
199 Ruffino v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 965 So.2d 414, 418 (La. 2007) 
200 Id. at 415 
201 Id. at 418. 
202 Hunt v. Town of New Llano, 930 So. 2d 251, 254 (La. 2006). 
203 John v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 219 P.3d 1276 (Nev. 2009). 
204 Id. at 1279. 
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after California adopted its statute, and both statutes are similar in 
purpose and language.”205 The court looked to the statute which 
provides: “If an action is brought against a person based upon a good 
faith communication in furtherance of the right to  petition . . .  [t]he 
person against whom the action is brought may file a special motion to 
dismiss.”206 
Finally, New York took the opposite tact from the Nevada court, 
finding that their anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect persons who 
petition government, not the government agency being petitioned. In 
City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, the court reasoned: 
“Clearly, as a municipality, petitioner is not a ‘public applicant or 
permittee’ and, thus, is not authorized to bring any claim for damages 
under this statute . . . .”207 
 
VI. THE PROPER CRITERIA FOR BALANCING THE 
GOVERNMENT INTEREST AT STAKE AGAINST THE 
PARAMOUNT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO 
PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 
 
Those state courts allowing government to use anti-SLAPP statutes 
are not applying the delicate balancing that pits a private right against 
another coequal private right. They are not protecting any right. What 
they are weighing involves the exercise of a preferred right against the 
government on one scale against a government interest on the other. The 
question is whether government  may  extract payment of its expenses 
incurred in preventing the successful exercise of that right. Resolution of 
that question has implications beyond government’s ability to use anti- 
SLAPP statutes. 
 
A. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD 
 
Outside of the Noerr-Pennington analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has balanced governmental interests against individual rights following 
 
 
205 Id. at 1281. 
206 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.660(a); John, 219 P.3d at 1284. The decision does not dwell 
upon whether the statute’s protection of a “person” for communications made “to” a government 
agency should only protect a defendant citizen who petitions government, not the government 
agency recipient. Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes define the operative language relied upon by the 
court: “good faith communication,” as any “Communication of information or a complaint to a 
Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political subdivision of this 
state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity” NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41.637(2). 
207 City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 178, 181 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2001). 
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certain fairly identifiable criteria. The undue burden standard has been 
used particularly in cases involving state restrictions on  a  woman’s 
access to abortion.208 A compelling state interest is required where a 
right is directly impinged such as by a statute targeting a  particular 
exercise of a right by creating an obstacle to or criminalizing the exercise 
of that right.209 Incidental burdening of a right which does not unduly 
burden that right is subject to a less exacting scrutiny.210 
Where a law does not directly infringe (such as a neutral regulatory 
measure), but incidentally burdens the exercise of a constitutionally 
protected right, no compelling state interest is required.211 However, a 
neutral regulation affecting the exercise of a right may still require a 
compelling state interest where it unduly burdens the right.212    Thus, the 
 
 
 
208 The standard was applied by Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her dissent in City 
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 US 416, 463 (1983) (O’ Connor, Sandra Day 
dissenting). O’Connor utilized the test as an alternative to the strict scrutiny test applied in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The test was later used by a plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to uphold state regulations on abortion. In City of 
Akron, O’Connor stated: “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly burden’ the fundamental 
right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the regulation 
rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 453. Justice John Paul 
Stevens in his partial concurrence, partial dissent to Planned Parenthood further defined undue 
burden by saying, “[a] burden may be ‘undue’ either because [it] is too severe or because it lacks a 
legitimate, rational justification.” Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
209 Church of Lukumi Babula Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that an 
ordinance banning ritual sacrifice—a key practice of the Santeria religion—required a compelling 
interest because the law was not neutral or of general applicability); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
472  (1977)  (noting  that  the  criminalization  of  abortion  in  Roe  v.  Wade  constitutes  such  an 
impermissible obstacle to the exercise of a right);. 
210 Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1973) (holding that a state system of financing 
public schools was “affirmative and reformatory” not an undue burden upon the fundamental right to 
an education); Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (holding that because a statute denying funding to indigent 
women for abortions placed “no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an 
abortion” and that no compelling state interest was required to justify the law); Burdick v. Takushi, 
504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (recognizing the regulatory needs involved in assuring the integrity of the 
electoral process allowed for incidental burdening of the right to vote: “[T]o subject every voting 
regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are 
operated equitably and efficiently.”) Laws imposing “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” burdens only 
require the state to show an “important regulatory interest.” Id. at 434. 
211 Emp’t Div. v. Smith,  494 U.S.  872, 878-879  (1990)  (upholding  the denial  of 
unemployment benefits to employees terminated for sacramental use of peyote: “We have never held 
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”). 
212 Wisconsin v. Yoder, (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 220 (holding that a law which is “neutral on its 
face” is unconstitutional where it “unduly burdens the practice of religion” absent a compelling 
interest.); Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877 (1992) (“A finding of an undue burden  is  a 
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose 
is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be 
calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the 
41
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U.S. Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail invalidated a law prohibiting 
an individual who was behind in support payments from obtaining a 
marriage license, because it “directly and substantially” interfered with 
the right to marry.213 The government agency was unable to “make clear 
the connection between  the  State’s interest and  the statute’s 
requirements.”214   The Court recognized: 
 
When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is 
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely 
tailored to effectuate only those interests. Appellant asserts that two 
interests are served by the challenged statute: the permission-to-marry 
proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the 
necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of 
the out-of-custody children is protected . . . [S]ince the means selected 
by the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the 
right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained.215 
 
The Court distinguished the undue burden upon Redhail’s right to marry 
from the loss of  a $20 monthly benefit as a result of marriage216 in 
Califano v. Jobst.217 
The burden involved in government use of anti-SLAPP statutes 
against petitioning citizens can be fit into the Court’s analysis. A strong 
argument can be made that anti-SLAPP statutes constitute a means of 
regulating the use of the judicial process to prevent abuse and inhibition 
of the exercise of participatory rights. The State’s interest in protecting 
such participatory rights is an important one, but hardly compelling.218 
An incidental effect of achieving that important governmental objective 
is that governmental use of the procedures results in the burdening of 
general petition rights.  So the question is whether the burden imposed is 
 
 
 
 
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its 
legitimate ends.”) 
213 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-387 (1978) (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that 
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of our prerequisites for marriage 
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. . . reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere 
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”) 
214 Id. at 389. 
215 Id. at 388 (citations omitted). 
216 Zablocki at n.12. 
217 (1977) 434 U.S. 47. 
218 As much as SLAPPs are to be condemned, American society has functioned without anti- 
SLAPP laws for most of its history. In addition, the judicial process provides many means to 
address meritless lawsuits, including malicious prosecution actions, motions for sanctions, summary 
judgment motions, demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings, and for nonsuit. 
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severe or undue, requiring a compelling state interest. If not, only a 
rational basis and narrow tailoring are required. 
Certainly, it would seem passing strange to the petitioning citizen 
who is charged over $225,000 for challenging what he or she genuinely 
believes to be government wrongdoing, that this would fee would not be 
considered a severe or undue burden.219  The question of government use 
of anti-SLAPP statutes stands apart from that presented by the mere 
regulatory imposition of a neutral fee for the governmental expense 
involved in registering a firearm or processing a marriage license. 
Instead, it involves a state imposition of a license, tax, or fee upon a 
constitutionally protected right. 
Myriad examples can be imagined of how governmental expense 
may be imposed upon one genuinely, but unsuccessfully, asserting a 
constitutional right. The effect of such an approach, however, is to chill 
the exercise of rights. In particular, the burden is felt  by  those  of 
minimal means. Because it singles out particular exercises of a particular 
right for a burden and not others, it moves beyond the neutral treatment 
of rights compelled by constitutional design. As the Court observed with 
regard to the disparate  impact of such selective burdening of  a  First 
Amendment right in Follett vs. Town of McCormick: 
 
Freedom of religion is not merely reserved for those with a long purse. 
Preachers of the more orthodox faiths are not engaged in commercial 
undertakings because they are dependent on their calling for a living. 
Whether needy or affluent, they avail themselves of the constitutional 
privilege of a “free exercise” of their religion when they enter the 
pulpit to proclaim their faith. The priest or preacher is as fully 
protected in his function as the parishioners are in their worship. A flat 
license tax on that constitutional privilege would be as odious as the 
early “taxes on knowledge” which the framers of the First Amendment 
sought to outlaw.220 
 
Potentially, fees incurred by state prosecutors responding to failed 
suppression motions, the state’s expense of a criminal jury trial, fees 
expended defending constitutional challenges to laws - all would  be 
proper subjects for government to shift expenses to individuals who rely 
upon constitutional rights.   Unquestionably, government agencies incur 
 
 
 
 
219 See Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 250. (awarding $229,423.84 in costs and fees against 
plaintiff). Much the same could be said for an award in the more common anti-SLAPP fee award 
range of $20-40,000, where the questionable, challenged government conduct is held to be proper. 
220 Follett vs. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-577 (1944); see also, Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania 319 US 105, 113 (1942) (“A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a 
right granted by the federal constitution. “). 
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litigation expense in defending lawsuits. This expense is ultimately borne 
by the citizenry.221  Much the same observation can be made with respect 
to government expense incurred dealing with the exercise of other rights 
by individuals. 
Consider elections—like petitioning, a key means for the People to 
control and hold government accountable.  The cost to a city for handling 
a single, simple municipal election is indisputably significant.222 Yet it 
would be inconceivable that voters who cast losing ballots should absorb 
this expense. Those who vote in good faith for obviously lost causes are 
not fined for civic irresponsibility in casting meritless votes. Even the 
idea of soaking supporters of “frivolous” ballot positions (e.g., write in 
votes for “Donald Duck”) with such costs is unthinkable and would 
involve limiting First Amendment expression.223   Once again, the impact 
of such a scheme would fall most heavily upon the economically 
disadvantaged segments of American society,  effectively 
disenfranchising them. 
Similarly, the extension of anti-SLAPP protections to government 
might be argued to serve the valid regulatory purpose of discouraging 
frivolous litigation against government, saving taxpayers the expense of 
defending such disingenuous litigation.  The rationale bears examination 
in light of treatment of the identical rationale pressed in regard to 
candidate filing fees in Lubin v. Panish.224 Lubin concerned an indigent 
candidate’s challenge to a $701.60 ballot filing fee in California.225 The 
state’s rational basis was the need to limit candidates on the ballot by 
discouraging “frivolous or otherwise non-serious candidates.”226 The 
Court held that the California law imposed a fee with the effect of 
excluding good faith as well as frivolous actors: 
 
Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves, test the 
genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the voter support of an 
aspirant for public office. A large filing fee . . . is not a certain test of 
whether the candidacy is serious or spurious. A wealthy candidate 
 
 
 
221 See Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 250.  Imposed upon an individual of average means, 
$225,000 is significant.   Spread among over 150,000 Salinas residents or covered by insurance 
(protection not afforded the public interest plaintiff), this dwindles to insignificance. 
222 Patricia Zengerle, 2012 Elections Putting Increased Financial Strain on Cash-Strapped 
Cities,   THE   HUFFINGTON   POST    (Jun.   25,   2012,   5:12   AM),   www.huffingtonpost.com/2012 
/04/25/2012-elections-voter-id-cost_n_1452433.html. 
223 Jeanne Kaiser, No Constitutional Right to Vote for Donald Duck: The Supreme Court 
Upholds The Constitutionality of Write-In Voting Bans in Burdick v. Takushi, W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
129, 148 (1993). 
224 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). 
225 Id. at 710 
226 Id. at 714. 
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with not the remotest chance of election may secure a place on the 
ballot by writing a check.227 
 
Likewise, the shrewd, wealthy  SLAPP  plaintiff  may  calculate  paying 
fees as one more cost of the process of punishing the defendant with an 
abusive lawsuit.228 Suits brought in earnest by less ruthless, but poor or 
impecunious litigants facing the risk of paying government’s potentially 
ruinous fees are chilled. In Lubin the exclusionary effect of the fee was 
fatal: 
 
Thus, California has chosen to achieve the important and legitimate 
interest of maintaining the integrity of elections by means which can 
operate to exclude some potentially serious candidates from  the 
ballot . . . Selection of candidates solely on the basis of ability to pay a 
fixed fee without providing any alternative means is not reasonably 
necessary to the accomplishment of the State’s legitimate election 
interests.229 
 
The size of a fee burdening exercise of a right may appropriately be 
considered as well. The U.S. Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter 
compared less burdensome filing fees most candidates could be expected 
to pay with the size of the fees in the Texas system. 230 It observed, “the 
very size of the fees imposed . . . [gave] it a patently exclusionary 
character.”231 The Court also observed that  the  restrictive  filing  fee 
would disproportionally impact the less affluent.232 
Like fees imposed upon electoral candidates, voters and religious 
proselytizers, the impact of awarding potentially tens to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in anti-SLAPP fees to government entities relates to 
the resources of litigants. The effect is unequal. The chill falls more 
heavily upon less affluent litigants who would challenge perceived 
government malfeasance—those unable or less able  to  afford 
government’s fees if they are earnest, but unsuccessful. The chill is even 
more foreboding than that recognized in Bullock, where the candidate fee 
was defined and imposed beforehand. The anti-SLAPP fee is non- 
quantified and imposed afterward, yet it still chills. 
 
 
 
 
227 Id. at 718. 
228 Thomas Waldmen, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Laws and in the Courts’ 
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1043 (1992). 
229 Lubin, 415 U.S. at 718. 
230 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 144 
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The foregoing cases counsel that the effect of statutory regulation 
must be assessed in terms of its effect upon the exercise of fundamental 
rights. Where the burden it imposes is direct or severe, a compelling 
state purpose is required. 
 
B. INTERMEDIATE STANDARD 
 
Assuming the burden upon the general petition right implicated by 
government use of an anti-SLAPP statute to suppress citizen petitioning 
is not undue, the appropriate level of inquiry is whether the government 
regulatory objective furthers a substantial government interest and the 
means are narrowly tailored to achieving that objective.233 
The governmental interest at stake behind anti-SLAPP statutes is 
hardly in doubt. It is stated plainly in the first paragraph of California’s 
anti-SLAPP statute: 
 
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing 
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress 
of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public 
interest to encourage continued  participation in matters of  public 
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through 
abuse  of  the  judicial  process.  To  this  end,  this  section  shall  be 
construed broadly.234 
 
Thus, the statute is intended to encourage petitioning activity— 
participation by members of the public in the process of self-governance. 
For this reason, the Motion to Strike procedure applies to a lawsuit 
“against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the 
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or 
California Constitution . . . .”235 
Unquestionably, this objective of protecting citizen activity that is 
essential to the function of our  democratic  processes  furthers  a 
substantial government interest. The real question is whether deterring 
that same participatory citizen activity in order to protect government 
from the challenge it presents is a means closely tailored to achieving 
that objective. 
 
 
 
 
 
233 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 256 
234 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(a). 
235 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(b)(1). 
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The intermediate analysis was carefully articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien with regard to freedom of 
expression. 236   That approach is formulated as follows: 
 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within 
the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the 
incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.237 
 
No argument is made here that anti-SLAPP statutes are not within the 
power of government to enact.238 We will start with the second and third 
intermediate standard requirements. 
 
1. The Governmental Objective in Advancing its Objectives Through 
Speech 
 
Government has an important interest in protecting the public 
participation of citizens in the processes of government just as it has a 
substantial interest in ensuring that the electoral process is sound. 
However, advancing the First Amendment rights of some involves 
diminishing the First Amendment rights of others. Anti-SLAPP statutes 
directly suppress First Amendment activity—the right of litigants to 
access to the courts. This involves terminating litigation. It also involves 
imposing fees and other penalties upon plaintiffs. While these burdens 
upon rights may be appropriate in private litigation, whether permitting 
government to use anti-SLAPP protections to impose such burdens 
actually furthers the statute’s stated interest and is narrowly tailored to 
serving that purpose involves different considerations. 
The statute’s purpose in protecting speech and petitioning has 
nothing to do with protecting any government objectives other than 
protecting those exercises of individual rights. This is congruent with 
basic constitutional theory. The Framers were concerned with confining 
government power and  protecting citizen rights, rather than with 
insulating  government  from  the  insignificant  insults  of  those  citizens 
 
 
 
 
236 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
237 Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(relying upon the restatement in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991), of the 
standard laid out by the United States Supreme Court in O’Brien. 
238 For discussion of this question see Pring & Canan, supra note 17. 
47
Andre: Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
162          GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
with the temerity to stand up to its power.239 This is apparent historically 
and from the Constitution’s structure manifested inter alia in the Bill of 
Rights and the separation of powers and system of checks and balances. 
Government  policies  are  not  forged  solely  by  election  returns.240 
Petitioning in all its forms is protected as a significant mechanism for 
citizens to direct their government and hold it accountable. As 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in  Burrough  of  Duryea, 
petitioning in the form of litigation is itself actually a source of 
government policy.241 The Court described how, historically, petitioning 
government allowed even those excluded from the franchise to interact 
with and influence government.242   The function of petitioning by means 
of litigation serves as a device  for citizens to hold government 
accountable and to effect political change: 
 
Petitions to the courts and similar bodies can likewise address matters 
of great public import. In the context of the civil rights movement, 
litigation provided a means for “the distinctive contribution of  a 
minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.” Individuals 
may also “engag[e] in litigation as a vehicle for effective political 
expression and association, as well as a means of communicating 
useful information to the public.” Litigation on matters of public 
concern may facilitate the  informed public  participation  that is a 
cornerstone of democratic society. It also allows individuals to pursue 
desired ends by direct appeal to government officials charged with 
applying the law.243 
 
If petitioning activity has this  functional component244of allowing 
citizens  to  interact  with  their  government,  then  that  activity  is  to  be 
 
 
 
 
239 Madison, J. (1792) in Hunt, G. (ed.), The Writings of James Madison v.6: 1790-1802 (New 
York, Knickerbocker Press) (“It is sufficiently obvious that persons and property are the two great 
subjects on which Governments are to act; and that the rights of persons and the rights of property 
are the objects for the protection of which Government was instituted”) 
240 Pre-election speech is but one means of touching social consciousness and effecting 
political change. There would seem to be no valid reason why citizens are protected in their first 
amendment right to be “wrong” when it comes to speech, but not when it comes to petitioning. 
Justice Holmes’ comment, “[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet 
by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would 
hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.” Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919). This would seem to have every bit as much application to 
ill-advised petitioning activity as to the speech erroneously penalized there. 
241 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2489 (2011). 
242 Id. at 2499 
243 Id. at 2500 (citations omitted). 
244  In terms of the social utility of a litigant’s right to be wrong on the merits, see, Reinert, 
Alexander A., Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, (2014) 89 Ind.L.J. 1191 
(explaining the social value provided by baseless lawsuits and the unfortunate tendency of courts and 
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promoted, not discouraged.245 In this light, it would be hypocritical to 
“protect” the advancement of government policies (via speech or 
otherwise) “against” such activity. Any supposed government interest in 
protecting its speech is both insignificant and invalid. More to the point, 
protecting that interest is not related to the purpose of anti-SLAPP 
statutes. 
The protection of such government activity as an incident of anti- 
SLAPP protection of rights-based activity in no way furthers achieving 
anti-SLAPP objectives. 
 
2. Narrow Tailoring of the Burden to Achieving Anti-SLAPP 
Objectives 
 
Given the plain purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes to protect the 
exercise of participatory rights from retaliatory lawsuits, there is  no 
reason to extend such protections to government. Given the burden such 
an extension would impose upon the exercise of petition rights— 
ironically, the very First Amendment freedom anti-SLAPP statutes seek 
to encourage and protect—it must be avoided under intermediate 
standard requirements where this is reasonably feasible. Because 
government may easily be excluded from enjoying anti-SLAPP 
protections, extension of anti-SLAPP provisions to government agencies, 
as will be shown, unquestionably fails narrow-tailoring analysis. 
California courts accept the O’Brien requirements and apply them 
to petition rights. Mejia v. City of Los Angeles held that “[r]estrictions 
on the right to  petition generally  are  subject  to the  same analysis as 
 
 
 
 
legislators to conflate “meritless” with “frivolous”).  Such arguments for succor for the social utility 
of meritless lawsuits gain more force as litigation moves outside of the situation of private disputes. 
245  That encouraging such litigation, rather than discouraging it, is the legislative objective is 
amply supported by enactment of a plethora of statutes designed specifically to promote and protect 
citizen petitioning in the form of litigation challenging government conduct, such as California’s 
Code Civ. Proc. §425.17, §526a and §1021.5. A scheme of promoting such activity by rewarding 
citizens who succeed in advancing an important public interest through litigation, but punishing 
efforts that fail ultimately discourages such litigation. This, if anything, is the lesson taught by 
Christiansburg Garment Company v. E.E.O.C. (1978) 434 U.S. 412, and copious other cases which 
recognize that fee awards against unsuccessful public interest litigants chill such beneficial activity 
and that a showing that the litigation was frivolous is necessary before such an award may be 
allowed. Geier v. Richardson (6th Cir.1989) 871 F.2d 1310,1314 (Dual standard not applicable to 
award of fees in favor of prevailing state defendant against the United States intervening as a 
plaintiff because, “The Christiansburg standards and statutes, congressional history, all indicate that 
it's designed to protect and to prevent the chilling of the assertion of rights by private attorney 
generals, by citizens trying to assert their constitutional rights and the reluctance of this court and all 
courts to award defendants fees against plaintiffs is to prevent the chilling of such rights. There's 
absolutely no element in this case where the awarding of fees against the United States could chill 
anybody's activity in the assertion of civil rights.”). 
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restrictions on the right of free speech.”246 The Court recognized that 
“[l]aws that cause some incidental restriction on conduct protected by the 
First Amendment but do not regulate the content of the expression 
generally are evaluated under the less stringent standard announced in 
United States v. O’Brien . . . .”247 Thus, the  appropriate  inquiry  is 
whether the “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”248 
With this in mind, it should involve a relatively simple analysis to 
recognize that a means of advancing the governmental interest in 
protecting participatory rights is readily available that does not involve 
suppressing fundamental petition rights: Government does not need to be 
included as a beneficiary of anti-SLAPP protection. Government 
agencies can easily be excluded from use of anti-SLAPP protections 
against petitioning citizens without degrading or undermining anti- 
SLAPP protections of public participation rights. Thus, the use of anti- 
SLAPP statutes against petitioning citizens flunks the intermediate 
standard analysis. 
 
3. The Vargas II Approach—Revisionism of Anti-SLAPP Statutes’ 
Objectives 
 
The court of appeals in Vargas II, approached the petition rights 
problem presented by government use of section 425.16(c) to levy fees 
against petitioning citizens with a novel twist on intermediate analysis. It 
managed to find that government use of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute 
passes muster under the O’Brien test by substituting out the statute’s 
purpose. 
Before moving to whether a government interest is advanced in a 
permissible (narrowly-tailored) way, Vargas II identified two different 
governmental interests underlying anti-SLAPP statutes that are not 
apparent from the statutory language or context: interests in protecting 
government’s promotion of its policies via speech and recouping 
government’s fees.249 Both of these posited governmental interests are 
suspect in terms of 1) whether they actually are the legislative interests 
advanced; 2) whether they are substantial enough to outweigh the 
intrusion upon petition rights incidentally infringed, and; 3) whether they 
are valid or important governmental interests at all. 
 
 
 
 
246 Mejia v. City of Los Angeles, 156 Cal. App. 4th 151, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
247 Id. 248 Id. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S.at 377). 
249 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1346. 
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a. The Government Interest in Advancing its Objectives Through 
Speech 
 
The promotion of policies enacted by voters or legislatures through 
speech or otherwise is an entirely mundane function of government. 
Framed in general terms, it can be regarded as essential. In specific 
terms—such as announcing bus schedules and driver sobriety checks—it 
hardly stands out  as  being  of any  greater importance than the minor 
function of watering the grass at city hall. 
The proposition that government has an interest of substantial 
importance in protecting its speech elevates the significance of its speech 
above private speech and over the importance of the particular policies 
the speech may actually serve to promote. The Bill of Rights  was 
designed to protect individuals against government’s prerogatives.250 As 
already observed, deference to legislative evaluations  that  rights 
colliding with governmental objectives should be burdened is tempered 
by the judicial branches’ role in observing constitutional limitations: 
“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding 
due deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional 
remedy.”251 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that to permit a 
statutory burden upon a right, more is required than that government is 
inconvenienced in carrying out its general objectives. This is the premise 
underlying the O’Brien test: 
 
[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its 
incidental impact upon First Amendment interests, ‘if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on . . . First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.’252 
 
The proper inquiry then is whether government’s objective in avoiding 
criticism is significant enough to permit it to burden persons who 
exercise First Amendment rights with the fees government incurs 
successfully resisting them. Without evaluating the specific interest 
advanced by particular government speech, the Vargas II court stated, 
“the   government’s   right   to   speak   is   a   substantial   interest   to   be 
 
 
 
250 W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943). 
251 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010). 
252 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976). 
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protected.”253 The difficulty with this generalization is that it lumps a 
routine report on sidewalk maintenance together with a tsunami warning. 
No doubt government must speak to govern, and likewise, must make 
laws and administer them.254 This does not mean, however, that 
legislation and the executive functioning of government should be 
insulated from criticism and legal challenge. Those functions are not so 
significant as to allow the imposition of  government’s  expense  upon 
those who unsuccessfully assail government actions or inactions as 
improper. 
Government policies should not be exposed only to criticism that 
is “right.”255 Suffering challenges to policies and the promotion of its 
policies and enduring the slings and arrows of having members of the 
citizenry exercise rights is what government is supposed to do as a matter 
of design in a system of popular governance. Facilitating the exercise of 
rights is its function in the constitutional scheme. There is no valid or 
substantial interest in preventing such dissent.   On the contrary, it is 
implicit that government is improved as a result of such exercises of 
rights. It is hypocritical to “protect” advancement of governmental 
policies (via speech  or otherwise) “against” such activity. This 
generalized government interest is invalid and insubstantial and, if 
accepted as a basis to compromise citizen dissension and other 
participatory conduct, would portend more than the erosion of the 
Petition right poised against vague and potentially insignificant or even 
improper governmental interests.256 
Carrying out policies is a governmental objective of  greater 
importance than  talking about  them. Following from this premise, a 
statute permitting a government agency to obtain fees any time a person 
unsuccessfully  sues  concerning  actual  government  action  should  have 
 
 
 
 
253 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th  at 1347. 
254 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467-68 (“Indeed it is not easy to imagine how 
government could function if it lacked this freedom.”). 
255 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-2 (1964) (providing that "error" must 
be protected if the freedom of speech is to have the "breathing space" required). 
256 Allowing government’s interest in speaking to exist at the expense of constitutional rights is 
the tip of the iceberg. Consider how the logic extends beyond governmental communications. If 
government’s interest in making statements to promote policies – regardless of the underlying 
policy’s importance - trumps the right of persons to sue over such statements, then myriad other 
indefinite and insubstantial governmental interests should similarly provide a basis for incursion 
upon citizen rights. The First Amendment right to publicly criticize one’s government, the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms, the Third Amendment freedom from the burden of quartering 
soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s protections from search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment’s right 
against self-incrimination and right to due process, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial 
and right to a jury trial - all involve individual objectives conflicting with state policies of some sort 
and also involve a cost to the government, directly or indirectly. 
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greater stature than one merely protecting government speech.257 If 
protecting mere government speech merits sanctioning the exercise of 
citizen rights, extending this logic compels the aberrant conclusion that 
the general governmental interest in advancing any policy should always 
outweigh incidental infringement of individual rights and permit its 
suppression. This unprotective approach to weighing First Amendment 
rights against governmental interests fell by the  wayside  almost  100 
years ago, with the opinions of Justice Holmes  and  Justice  Brandeis 
which engendered a rights-protective “clear and present danger” standard 
and later, with Brandenburg,258 into a standard lending even greater 
protection to rights balanced against the assertion of government 
interests. 
 
b. Recouping the Expense of Entertaining Unsuccessful Citizen 
Petitions 
 
The second legislative objective attributed by the court in Vargas II 
to California’s anti-SLAPP statute was the advancement of the 
governmental interest “in being free of the costs of defending meritless 
lawsuits aimed at infringing the government’s free-speech activities.”259 
In general, anti-SLAPP statutes are set up to protect persons from 
retaliation for rights-based public participation. They operate by 
preventing well-heeled, powerful plaintiffs from using the legal process 
to squelch those exercising their political rights to oppose a plaintiff’s 
objectives: “The paradigm SLAPP is a suit filed by a large land 
developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood association 
intended to chill the defendants’ continued political or legal opposition to 
the developers’ plans.”260 
The economics of SLAPPs are explained, as follows: 
 
SLAPP suits are brought to obtain an economic advantage over the 
defendant, not to vindicate a legally cognizable right of the plaintiff. 
Indeed, one of the common characteristics of a SLAPP suit is its lack 
of merit. But lack of merit is not of concern to the plaintiff because 
the plaintiff does not expect to succeed in the lawsuit, only to tie up 
 
 
257 Likewise, a state scheme that discriminates against unsuccessful defendants who assert 
the right to trial by jury or right to refuse to testify by imposing government fees incurred 
resulting from the exercise of such rights would be proper. This allows the government to 
recoup its expense of dealing with troublesome assertions of constitutional rights.  Nor, in light 
of this purpose, does there seems to be any reason not to impose the governmental expense upon 
all defendants who assert those rights (but not upon those who waive them) irrespective of 
whether or not they are successful in their defense. 
258 See supra note 74, and related text. 
259 Vargas II, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 1350. 
260 Wilcox v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 815 (1994). 
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the defendant’s resources for a sufficient length of time to accomplish 
plaintiff’s underlying objective. As long as the defendant is forced to 
devote its time, energy  and financial resources to combating the 
lawsuit its ability to combat the plaintiff in the political arena is 
substantially  diminished.261 
 
Consequently, one of the remedies for the SLAPP problem is to prevent 
the economic exploitation involved. This is accomplished by relieving 
the person who is SLAPPed from the legal expense involved in 
defending against the SLAPP so as to enable continued public 
participation.262 
The foregoing reasoning has no correlation to a government 
defendant sued by an earnest, but misguided citizen. The government 
agency is not exercising free speech or any other right. Its “public 
participation” is merely a corollary of the fact that it is the government 
simply doing its job. The genuinely concerned plaintiff is not trying to 
punish or retaliate against the government, but is seeking redress—trying 
to change or prevent something the government is doing wrong. 
Shifting fees upon those who are exercising their rights by publicly 
participating—speaking out and criticizing their government’s actions or 
policies and seeking legal recourse to change the status quo—does not 
serve any anti-SLAPP purpose. The justification for doing so must be 
found outside of anti-SLAPP considerations—in the savings to taxpayers 
from having to defend against gadflys, cranks, misguided public interest 
groups and just plain aggrieved, but mistaken citizens. 
The rationale cited by the state in Bullock, as justifying disparate 
treatment of candidates who were not able or willing to afford to be on 
the ballot, is the same as that relied upon by the court in Vargas II: “if 
the State must assume the cost . . . taxpayers will ultimately be burdened 
with the expense”.263 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s rebuke of that rationale is informative 
here. The Court recognized that once the right to participate in the 
democratic process (via a primary) is established, it is too late to contend 
it is of such lesser stature that its cost may be shifted away from 
taxpayers generally to those exercising the right: “Without making light 
of the State’s interest in husbanding its revenues, we fail to see such an 
 
 
 
 
 
261 Id. at 816 (citations omitted). Not only does early termination end  the  expense  of 
litigation, but a fee award restores some of the funds diverted by the SLAPP target to combat the 
SLAPP. 
262 Id. at 817. 
263 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 148. 
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element of necessity in the State’s present means of financing primaries 
as to justify the resulting incursion on the prerogatives of voters.”264 
Where citizens seek redress from their government, particularly in 
public interest lawsuits, the public benefits directly when that process 
vindicates individual rights, exposes government wrongdoing or 
improves government practices. Lawsuits amongst parties litigating 
private rights do not have the same implications. Such activity 
redounding to the public benefit is to be encouraged. If the right to 
petition one’s government for redress of grievances means anything, it 
means that one who seeks redress in good faith should not be 
individually burdened with the governmental expense involved in 
making that appeal. 
The purported fiscal interest is inevitably tied to suppression of 
persons critical of government policies.  While  characterized  as 
benefitting taxpayers generally—by saving them the expense of dealing 
with the exercise of individual rights which interfere with government 
achieving its objectives—this purpose is ultimately  misguided.  As 
Justice Brandeis aptly observed: “Experience should teach us to be most 
on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are 
beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but  without 
understanding.”265 
In view of the overtly political objectives of lawsuits noted in 
Borough of Duryea, even unmeritorious litigation must be regarded as 
valued and protected in the American political process.266 Yesterday’s 
gadfly may be tomorrow’s elected member of Congress or public interest 
litigant successfully obtaining a cutting-edge legal result. 
The expense to taxpayers of non-frivolous general petitioning 
activity is the price of freedom and of a participatory form of 
government.267 If the statute’s purpose is truly to allow government to 
recoup expenses dealing with some citizen petitions, the benefit of doing 
 
 
 
 
264 Id. at 148-149; see also Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“[W]e 
conclude that this interest is not ‘of compelling importance,’ nor is the means of achieving it 
‘narrowly drawn.’” (citation omitted)). 
265 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
266 BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532 (“Nor does the text of the First Amendment speak in terms of 
successful petitioning–it speaks simply of ‘the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.’”). 
267 Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding the financial burden to 
city when listeners throw speaker’s leaflets on the street does not justify restriction on distribution of 
leaflets); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (holding imposition of 
parade permit fee designed to offset county’s administration expense invalid where basis for 
assessment depended upon the content of the speech and potentially hostile response). 
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so is not worth the corrosive effects upon citizen participation.268 If the 
statute’s objective is instead to promote First Amendment activity, this 
purpose is counteracted by burdening general petitioning. 
An extrapolation of the purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes as allowing 
government to recoup expenses in dealing with unsuccessful citizen 
petitions is not only at odds with anti-SLAPP statutes’ expressly stated 
purposes, it is contrary to the well established line of cases indicating 
that fee awards in favor of public interest litigants are favored, while 
awards against them are disfavored. It is not that fee awards are never 
properly granted in favor of government entities  against  private 
persons,269 but that such awards do not comport with anti-SLAPP 
objectives, constitutional protection of First Amendment petitioning, or 
public policy against burdening those exercising  rights  with 
government’s fees incurred responding to that public participation. 
 
C. APPLYING THE TRUE PURPOSE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES UNDER 
THE NARROW-TAILORING REQUIREMENT OF THE TEST 
 
The conclusion of the Vargas II court, that government use of an 
anti-SLAPP statute to obtain fees incidentally burdening citizen petition 
rights is narrowly-tailored to serving the government’s purpose, derives 
 
 
 
268 Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minn Comm’r. of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 
(1983). 
269 The dissent in Bozek pointed out that there are cases allowing such awards, but overlooked 
the significant difference between private suits and suits seeking redress from government. In 
addition, the dissent did not analyze why the cases it cited all imposed a higher threshold for the 
imposition of fee awards in favor of government agents: 
Numerous federal cases have indicated that . . . government defendants may recover attorney 
fees against private parties who have maliciously pursued civil actions against them. (See, 
e.g., Gage v. Wexler (N.D.Cal. 1979) 82 F.R.D. 717, 719-720; Abney v. Ward (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) 440 F.Supp. 1129, 1131-1132; Blackburn v. City of Columbus, Ohio (S.D. Ohio 1973) 
60 F.R.D. 197, 198-199; cf. Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2d Cir. 
1976) 538 F.2d 918, 920-921.) The majority’s constitutional conclusion flies in the face of 
these authorities.4 
Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 542 (Kaus, J., dissenting). Footnote four elaborated, but none of the cases cited 
actually considered the constitutionality of making a private citizen pay government’s fees as the 
price of unsuccessfully petitioning: 
In fact, the relevant decisions demonstrate that even in the absence of bad faith, there is 
nothing unconstitutional in requiring a losing plaintiff to pay attorney fees to a prevailing 
government defendant under a generally applicable attorney fee statute. (See, e.g., Gage v. 
Wexler, supra, 82 F.R.D. 717, 718-719 (applying standard enunciated in Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421-422); Anthony v. Marion County General 
Hospital (5th Cir. 1980) 617 F.2d 1164, 1169-1170; Lujan v. State of N.M. Health & Soc. 
Serv. (10th Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 968, 970; Lopez v. Aransas Cty. Independent Sch. Dist. (5th 
Cir. 1978) 570 F.2d 541, 545.) . . . 
Id. at 432 n.4. 
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from and depends entirely upon whether its identification of 
governmental purposes is correct, and  whether  those  government 
purposes are valid. Where the purposes identified are  inaccurate  or 
invalid, any narrow tailoring to achieve those purposes  is  beside  the 
point. 
As has been demonstrated, government has no valid purpose in 
suppressing citizen participation either to advance its generalized interest 
in speech  of no identifiable significance or  to recoup  the expense of 
handling citizens’ assertions of their rights. The problem  with  the 
Vargas II analysis is its flawed and errant concoction of these supposed 
purposes supporting government use of an anti-SLAPP statute. While 
the means of burdening and suppressing citizen petitioning activity are 
closely attuned to achieving the ends identified by the Vargas II court, 
those purported objectives really have nothing to do with the genuine 
evil addressed by anti-SLAPP statutes. 
Treating the narrow-tailoring analysis in terms of the actual 
objective of anti-SLAPP statutes—promoting and encouraging public 
participation, rather than the revisionist purpose assigned by the Vargas 
II court, yields a very different and inescapable conclusion.  The actual 
anti-SLAPP purpose in protecting such First Amendment rights is not 
served by allowing government agents to punish and chill  First 
Amendment activity of good faith litigants. That would be hypocrisy. 
There is no substantial relationship between the end and a means that is 
counter to that end. Nor is the burdening of petition rights the least 
restrictive means to achieving that objective. 
 
VII. ANALYTIC DIFFICULTIES WITH BESTOWING ANTI-SLAPP 
PROTECTION UPON GOVERNMENT SPEECH IN LIGHT OF 
THE “ARISING FROM” REQUIREMENT 
 
Justice Souter, concurring in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
observed: “Because the government speech doctrine . . . is ‘recently 
minted,’ it would do well for us to go slow in setting its bounds, which 
will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet explored.”270 Difficulties 
with the undefined parameters of the government speech doctrine have 
been created by: 1) the resemblance of government acts to private First 
Amendment activity; and 2) the similarity of the protections bestowed 
upon the private exercise of rights to acts of government power.  There is 
a marked tendency to confabulate government speech with private 
petitioning and speech and to treat it in the same manner as a protected 
right. 
 
 
270 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 485 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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This confusion is evident in California common law construing 
section 425.16 as privileging government speech over citizen petitioning 
and as treating statements made by private actors as unprotected while 
statements made  in identical contexts by government agents are held 
protected. To understand how this paradoxical construction developed, 
we will start with the statute, then look at how the courts have interpreted 
section 425.16 in the private context, and then compare this treatment to 
that bestowed upon government speech. This analysis will reveal how 
confusion over the position government speech occupies in the 
constitutional firmament has resulted in an awkward and unorthodox 
judicial approach to both government speech and to government use of 
anti-SLAPP statutes. 
 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL OVERBREADTH 
 
The inappropriateness of treating all government conduct recited in 
subsection (e) of California’s section 425.16 as  protected  becomes 
glaring upon examining the vast expanse of such activity described as an 
“act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the 
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public 
issue.”271 Because this language was framed to  protect  all  kinds  of 
citizen activity involving participation in public issues, it describes all 
manner of interaction with government bodies, procedures, agencies and 
officials. 272 
When applied to government actors, section 425.16(e)’s literal 
application in that context ipso facto encompasses almost any of  the 
myriad functions of government  agencies and  anything a  government 
agent says or does. Courts have tended to treat government actors 
performing such functions as protected by California’s anti-SLAPP 
statute. Comparable bureaucratic conduct by private sector actors— 
reports,   claims,   investigations,   administrative   proceedings,   hiring 
 
 
 
271 See Siam v. Kizilbash, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1563, 1569-1570 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
272 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16(e) states: 
As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under 
the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) 
any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial 
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral 
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; 
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public 
forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance 
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech 
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. 
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decisions and communications and advertisements—has been held to not 
constitute an act in furtherance of speech or petitioning.273 Under the 
former approach, it is the activity’s relationship to government that is 
regarded as imbuing it with anti-SLAPP status, not the activity’s 
relationship to the exercise of rights.274 Under the latter approach, anti- 
SLAPP protection is dependent upon a nexus to rights-based conduct.275 
Application of the anti-SLAPP statute to private situations that are 
comparable to government processes has been limited to those special 
circumstances where a proceeding is required by public law and subject 
to review by mandamus276 or involves a matter in the public interest.277 
Judicial treatment addressing what government activity encompassed by 
the broad language of section 425.16 is subject to anti-SLAPP protection 
also betrays deep-seated confusion over the nature and relationship of 
rights and government power. 
 
 
 
273 See, e.g., Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1400 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding allegations of claims handling misconduct relating to report not subject to 
motion to strike); Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 418 (holding 
commercial speech about product safety for purposes of sales does not constitute an issue of public 
interest); Century 21 Chamberlain v. Haberman (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 1, 5 (holding statute does 
not protect the initiation of private arbitration); People ex re. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 
211 Cal.App.4th 809 (alleged fraudulent insurance reports); Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 
1508 (allegedly improper non-judicial foreclosure); Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199 
(alleged improper preparation of document); People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Building Permit 
Consultants, Inc. (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 280 (alleged fraudulent estimates, reports); Lafayette 
Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 855, 863, n.5 (newspaper 
publication of allegedly libelous material).  Compare, Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 
97 Cal.App.4th 798, and Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 226 (both 
involving public issues and decided after the 1997 amendment adding subsection (e)(4) which 
protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”); 
State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Majorino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 974, 977 (insurer's action for 
declaratory relief did not arise from defendants’ lawsuit against the insured, but rather arose from the 
insured's tender of defense to insurer and the terms of an insurance policy, so anti-SLAPP statute did 
not apply); Min v. Tanaka (2nd Dist.Div4,2008) B202175 (unpublished decision) (in lawsuit over 
driveway construction the fact the claim related to the permit process did not place it within scope of 
anti-SLAPP law). 
274 See Siam, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1569-1570. 
275 Infra, Section VII B 1 a. 
276 Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., 39 Cal. 4th 192, 203 (Cal. 2006); but 
see Olaes v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a 
private company’s sexual harassment grievance protocol did not constitute an official proceeding 
authorized by law). 
277 Cabrera v. Alam, 197 Cal.App.4th 1077 (Cal.2011), 1087-1088 (statements made during a 
board meeting prior to the election for directors of a homeowners association covered); Damon v. 
Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal.App.4th 468 (Cal.2000) (holding conduct involving 
homeowners association was protected, observing: "The definition of 'public interest' within the 
meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental 
matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a 
community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity." Id. at 479). 
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B. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-SLAPP “ARISING FROM” 
PREREQUISITE FOR PROTECTED CONDUCT APPLIED TO 
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY 
 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute does not differentiate between 
communication and other acts.278  It allows a motion to strike for a cause 
of action “arising from any act” of the defendant in “furtherance” of free 
speech or petitioning. 279 It covers activities which include both speech 
and other conduct implicating the First Amendment.280 Other states use 
the same terminology281 or “based on”282 or something similar283 to 
insulate  activity  involving  exercise  of  a  First  Amendment  right  from 
 
 
 
 
278 See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1116 (Cal. 1999) 
(resolving a conflict in the appellate courts over whether anti-SLAPP protection was limited to 
expressive activity by rejecting the limited view that Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 425.16 only protects 
“expressive” conduct); see also Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1046- 
1047 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 425.16 “requires simply any writing or 
statement made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by, the specified 
proceeding or body. Thus these clauses safeguard free speech and petition conduct aimed at 
advancing self government, as well as conduct aimed at more mundane pursuits.”); but see Zhao v. 
Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), disapproved by Briggs v. Eden Council for 
Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) (advancing the view that the anti-SLAPP statute 
was intended by the Legislature to protect activity “with a particularly clear focus on expressive 
conduct.”) 
279 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE. § 425.16(b)(1) 
280 Cal. Civ. Pro. Code. § 425.16(e) 
281 Guam (7 Guam Code §17105); Hawaii(Haw.Rev.Stat. §634(F-2); Illinois (Ill.Comp.Stat. 
110/15); Indiana (Ind. Code §34-7-7-9(d)); Maine (Me.Rev.Stat.§556); Massachusetts (Mass.Gen. 
Laws.§59H); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003 (“If a legal action is based on, relates to, or is 
in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association, 
that  party  may  file  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  legal  action.”);  Washington  (Wash.Rev.Code 
§4.24.525(4)(b)). 
282 District of Columbia (D.C.Law §16-5502(a)); Georgia (Ga.Code §9-11-11.2); Louisiana 
(LA.Code.Civ.Proc.§971(A)(1));     Oregon     (Or.Rev.Stat.§31.150(2));     Vermont     (Vt.Stat.Ann. 
§1041(a)). 
283 Similarly, Arkansas’ statute protects, conduct “in furtherance of the right of free speech or 
the right to petition”.(Ark.Code §16-63-504); Delaware covers conduct “materially related to any 
efforts of the defendant to report on, rule on, challenge or oppose” permit and other applicants for 
government entitlements. (Del.Code.Ann. §8136(a)(1)-(2)); Minnesota provides protection where a 
claim “materially relates to an act of the moving party that involves public participation.” 
(Minn.Stat.§54.02); Missouri and New Mexico protect “conduct or speech undertaken or made in 
connection with” official proceedings. (Mo.Rev.Stat.§537.528(1)), (N.M.Stat.Ann.§38-2-9.1(A)); 
Rhode Island protects the exercise of  one’s right of petition or of free speech . . . in connection with 
a matter of public concern”. (R.I.Gen.Laws §9-33-2); Nebraska protects against an action “involving 
public petition and participation”. (Neb.Rev.Stat.§25-21,244-246); Nevada provides protection for a 
“good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition”. (Nev.Rev.Stat.§41.637); 
Tennessee immunizes communications to a government agency “in furtherance of” a “person's right 
of free speech or petition. . . in connection with a public or governmental issue”. (Tenn. 
Code.Ann.§4-21-1003); Maryland covers public communications and communications to 
government “to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, oppose, or in any other way exercise 
rights under the First Amendment . . .” Maryland (Md.Code.Ann. Cts&Jud. Proc.§5-807(b)-(c)); 
New York protects “efforts. . . to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose” permit and 
other applicants; (N.Y.Civ.Rts,§76-a(1)(a)). 
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suppressive, retaliatory, meritless lawsuits. Such statutory language 
expansively describing contexts in which protected statements may occur 
is interpreted by courts to involve inquiry into the nature of the liability 
asserted. In other words, courts look beyond whether a statement was 
merely made in a described setting. 
Massachusetts, for example, has addressed whether anti-SLAPP 
protection covers activity that is not rights-based. Unlike California’s, 
Massachusetts’ statute seeks to protect petitioning activity, but not free 
speech activity.284 Like California’s law, however, it does so by broadly 
covering statements made in official proceedings without qualifying that 
the statements must actually  involve or further  exercise of First 
Amendment rights.285 In Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., the 
Massachusetts high court recognized that inquiry into whether First 
Amendment activity is the primary basis for liability is compelled by the 
balancing of respective petition rights at stake: “By protecting one 
party’s exercise of its right of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham 
petitioning, the statute impinges on the adverse party’s exercise of its 
right to petition, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning.”286 
To avoid constitutional infirmity and to remain consistent with the 
statute’s objective of disposing “expeditiously of meritless lawsuits that 
may chill petitioning activity,” the court construed “based on” to exclude 
“meritorious claims with a substantial basis other than or in addition to 
the petitioning activities implicated.”287 
The same analysis was recently approved in Maine and  Illinois. 
Nader v. Maine Democratic Party rejected an overbroad treatment of 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. 288  Recognizing the negative impact upon 
the petition rights of litigants, and particularly the plaintiff there, Ralph 
Nader, a candidate for elected office, the court acknowledged the 
paramount protection bestowed upon petitioning entailing more than the 
resolution of private disputes: “Petitions to the government assume an 
added dimension when they seek to advance political, social, or other 
ideas of interest to the community as a whole.”289 
The Illinois Supreme Court likewise followed Duracraft.290 It held 
Illinois’  anti-SLAPP  statute  should  be  construed  in  keeping  with  its 
 
 
 
284 Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, Note, The Special Motion Requirements of the Massachusetts 
Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and Procedure, 16 B.U. 
Pub. Int.L.J. 97, 101-102 (Fall 2006). 
285 Id. 286 Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp, 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998).. 
287 Id. 
288 Nader v. Maine Democratic Party, 41 A.3d 551, 554 (Me. 2012). 
289 Id. at 559 n.8. 
290 Sandholm v. Kueker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 431 (Ill. 2012). 
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intent and did not “immunize defamation or other intentional torts.”291 
The court rejected an approach inquiring as to the defendant’s motives: 
“If a plaintiff’s complaint genuinely seeks redress for damages from 
defamation or other intentional torts . . . it is irrelevant whether the 
defendants’ actions were ‘genuinely aimed at procuring favorable 
government action, result, or outcome.’”292   The court concluded: 
 
Not only is a suit subject to cursory dismissal . . . but the plaintiff is 
prohibited from conducting discovery, except through leave of court, 
and is required to pay defendant’s attorney fees incurred in connection 
with the motion. In light of the severe penalties imposed on a plaintiff 
under the Act, we will not read into the statute an intent to establish a 
new, qualified privilege absent an explicit statement of such intent.293 
 
California courts likewise have recognized the accommodation of 
countervailing rights involved and evaluate whether a plaintiff’s action is 
brought substantially because of protected activity or whether First 
Amendment activity is merely incidental to the liability: 
 
The applicable test is whether the allegations referring to arguably 
unprotected activity are only incidental or collateral to a cause of 
action based essentially on protected activity, and therefore we 
examine the principal thrust or predominant nature of the complaint to 
determine applicability of the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme.294 
 
Based upon this constitutionally compelled inquiry, California courts in 
suits involving private litigants hold that merely because a statement was 
made in an official proceeding described by the state’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, it does not necessarily follow that the liability pertaining to that 
statement relates to an exercise of the speaker’s First Amendment rights. 
Where the defendant’s statement is not imbued with First Amendment 
stature, the interest in protecting the defendant does not outweigh the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment right to seek redress from the courts. 
Consequently,  statements  literally  described  by  the  statute  are  not 
 
 
 
291 Id. at 429. 
292 Id. at 433. 
293 Id. at 432. The balance achieved by the Illinois decision has been criticized for going 
beyond Duracraft and making availability of anti-SLAPP protection depend upon the genuineness of 
the plaintiff’s intent in bringing suit. Charles E. Harris and Victoria D. McCoy, Applying Illinois’s 
Anti-SLAPP Statute Following the Illinois Supreme Court’s Decision in Sandholm v. Kuecker, 
MARTINDALE.COM (Feb. 1, 2012), www.martindale.com/Government/article_Mayer-Brown- 
LLP_1431038.htm. 
294 Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
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afforded anti-SLAPP protection where they do not actually involve the 
speaker’s rights-based activity. 295 
When it comes to government defendants, since government agents 
have no First Amendment speech or petitioning rights, the inquiry into 
whether an act was protected First Amendment conduct or not, makes no 
sense. 296 The judicial focus has instead often devolved upon the statute’s 
reference to “statements” occurring in various governmental settings.297 
However, treating any governmental statement made in the specified 
contexts as warranting protection regardless of First Amendment 
significance also makes no sense. This approach would not correspond 
with the anti-SLAPP statute’s objective in protecting and encouraging 
First Amendment participatory activity. For example, anti-SLAPP 
statutes protect private actors in regard to subsection (e)(1) and (e)(2) 
“official proceedings” and in regard  to a subsection (e)(3) and (e)(4) 
“issue of public interest” because of the significance individual activity 
has to self-governance in a popular sovereignty.298 In the case of 
extending this protection to government actors, the anti-SLAPP statute 
would really just be protecting governmental actions, not protecting any 
activity endowed with constitutional significance. To the extent it would 
privilege government action over the petition rights of citizen litigants, 
bestowing such protection would be counter to the anti-SLAPP statute’s 
overarching objective. 
Since the wording of the statute frames the anti-SLAPP movant as 
the person whose First Amendment rights must be furthered by the 
conduct,  a  government  agent  would  seemingly  be  unable  to  claim 
 
 
 
 
295 Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding acts and 
statements made in pursuing a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding are not protected); Blackburn v. 
Brady, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding bids made at sheriff’s auction were 
not protected activity); Kajima Engineering & Constr. v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187, 
189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding filing of a lawsuit, submission of bids to a city to obtain a 
construction contract, and written requests for payment not protected)., A.F. Brown Electrical 
Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc., 41 Cal.Rptr.3d (2006)(Submission of stop notices 
relating to a construction project.); Wang, supra. (Applications for development permits.) Panakosta 
Partners, LP v. Hammer Lane Mgt., LLC, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 (2011)(Lawsuit for dissolution of 
partnership.) 
296 While the court in Vargas I declined to rule on the question, the lower courts recognized 
the court’s cue as a departure from the line of cases that had previously premised government’s 
ability to utilize the anti-SLAPP statute upon a government “right” and have specifically 
acknowledged that government agents have no free speech rights when acting in their official 
capacities. See USA Waste of Cal., Inc. v, City of Irwindale, 184 Cal. App. 4th 53, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010 (“The First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to government 
speech.”); see also Vargas II, 200 Cal App. 4th at 1347 (“Plaintiffs are correct that the First 
Amendment does not explicitly grant the government the right to speak.”). 
297 CAL. CIV PRO. CODE § 425.16(e). 
298 CAL. CIV PRO. CODE § 425.16(a). 
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vicarious protection for furthering participatory acts of actual persons.299 
The Vargas I court’s use of the term “statements” rather than “acts” may 
reflect the statute’s pinpoint of “other conduct”300  involving the exercise 
of rights and as literally not including government. 
In any event, the correct focus for anti-SLAPP purposes is  not 
merely whether a statement was made,301 but whether the lawsuit at issue 
arises from actual First Amendment activity. This is where application 
of anti-SLAPP statutes to government activity has gone seriously awry. 
It is critical to understand how courts have treated the requirement that a 
statement or act must be “based on” or “arise from” First Amendment 
activity in the context of private activity before considering the treatment 
given comparable governmental statements or acts. 
 
1. California’s Judicial Application of the “Arising From” 
Requirement to Lawsuits Based Upon Private Speech and 
Petitioning 
 
a. Cotati & Navellier 
 
The California supreme court directly rejected the view that the anti-
SLAPP statute applies to all statements made in the governmental 
 
 
 
299 But see Vergos v McNeal, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1387, 1399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding 
that “[s]ection 425.16 ‘does not require that a defendant. . . demonstrate that its protected statements 
or writings were made on its own behalf (rather than, for example, on behalf of its clients or the 
general public.”). However, the court in Vergos did not consider the statute’s limiting language in 
finding that a public agency hearing officer could avail herself of §425.16’s protection because she 
was advancing the First Amendment actions of others. Courts have not considered the implications 
of providing vicarious constitutional protection to government asserting First Amendment rights of 
individuals in abstentia. See, e.g.,, Kearney v. Foley, 590 F.3d 638, 644-645 (9th Cir. 2009). The 
difficulty in pushing the logic that government is acting on behalf of citizens and therefore deserves 
the same protection they would enjoy is that theoretically government is always acting on behalf of 
citizens. Fundamental to the concept of rights is that they exist to protect minority interests against 
majoritarian power represented by the State. Making the call as to whether a government is 
representing individual or governmental interests is a chicken-egg question—neither answerable nor 
a proper exercise of judicial power. Another analytic obstacle, even without the limiting language of 
subsection (b)(1), is that rights are generally considered personal and non-assignable. See Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 (1978) (holding one person may not invoke another’s Fourth 
Amendment right). 
300 Vargas I’s language was limited to protection of government “statements” falling under 
§425.16 (e)’s description of covered conduct. Subsection (e) goes beyond “statements” in only one 
particular. Subsection (e)(4) describes an “act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free 
speech” as including “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of 
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest.” 
301 Obviously some free "speech" is not really speech (shouting “fire” in a crowded theater, a 
statement reneging on a contract, obscenity) for First Amendment purposes and does not enjoy 
protection. Meanwhile, some non-speech is protected (expressive acts, filing a lawsuit, acts of 
association). 
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contexts described by subsection (e) in City of Cotati v. Cashman.302 
There, mobile home park owners sued the City of Cotati in federal court 
for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, with respect to the 
City’s efforts to enforce a rent-control ordinance applicable to mobile 
home parks.303 The City responded by suing in state court for 
declaratory relief relating to the same facts.304 The park owners filed an 
anti-SLAPP motion as to the City’s state lawsuit.305 The court 
considered the issue of whether the City’s lawsuit should be regarded as 
“arising from” the lawsuit filed by the owners (qualifying as protected 
petitioning activity), and thus subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.306 
The court recognized that the mere fact the one lawsuit was filed in 
response to the other “does not mean it arose from that activity.”307 The 
court pointed out that it was a different matter where a countersuit was 
brought based upon the first suit (i.e., a malicious prosecution or abuse 
of process suit), and stated: 
 
To construe “arising from” in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as 
meaning “in response to,” as Owners have urged, would in effect 
render all cross-actions  potential  SLAPPs. We presume  the 
Legislature did not intend such an absurd result. Absurdity aside, to 
suggest that all cross-actions arise from the causes of action in 
response to which they are pled would contravene the statutory 
scheme governing cross-complaints . . . . Indeed, Owners’ counsel, 
when arguing before the trial court, acknowledged City’s action could 
not be a SLAPP if City had filed it as a counterclaim in Owners’ 
federal action.308 
 
The California supreme court did not stop with recognizing that a cross- 
complaint premised on the same factual circumstances as the complaint 
or raising unrelated counterclaims against a plaintiff is not automatically 
subject to a motion to strike. It went on to state that even purely tactical 
considerations driving the filing do not amount to a SLAPP.309 
Applying this approach to the situation in Cotati yielded no 
surprises. Instead of looking at the form of the legal theory, the 
gravamen  of  the  cause  of  action  stated  by  the  cross-complaint,  the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002). 
302 City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 76-77 (Cal. 2002). 
303 Id. at 72 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 72-73 
306 Id. at 76 
307 Id. at 76-77 
308 Id. at 77 (citation omitted); see also Navellier v. Sletton, 29 Cal. 4th   82, 90-91 (Cal. 
 
309 City of Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 78-79. 
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strategic considerations behind that filing or the fact that it was filed in 
response to a lawsuit, the court focused upon whether,  factually,  the 
reason the cross-complaint was brought was protected First Amendment 
activity. The court observed that the activity producing the suit was an 
underlying controversy, not the federal lawsuit it incited. 
 
That the constitutionality of an ordinance can be a proper subject for 
declaratory relief is without doubt. . . . In this case, as the Court of Appeal 
stated, a dispute exists between the parties over the constitutionality of 
Cotati Ordinance No. 680. And just as Owners’ lawsuit itself was not the 
actual controversy underlying Owners’ request for declaratory relief in 
federal court, neither was that lawsuit the actual controversy underlying 
City’s state court request for declaratory relief. Rather, the actual 
controversy giving rise to both actions—the fundamental basis of each 
request for declaratory relief—was the same underlying controversy 
respecting City’s ordinance. City’s cause of action therefore was not one 
arising from Owners’ federal suit. Accordingly, City’s action was not 
subject to a special motion to strike.310 
 
In a companion case, the California supreme court elaborated 
further on this point. In Navellier v. Sletton, the court explained a court’s 
duty to look at whether First Amendment activity is the basis for claimed 
liability: 
 
As is discussed at length in Cotati . . . the mere fact that an action was 
filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose 
from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. 
Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been “triggered” 
by protected activity does not entail it is one arising from such. In the 
anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of 
action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning 
activity.311 
 
The claimed liability in Navellier involved a complex backdrop of 
federal suits, countersuits, and settlement.312 Following execution of a 
release by the parties, the plaintiff continued prosecuting the federal 
lawsuit.313 The defendant counterclaimed, challenging the validity of the 
release.314      Plaintiff then sued in state court claiming a breach of the 
 
 
310 Id. at 79-81. 
311 Navallier, 29 Cal. 4th at 89 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
312 See id. at 86-87. 
313 Id. at 86. 
314 Id. 
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release terms, and fraud concerning the defendant’s representations as to 
compliance with the release.315  The defendant responded to this reaction 
to his challenge to the validity of the release by filing a  motion  to 
strike.316 In holding that each of the defendant’s alleged acts and 
omissions fell squarely within the statute’s purview as  protected 
petitioning or speech, the court found that his negotiation and execution 
of the release, his arguments contesting its validity, and his counterclaim 
were “statement[s] or writing[s] made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a . . . judicial body,” or “made before a . . 
judicial proceeding” within the meaning of sections 425.16(e)(1) and 
(e)(2).317 
The court explained the first showing that must be made by a party 
bringing a motion to strike is to establish that the basis for the cause of 
action is protected activity. Not surprisingly, more than the mere fact 
that a defendant’s petitioning (a lawsuit) was involved or that official 
actions were implicated was required.318 
The court also recognized that it was necessary that the cause of 
action319 arise from defendant’s First Amendment petitioning or speech, 
observing that the constitutional right of petition encompasses filing 
litigation and concluding, “Sletten is being sued because  of  the 
affirmative counterclaims he filed in federal court.”320   The court zeroed 
in on the flaw in the plaintiff’s attempt to mischaracterize the lawsuit as 
simply based upon fraud or breach of contract: 
 
 
315 Id. at 87. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. at 90. 
318 Id. at 89-90. 
319 An obvious source of confusion for attorneys and judges seeking to wrap the legal mind 
around the “arising from” analysis emanates from use of two terms of art: “cause of action” and 
“gravamen.” The phrase “cause of action” is used colloquially as synonymous with a  count 
expressing a legal theory of recovery in a complaint. Additionally, in one important legal context 
the terms are understood in relation to the concept of a plaintiff’s primary right: the basic legal 
wrong for which the plaintiff seeks recovery. See, 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d), Pleading § 22. 
For example, a complaint may include various counts: fraud, negligence, breach of contract and so 
on. But the gravamen of the complaint may be one basic wrong sounding in tort: the defendant 
intentionally falsely promised some material thing, took plaintiff’s money and did not deliver. In the 
anti-SLAPP context, judicial use of these terms does not have the same meaning and is misleading. 
The inquiry is not into the “cause of action” in the sense of determining the legal theory or the 
primary right involved. Instead, it probes whether the reason for the lawsuit was constitutionally 
protected activity.  So, when decisions engaged in this evaluation refer to the “gravamen,” “gestalt” 
or “principal thrust” for the claim, they are not trying to place the lawsuit as sounding in equity as 
opposed to law or fraud as opposed to contract, they are seeking to gauge whether the main reason 
for the plaintiff’s suit was First Amendment activity or something else. One court in addressing this 
misleading terminology and rejecting an approach seeking to divine the metaphysical essence of the 
action observed, “We are admonished to examine the act underlying the cause of action, not the gist 
of the cause of action.” Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1190; see also, the 
Wallace court’s discussion at n.5. 
320 Id. at 90. 
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The logical flaw in plaintiffs’ argument is its false dichotomy between 
actions that target “the formation or performance of contractual 
obligations” and those that target “the exercise of the right of free 
speech.” A given action, or cause of action, may indeed target both. 
As the facts in this lawsuit illustrate, conduct alleged to constitute 
breach of contract may also come within constitutionally protected 
speech or petitioning. The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is 
not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the 
defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and 
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. 
Evidently, “[t]he Legislature recognized that ‘all kinds of claims could 
achieve the objective of a SLAPP suit—to interfere with and burden 
the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights.’” Considering the purpose 
of the [anti-SLAPP] provision, expressly stated, the nature or form of 
the action is not what is critical but rather that it is against a person 
who has exercised certain rights.321 
 
Thus, the California Supreme Court clearly tethered  anti-SLAPP 
protection to the exercise of First Amendment rights, not context, and 
rejected the idea that conduct not associated with the exercise of such 
rights merits anti-SLAPP protection. 
 
b. Lower California court treatment of the requirement that the cause 
of action must arise from First Amendment activity 
 
From Cotati and Navellier, it can be understood that merely because 
a written or oral statement was made in relation to activity falling under 
subsection (e) does not mean the liability in question is per se premised 
upon protected activity and subject to a motion to strike. Certainly, this 
has been the understanding of the lower courts applying the logic of 
those decisions.  For example, Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. 
v. City of Los Angeles involved a lawsuit to collect for construction work 
on a city contract.322 The court held that First Amendment activity was 
not the basis for liability.323 The basis for  the  cross-complaint  was 
instead the movant’s bidding and contracting practices.324 
The court in Kajima rejected an anti-SLAPP motion premised upon 
the mere filing of a cross-complaint in response to Kajima’s  lawsuit 
without any showing “that the amended cross-complaint ‘alleges acts in 
furtherance of [Kajima’s] right of petition or free speech in connection 
 
 
321 Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
322 Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 95 Cal. App. 4th 921, 
924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
323 Id. at 935 
324 Id. at 933 
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with a public issue.’”325 The court recognized that, in spite of the 
subsection (e) context, the anti-SLAPP statute had no application where 
the City’s cause of action did not arise from protected acts.326 The court 
stressed the critical difference between acts or conduct relating to 
litigation and acts and conduct in furtherance of speech and petitioning: 
 
We publish this opinion, however, to emphasize that a cross-complaint 
or independent lawsuit filed in response to, or in retaliation for, 
threatened or actual litigation is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute 
simply because it may be viewed as an oppressive litigation tactic. No 
lawsuit is properly subject to a special motion to strike under section 
425.16 unless its allegations arise from acts in furtherance of the right 
of petition or free speech.327 
 
Lending protection where any liability claim involves statements poses a 
basic problem that should be avoided after Cotati and Navellier. This is 
easily illustrated by an example. Let’s say an employer accused of a 
highly publicized Ponzi scheme publicly announces an employee that is 
the subject of the investigation is being let go “because she is a woman.” 
When the employee sues, the employer should not be able to rely upon 
free speech  considerations in invoking  anti-SLAPP   protection. 
Certainly, a statement was made and the employer’s right to speak is 
protected. But the liability arises not from protected speech on a matter 
of public interest, but from the act of discrimination. By contrast, the 
employer’s statement, “She’s fired because she cooked the  books,” 
would entitle the employer to raise anti-SLAPP protection against the 
employee’s suit for slander. 
Failing to look at anything more than the fact that a claimed liability 
involves a statement would disregard the distinction between whether 
First Amendment activity is the basis for bringing the claim, or whether 
the  statement  is  merely  peripheral  to  or  evidence  of  a  different, 
 
 
325 Id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
326 Id.  (“This error is fatal to Kajima’s motion: The amended cross-complaint alleges causes 
of action arising from Kajima’s bidding and contracting practices, not from acts in furtherance of its 
right of petition or free speech.”) 
327 Id. at 924; see Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 
1399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding protected communicative acts were merely evidence supporting 
the liability, not the alleged wrongful act itself); see also Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l., Inc., 113 Cal. 
App. 4th 181, 184-185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a product liability suit involving 
commercial statements made concerning the merits of a dietary supplement were not the basis for 
the plaintiff’s cause of action and thus were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute “merely 
because the complaint also alleges the manufacturer or seller engaged in commercial speech”); see 
also, Scott v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 416-417 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that statements made in products advertising were not the basis for liability in products liability 
action). 
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unprotected, underlying basis.328 With Cotati and Navellier, California 
recognized that failing to look beyond the context and the mere fact that 
a claim of liability involves a statement disregards that distinction. Cotati 
emphasized that whether a lawsuit ensues from or involves contexts 
described by the statute is not the proper inquiry: “In short, the statutory 
phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’ means simply  that  the 
defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have 
been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.”329 The 
form of the asserted liability is also not controlling, merely because a 
lawsuit is framed as one for discrimination does not mean the activity 
giving rise to the liability is not protected.330 
To recap, a clear distinction has been drawn by California and other 
appellate courts between liability arising from First Amendment conduct 
and liability that arises for other reasons. This involves an inquiry into 
whether the activity forming the basis for liability is actually First 
Amendment activity, or something else. Judicial acceptance of this 
distinction is particularly illustrated by  courts’  treatment  of  attorneys 
who are sued for acts related to the litigation process. 
 
 
 
 
 
328Martinez, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 188 (“[W]hen the allegations referring to arguably protected 
activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral 
allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.”); 
Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820 (stating in the hypothetical of a lawsuit against a defendant whose 
act was burning down a developer’s office in political protest, the incidental First Amendment aspect 
meant “the defendant’s motion to strike could be summarily denied without putting the developer to 
the burden of establishing the probability of success on the merits in a tort suit against defendant.”); 
but see Thomas v. Quintero, 126 Cal. App. 4th 635, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the 
primary reason the suit had been brought was not the torts of trespassing, infliction of emotional 
distress, blocking the passage of churchgoers, etc., but First Amendment activity). See, Tri-City 
Healthcare Dist. v. Sterling (4th Dist. 2011) D060431 (unpublished) (Censured board member who 
sought to enter meeting from which she was barred was sued for trespass, assault, battery, injury to 
business reputation and dilution, and negligence. The court of appeal rejected the plaintiff’s position 
that the basis for the action was Sterling’s violence involved in “violating the Board's resolutions and 
disobeying disciplinary measures imposed because of her disruptive behavior.” (Slip Opn. at 17-18) 
and held the protected conduct giving rise to the claims “was Sterling’s desire for access to a public 
meeting room to express her views to the board members, or her constituents in the audience” (Slip 
Opn. at 19)); Yan v. Sing (1st Dist. 2008) No. A120311 (unpublished) (Where reporter sought to 
photograph and interview trial witness and witness sued for assault, the activity was held to be in 
furtherance of right of free speech). So, the anti-SLAPP prong one inquiry searches beyond 
allegations and involves evaluating the facts to prevent frustration of “the purposes of the SLAPP 
statute through a pleading tactic of combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity 
under the label of one ‘cause of action.’” Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal. 
App. 4th 294, 308. 
329 Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 71. 
330 See Tuszynska v. Cunningham, 199 Cal. App. 4th 257, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
that a lawsuit for alleged gender discriminatory assignment of attorneys to litigation was based upon 
the “attorney selection and litigation funding decisions themselves,” and thus an activity 
substantially tied to protected petitioning activity). 
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c. The analogy to cases involving attorneys 
 
Outside of government use of the anti-SLAPP statute, in  cases 
where the basis for liability underlying the veneer of an official 
proceeding is something other than First Amendment conduct, courts in 
a robust body of case law consistently have found anti-SLAPP protection 
does not  apply in spite of literal  application of subsection (e). This 
departure from the judicial treatment afforded governmental activity is 
especially apparent in lawsuits charging attorneys with a breach of duties 
related to, but separate from the litigation process—misfeasance or 
malpractice. For example, an attorney who allegedly  commits 
malpractice or reneges upon a promise to represent a client for a certain 
fee is not covered, even though statements might occur during the course 
of litigation. Attorney malfeasance is not invariably protected by anti- 
SLAPP statutes because the operative conduct from which liability often 
arises is not the actual conduct of litigation, but instead other related 
activity.331   This tracks the essential distinction illuminated in Navellier. 
This inquiry involves looking beyond whether statements were 
merely made in a legal proceeding to whether the statement is connected 
to actual petitioning activity. In Paul v. Friedman, a lawyer brought an 
anti-SLAPP motion as to a securities broker’s allegations that the 
attorney had in a prior arbitration proceeding concerning alleged 
securities fraud disclosed to the broker’s clients and others  personal 
details about the broker’s financial affairs, spending habits, tax liabilities, 
and intimate relationship with another individual.332 The attorney 
asserted his conduct was protected because it was undertaken “in 
connection with” the arbitration.333 
In finding the attorney’s conduct did not “arise from” protected 
activity, the court of appeal recognized that section 425.16 “does not 
accord anti-SLAPP protection to suits arising from any act having any 
connection, however remote, with an official proceeding. The statements 
or writings in question must occur in connection with ‘an issue under 
consideration or review’ in the proceeding.”334  Statements that “bear [ ] 
no relationship to” or “ha[ve] nothing to do with the claims under 
consideration” in the litigation do not satisfy prong one’s requirement 
 
 
 
331 The courts have not blinked at providing anti-SLAPP protection for an attorney in spite of 
the fact that the lawyer is doing the petitioning of someone else—a client—in the litigation process. 
This vicarious treatment would seem to be directly at odds with the requirement that anti-SLAPP 
protection is personal – it only extends to acts by a person in furtherance of their personal speech or 
petition rights. CAL CIV. PRO. CODE §425.16(b)(1). 
332 Paul v. Friedman, 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 857-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
333 Id. at 865. 
334 Id. at 866. 
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that First Amendment activity be the basis for the liability.335 The 
investigation and disclosure of the plaintiff’s  private  information, 
although “in connection with” the proceeding, were not tied to issues 
under review in the arbitration proceeding.336 
There are numerous instances of attorney malfeasance in which an 
overlay of litigation was involved, statements were made and yet 
attorneys were unable to avail themselves of section 425.16 because the 
liability in question was not for protected litigation  activity, but  was 
based on related, but separate wrongful conduct.337 
 
 
 
335 Id. 
336 Id. at 867-68. 
337 In spite of the existence of statements made in contexts where protection would otherwise 
be available, but the cause of action is not actually based upon First Amendment conduct, the courts, 
following Cotati and Navellier have consistently declined to apply anti-SLAPP protections. See 
Kolar v. Donaine. McIntosh & Hammerton, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Legal malpractice is not an activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. That the malpractice 
allegedly occurred in the course of petitioning activity does not mean the claim arose from the 
activity itself.”); California Back Specialists Medical Group v. Rand, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1032, 1037 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Not all attorney conduct in connection with litigation, or in the course of 
representing clients, is protected by section 425.16”); Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp, 114 Cal. 
App. 4th 624, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a cause of action for legal malpractice was not 
subject to an anti-SLAPP motion because the cause of action did not arise from furtherance of 
speech or petitioning, but from negligent failure to serve timely discovery responses); Freeman v. 
Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a contract and tort action 
against attorney for representing adverse interests in litigation not subject to anti-SLAPP statute); 
Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182 (action against estate planning attorney for participation 
in breach of trust not subject to anti-SLAPP motion); Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 
(plaintiff’s cause of action based upon the defendant attorney’s letter was not based upon protected 
activity where the letter "constituted criminal extortion”. Id. at p. 311.); McConnell v. Innovative 
Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 176-177 (basis for liability 
underlying plaintiff's claims of retaliation and wrongful termination was imposition of restrictive 
work conditions, not a letter written by the employer's attorney imposing the conditions); United 
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1617 ( 
§425.16 did not apply in action to enjoin law firm from representing another party based upon “a 
disqualifying conflict of interest” arising out of the firm’s former representation of U.S. Fire in 
another matter because the complaint did not arise out of protected activity since “the principal 
thrust of the misconduct averred in the underlying complaint [was] the acceptance by Sheppard 
Mullin of representation adverse to U.S. Fire” Id. at 1628.); Prediwave Corporation v. Simpson 
Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204 (anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to suit 
against law firm for “(1) breach of fiduciary duty by defendants, (2) constructive fraud by 
defendants, (3) legal malpractice by defendants, and (4) violation of Business and Professions Code 
section 17200 et seq.” (Id. at 1209), where the principal thrust of the action was that the defendant 
law firm represented two clients in matters in which they had an irreconcilable conflict of interest. 
Id. at 1226-1227); Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264 (§425.16 did 
not apply to action against attorney based on an unconscionable contingency fee where the gravamen 
of the cause of action rested “on the alleged violation of Rogozienski’s fiduciary obligations to 
Hylton by giving Hylton false advice to induce him to pay an excessive fee to Rogozienski.” Id. at 
1274); Robles v. Chalilpoyil (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 566 (action against law firm for negligence and 
conspiracy to commit fraud was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute where: “The gravamen of this 
cause of action is not litigation-related speech or petitioning activity on respondents’ behalf; it was 
conduct outside the litigation—specifically, suppression of information about defendants’ business 
relationship—which deprived respondents of the representation for which they had retained 
defendants.” Id. at  579). 
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The anti-SLAPP statute comprehends acts constituting steps taken 
to advance the constitutional right of petition. Nevertheless acts that do 
not advance any actual petitioning enjoy no protection, including conduct 
involving litigation. For example, in Benasra v. Mitchell, Silberberg & 
Knupp338, plaintiffs argued the defendant law firm breached a duty of 
loyalty owed to them as current and former clients because it represented 
an opponent in an arbitration proceeding against them.339 The trial court 
concluded the suit was based on the firm's statements and writings made 
in or in connection with arbitration and judicial proceedings and was 
subject to §425.16.340 The court of appeal reversed.341  It recognized that 
the plaintiffs' malpractice claim did not arise out of the firm's protected 
activity in representing an adverse party in arbitration, but rather from 
the earlier breach of loyalty that occurred when the law firm allied itself 
with the adverse party.342 
Where cases have allowed  attorneys to avail themselves of anti- 
SLAPP protection, the courts have viewed the basis for liability asserted 
against the attorney to be premised upon petitioning activity.343 Here 
again, the courts scrutinize whether the statements are the basis  for 
liability and whether they are actually tied to an exercise of First 
Amendment rights. In Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation 
Corp., a homeowners association was denied maintenance access by a 
homeowner. 344 The association sued and had its lawyer send a letter to 
association members averring that the denial of access had resulted in 
increased costs.345  The homeowner sued for defamation and the 
homeowners  association  brought  a  motion  to  strike.346      The  court  of 
 
 
338 (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179. 
339 Id. at pp. 1182-1183. 
340 Id. at 1183-1184. 
341 Id. at 1190. 
342 Id. at pp. 1186-1189. 
343 See Neville v. Chudacoff, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1267-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding 
anti-SLAPP statute covers pre-litigation communications such as demand letters or other statements 
to adverse parties, potential adverse parties, and sometimes nonparties); Gallanis-Politis v. Medina, 
152 Cal. App. 4th 600, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A]cts in furtherance of free speech or petition 
rights include ‘communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution  of  a  civil 
action.’” (citation omitted)); Salma v. Capon, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1285 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding that filing a notice of lis pendens and a notice of rescission falls within the purview of 
§425.16);  Jarrow  Formulas,  Inc.  v.  LaMarche  (2003)  31  Cal.4th   728  (malicious  prosecution); 
Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048 (abuse of process based on a lawsuit); Drum v. Bleau, Fox 
& Associates (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 109 (abuse of process action based upon a levy); Ludwig v. 
Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8,17 (an entity’s act of directing litigation, even though it was 
not a party to the underlying lawsuit, fell within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute). 
344 Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., 137 Cal. App. 4th 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
345 Id. at 4. 
346 Id. 
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appeal found the statements in the letter to be related to the purpose of 
petitioning involved in the judicial proceeding and allowed  the 
association to rely upon the anti-SLAPP statute: “Because one purpose of 
the letter . . . was to inform members of the association of pending 
litigation involving the association, the letter is unquestionably ‘in 
connection with’ judicial proceedings.’”347 
Similarly, Taheri Law Group v. Evans allowed use of the anti- 
SLAPP statute by a lawyer. 348 The Taheri Law Group sued another 
attorney alleging that he improperly solicited Taheri’s client during 
pending litigation.349 The complaint premised liability upon Evans’s 
communications with the client and his conduct in enforcing a settlement 
agreement on the client’s behalf.350 The  case  should not  be read as 
holding that an attorney’s solicitation of a client during pending litigation 
constitutes an act in furtherance of speech or petition rights. On the 
contrary, the court stated: 
 
Taheri contends its lawsuit . . . arose from Evans’s conduct soliciting a 
client, ‘not what [Evans] did  when  he got into the case.’  Taheri’s 
analysis is erroneous. Its complaint plainly shows it arose from 
Evans’s communications with Sorokurs about pending litigation, and 
from  Evans’s  conduct  in  enforcing  the  settlement  agreement  on 
Sorokurs’s behalf.351 
 
The act of solicitation arises out of the attorney’s interest in obtaining 
business and advances no speech or petitioning interests. But because 
the cause of action was based upon “conduct in enforcing the settlement 
agreement”, it arose from an act in furtherance of the client’s right of 
petition. 352 
In   Chodos   v.   Cole,353     an   attorney,   Chodos,   was   sued   for 
malpractice. He cross-complained, seeking indemnification against other 
attorneys who had rendered advice concerning a marital settlement 
agreement. They responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The court 
observed  the  uniform  authority354   establishing  that  §425.16  “does  not 
 
 
 
347 Id. at 6 (citation omitted). 
348 Taheri Law Group v. Evans, 160 Cal. App. 4th  482, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
349 Id. at 485. 
350 Id. at 489. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. 353   210 Cal.App.4th 692 (2012). 
354 The court expressed some unease with the holdings in Taheri, supra, (Id. at       ) and Thayer 
v. Kabateck, Brown, Kellner, LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141 (Wife’s lawsuit against husband’s 
attorneys for wrongful disposition of class action settlement proceeds subject to anti-SLAPP motion) 
and observed the statement in Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar (9th Cir.2010) 611 F.3d 590, 598, that 
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apply to claims of attorney malpractice.”355 It reviewed a number of the 
cases cited infra, noting the statement in Kolar that “In a malpractice suit, 
the client is not suing because the attorney petitioned on his or her behalf, 
but because the attorney did not competently represent the client’s interests 
while doing so.”356 The court concluded the indemnification claim was 
still grounded in attorney malpractice and, therefore, did not arise from 
First Amendment activity: “Malpractice involves a breach of duty by 
neglecting to do an act or doing an act, not the right of petition.”357 
The treatment of the distinction drawn between lawsuits challenging 
attorney misconduct and conduct involving access to  the  courts is in 
stark contrast to the treatment given by courts to lawsuits challenging 
wrongful conduct by government agents. Where the courts have readily 
distinguished attorney acts that further the purposes of an official 
proceeding from acts that do not, the government agent’s activities are 
the official proceeding and cannot be dichotomized between petitioning 
and non-petitioning conduct. 
 
C. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE “ARISING FROM” REQUIREMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
 
In view of the anti-SLAPP statute’s requirement that the liability in 
question “arise from” a First Amendment exercise of rights, it is 
necessary to consider how courts apply this to government speech.  Prior 
to Vargas I, the courts took two approaches. Some evaluated the 
underlying basis for liability in terms of whether the challenge to 
government involved an actual challenge to an exercise of First 
Amendment rights. 358   Reflecting confusion over the nature and extent of 
 
 
 
attorney   malpractice   claims   were   not   categorically   excluded   from   anti-SLAPP   coverage, 
acknowledging the “arising from” inquiry probes beyond the form of the action. Id. at       . 
355 Id. at       . 
356 Id at       . 
357 Id. at . The court held that “a claim by an attorney against other attorneys for equitable 
indemnity in connection with a claim of attorney malpractice is not distinguishable from a client’s 
claim against an attorney for malpractice.” Id. at       . 
358 E.g., San Ramon Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Empls. Ret. Ass’n, 125 Cal. 
App. 4th 343, 354 (2004) (distinguishing “[a]cts of governance mandated by law” from speech); 
Visher v. Malibu, 126 Cal. App. 4th 364, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the lawsuit was 
based upon Malibu’s refusal to issue a permit and did not arise from the city’s appeal of unrelated 
Coastal Commission decision). Why a public entity’s mandatory act should be treated  any 
differently from a governing body’s discretionary decision with regard to whether or not it is an act 
“in connection with an . . . official proceeding” is not explained by the court. Nor does there appear 
to be any cogent reason to treat government activity involving statements in a police report or 
investigatory communications differently from activity involving statements in other contexts. All 
these situations just involve government doing what government does (albeit allegedly without 
proper authority, improperly or with an improper purpose), rather than government engaging in 
quasi-free speech or petitioning activity in the manner of a private citizen. 
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the government speech doctrine, some of these courts treated any 
statement by a government agent as an exercise of First Amendment 
rights.359 Others did not even mention the First Amendment and found 
protection for government agencies in the language of the statute. 360 
Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica is a representative case of pre- 
Vargas I judicial application of the “arising from” analysis to find anti- 
SLAPP protection extended to conduct of government actors.361 In 
Holbrook, the plaintiff brought suit for declaratory relief and mandamus 
alleging the city failed to comply with open meeting requirements and 
other laws by holding meetings that ran late into the  night.362  The 
decision, including a smattering of references to the “City Council’s 
exercise of its right of free speech,” found that “the causes of action arise 
from protected activity: governmental speech and legislative action at 
City Council meetings.”363 The court found the protection was bestowed 
by the broad language of all four parts of subsection (e): 
 
Council members make oral statements before the other members of 
their legislative body and in connection with issues under review by 
the City Council. They make statements in a place open to the public 
or a public forum in connection with issues of public interest. The 
public meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public 
 
 
 
 
359 E.g., Santa Barbara Cnty. Coalition Against Auto. Subsidies v. Santa Barbara Cnty. Ass’n 
of Gov’ts, 167 Cal. App. 4th  1229, 1237-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding government use of 
§425.16 against a citizen challenge to government expenditures to develop a ballot initiative); 
Gallanis-Politis v. Medina, 152 Cal.App.4th 600, 611-612 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (retaliation claim 
against county employer based on content of report and memorandum); Levy v. City of Santa 
Monica, 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1255-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (lawsuit for injunctive and declaratory 
relief in response to building code red-tag to large backyard playhouse subject to the anti-SLAPP 
law because it arose directly out of the neighbor's and the building inspector's communications with 
city employees.) 
360 See Schaffer v. City of San Francisco, 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1003-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding  that  the asserted  liability  was  characterized  as arising from protected  Civ. Pro. Code 
§425.16(e) activity—official police investigation proceedings and a memorandum and arrest 
warrant); see also, Hansen, supra (likewise characterizing liability as arising from an official 
investigation, not just statements related to or involving that official proceeding); Maranatha 
Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1085-1086 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding that an alleged defamation by government agents arising from a letter regarding an 
issue under consideration in an official proceeding was covered by Civ. Pro. Code §425.16(e)); 
Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383 (holding a city’s investigation into a 
public employee’s conduct was covered relying solely upon subsection (e) and without regard to 
whether the liability actually arose from petitioning or free speech.) While these decisions give lip- 
service to the Navellier and Cotati analysis requiring that the liability involved must “arise from” 
protected activity, they reached their conclusion by the circular logic of citing subsection (e)’s list of 
activity defined as First Amendment speech and petitioning. 
361 Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (2006). 
362 Id. at 1245. 
363 Id. 1247. 
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interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council 
members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public 
issues and issues of public interest.364 
 
Without the premise that the governmental statements are the exercise of 
First Amendment rights, the analysis crumbles. If the underlying basis 
for liability—holding meetings too late—did not “arise from” the 
exercise of  free speech  or petitioning,  there could be  no anti-SLAPP 
protection. But if the government statements made at the overlong 
meetings are endowed with First Amendment stature, the basis for 
liability is transformed from an assault upon government misconduct to 
an attack upon protected activity. 
Vargas I effectively removed the First Amendment prop to this 
analysis.  But the house of cards has not fallen yet. 
 
1. Post Vargas I “arising from” analysis of government speech — 
confusion compounded 
 
After Vargas I, the threshold inquiry for applicability of §425.16 – 
whether to a governmental statement or private statement –remains the 
“arising from” inquiry of whether liability is based upon activity in 
furtherance of the speaker’s First Amendment speech or petition rights.365 
The conundrum is how this question can ever be answered in the 
affirmative for a government speaker. 
The Vargas I approach that looks at whether a private speaker would 
be protected if he or she made the governmental statement cannot be 
reconciled with Cotati’s “arising from” approach that disregards the form 
of the cause of action and looks to whether the defendant’s activity that 
gives rise to the asserted liability constitutes constitutionally protected 
speech.366   The mere fact a statement was made or an official proceeding 
occurred is not the determinant.367    The court in Cotati recognized that 
 
 
 
364 Id. at 1247-48. 
365 §425.16(b)(1). 
366 Navellier at 92; Cotati at 78-79. 
367 Considering whether the government conduct in question involves the public interest is not 
helpful because the innumerable functions of government are always and necessarily of interest to 
the public. Looking to section 425.16(e)’s list of protected conduct only hampers analysis by 
redirecting inquiry away from substance (i.e., whether First Amendment activity is threatened by a 
SLAPP) to form (i.e., whether activity that is the subject of the lawsuit is simply listed in that 
subsection). The superior source for guidance lies in the admirable purpose of section 425.16 in 
protecting First Amendment activity by creating an expedited mechanism for addressing lawsuits 
brought to suppress such activity. An approach to section 425.16 that disregards its primary object – 
the protection of “any act . . . in furtherance of the . . . right of petition or free speech under the 
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue. . .” (§425.16(b)(1) ) - in 
favor of sub-definitional considerations set forth at subsection (e), overlooks the forest for the trees. 
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whether a lawsuit follows or involves activity listed in subsection (e) is 
not the proper inquiry. 
Applying the “arising from” inquiry to private statements has never 
proven easy for California courts – even the state supreme court368, - and 
the methodology remains fraught with discord. Cases addressing private 
disputes where the ostensible basis for liability might be either retaliation 
for First Amendment activity or unprotected conduct or a combination of 
both, appear to make it something of a crap-shoot how the court will 
dispose of the first prong inquiry of whether the lawsuit is substantially 
rather than incidentally premised on rights-based activity.369 
In application, this has yielded much judicial uncertainty expressed 
in split decisions, dissents and dueling authorities. For one thing, “any 
written or oral statement or writing” as set forth in subsection (e) does 
not confine anti-SLAPP protection to activity involving communicative 
activity. The supreme court in Rusheen v. Cohen370 made it plain that 
necessarily related non-communicative acts subsequent to protected 
communicative acts are protected as well. Additionally, the court in 
Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.371 held that the anti-SLAPP first 
prong is satisfied where a defendant shows that a “substantial part” of a 
cause of action is protected activity.” Applying this approach, the court 
in Wallace v. McCubbin372 held that causes of action arising from both 
subsection (e) protected activity and nonprotected conduct are covered 
by the anti-SLAPP statute unless the protected activity is merely 
incidental to the unprotected activity.373 Courts addressing   private 
lawsuits have not agreed with this standard and have disagreed over how 
to apply it.374    In terms of government actions this is significant because 
 
 
 
368 Navellier, addressed whether a lawsuit for breach of contract alleging violation of a 
settlement release was subject to anti-SLAPP protection. The dissenting opinion, relying upon 
Duracraft objected that the majority holding that the suit was covered lent an overly broad treatment 
of the “arising from” language, chiding: “Distinguishing SLAPP's from legitimate petitioning is 
challenging but essential. Our proper solicitude for one party's right to petition cannot come at the 
expense of the other party's parallel right.” Navellier at 718-719. 
369 Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 
Cal.App.4th 658, 672 (holding a " 'cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the 
protected conduct is "merely incidental" to the unprotected conduct.' "); Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 
Cal.App.4th 1275, 1287. ("A mixed cause of action is subject to section 425.16 if at least one of the 
underlying acts is protected conduct, unless the allegations of protected conduct are merely 
incidental to the unprotected activity.") . 
370 (2006) 37 Cal.4th  1048, 1062. 
371   120 Cal.App.4th 90 (2004). 
372 (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169 
373 Id. at 1187. 
374 See, Haight Ashbury  Free  Clinics, Inc. v. Happening  House  Ventures, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 
129,144 (2010) (concurring and dissenting opn.: “The majority opinion adopts the rule set forth in 
Mann . . . that a plaintiff may freely make utterly meritless attacks on a defendant's exercise of free 
speech and petition, if the plaintiff has also alleged some nonprotected activity that supports the 
cause of action. This is plainly inconsistent with the anti-SLAPP  statute's  purpose  of  curbing 
lawsuits  that chill the valid  exercise of free speech.”);  Wallace  v.  McCubbin, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 
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government functions generally involve mixed activity – communicative 
in nature (e.g., a report, citation, finding) as well as non-communicative 
conduct (enforcement action, determination, arrest). 
The second prong analysis for mixed protected and non-protected 
activity is in flux as well. The court in Mann reasoned that so long as a 
plaintiff can establish minimal merit for the cause of action it should not 
matter whether the merit relates to protected or nonprotected activity, the 
cause of action survives.375 Some courts have held that only the 
allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint that arose from protected activity 
and for which minimal merit cannot be established get  stricken.376 
Courts applying Mann have held that a cause of action which does not 
meet the probable cause standard gets stricken regardless of whether or 
not it is based in part upon underlying activity that is unprotected.377 
The perils this confusion presents for prospective private litigants - 
laypersons not in the habit of parsing legalistic hairs - who approach the 
possibility of a lawsuit involving official proceedings cannot be gainsaid. 
One cannot divine  when  a lawsuit will  be  subject to an anti-SLAPP 
motion where appellate courts are in disarray on where to draw the line. 
The difficulty – and likewise the chill - for a citizen contemplating suit 
against the government, however, is considerably greater. This  is 
because in addition to all the other vagaries plaguing evaluation  of 
private   actions,   the   litigant   must   also   guess   when   challenged 
 
 
 
205,242 (2011) (Concurring opn.; “I respectfully disagree with my colleagues' criticism of the rule 
articulated in Mann . . . and so I cannot join the majority's view that a plaintiff ‘basing liability on 
both protected activity and unprotected activity should have to establish a probability of prevailing 
as to his or her attack on the activity the statute was designed to protect--protected activity--nothing 
more than that, and nothing less.’”); City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 
751,(Concurring & dissenting opn.: “In my view, the gravamen of the fourth cause of action as well 
as the sixth cause of action of the cross-complaint was wholly unrelated to any protected activity.”) 
375 Mann at 106 (if a plaintiff pursuing mixed cause of action demonstrates  probability  of 
prevailing on any part of his or her claim, the cause of action survives the motion to strike and the 
court does not parse allegations of protected activity from nonprotected activity) 
376 City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 772, (holding that court should 
parse a mixed cause of action, granting motion to strike meritless protected activity while allowing 
complaint to proceed as to unprotected activity;   and see dissenting opinion by Richli, J., at 206 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 787, 789, disagreeing with this view); Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 
Cal.App.4th 1169, 1199, 1210 (holding §425.16 requires a plaintiff to establish probability of 
prevailing on protected activity “and nothing else” to allow the court to strike just the “claims” based 
on protected activity);   Cho v. Chang (2nd District, Div. 4) B239719 September 06, 2013 
(unpublished) (holding court is to strike “allegations” arising from protected conduct but not those 
arising from activity that is not protected by §425.16). 
377  Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 
1539, 1554, (entire cause of action properly stricken where any part arises from protected conduct 
not merely “incidental” to unprotected activity, and plaintiff fails to show requisite probability of 
success on any part of the cause of action). But see dissenting opinion by Needham, J., Id. at 1555 
(arguing this approach is inconsistent with the statute, rejecting Mann’s reasoning, and asserting that 
the court should distinguish between “claim” and “cause of action”); Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 
Cal.App.4th 357, 378, (disagreeing with majority opinion in Singletary that a court should parse and 
strike allegations in a complaint and agreeing with the dissent). 
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governmental action is going to be characterized by a court as in the 
nature of a “right.” 
The Vargas I proposition that courts should regard government 
speech as protected if it would be protected when uttered by a private 
actor provides an entirely unworkable guideline. For  fundamental 
reasons of constitutional design government activity cannot be treated 
like rights. Treating communicative governmental activity like an ersatz 
exercise of individual rights fails to comprehend the vast difference 
between the constitutional roles of private and government conduct, 
including speech.378 Both individuals and government play  roles  and 
speak in the process of governance.  They just do this differently.  For a 
private actor it means the exercise of rights - seeking to influence the 
government in order to change the status quo or to maintain it. For a 
government actor it does not. 
For the same reasons it cannot be discerned when  an  individual 
would have made a particular governmental statement because a private 
individual or entity would not make a governmental statement.379     A 
county policy, school board decision or police report cannot be treated 
“as if” made by a person for section 425.16 purposes because private 
actors do not make governmental policies, decisions and reports. They 
participate in the process – they complain to government officials, they 
attend and have input into proceedings, they report crimes and concerns. 
But they do not bureaucratically process the policies, decisions and 
reports themselves. Even the expression of a point of view on an issue 
by a government actor represents government’s view, not a First 
Amendment expression of private opinion. 
 
 
 
378 Conceptually, government’s role is to provide for sovereign citizen participation in the 
political process and to implement decisions of the electorate and its elected representatives. This 
role is entirely responsive, incidental or collateral to private activity in furtherance of speech or 
petitioning rights. Government agents accept and process and decide and regulate based upon 
individual participatory activity. They facilitate such exercises of rights. But they do not engage in 
such petitioning or expressing themselves. Their participation is limited to simply performing the 
function of government – holding meetings, making reports, accepting public input and advancing 
policies. Government furthers the rights of private actors, not its own. 
379 Certainly both government agents and private actors make statements. Those statements 
may involve liability on tort, breach of contract or other theories. For example, governmental 
statements were made in McGarry v. Univ. of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 57, concerning the 
circumstances of a college head football coach’s termination that were alleged to be defamatory. 
The court held anti-SLAPP protections applied because the liability arose from “speech in 
connection with a public issue or a matter of public interest within the meaning of section 425.16, 
subdivision (e)(4).” Id. at 111. While the remarks about the coach’s conduct could be uttered by 
private actors, they did not amount to an exercise of free speech rights. It is the context of such 
statements that generally has no correlation to private speech. In McGarry these were the comments 
of a government agent on why a particular official action occurred. In Schaffer, supra, these 
allegedly false statements were remarks in a police report. Private actors do not speak in those 
official capacities. Compare, People ex rel. Fire Exchange v. Anapol (2012)  Cal.App.4th           
(holding that private action asserting preparation of false and fraudulent insurance reports was not 
subject to a motion to strike). 
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For a court or a litigant pondering the question, it makes no sense to 
treat governmental speech and private speech involving an exercise of 
rights identically in terms of their similarities in form when they are 
entirely different in substance. The propriety of government handling of 
government affairs is a question of misconduct, not the exercise of a 
right.  Seeking to isolate governmental statements emulating free speech 
to some greater degree than countless government communications 
amounting to nothing more than government  performing  routine 
functions is a venture into a Dickensian “fog everywhere.” 
The analytic approach after Cotati calls upon a court to evaluate 
when an asserted basis for liability originates in actual rights-based 
activity. A court cannot do this if the government activity in question 
merely seems like First Amendment conduct. The entire point of the 
“arising from” analysis is to sort out liability that looks like it attacks 
First Amendment rights (but does not) from liability that actually does 
retaliate against First Amendment activity. Extending protection  to 
speech that mimics exercises of rights completely defeats the point of 
this exercise. And it defeats the objective of protecting First Amendment 
rights. 
The California supreme court recognized “Vague definitions of what 
constitutes a frivolous appeal raise the danger that attorneys will be 
deterred from asserting valid claims out of a fear that they will incur 
court sanctions.”380 Vagueness over when government may use §425.16 
raises the identical danger: “Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason 
vague laws chill speech: People of ‘common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at [the law’s] meaning and differ as to its 
application.’”381 
 
2. Judicial Application of Anti-SLAPP Statutes to Government 
Speech in a Post-Vargas World Where Government Speech is Not 
Constitutionally Protected 
 
The difficulty in applying the vague analogy, drawn by the court in 
Vargas I, between government speech and the exercise of  First 
Amendment rights by private agents, has been reflected in the decisions 
of California’s lower courts. Instead of expressing well-deserved, 
profound befuddlement as to how to proceed in analyzing when 
government’s speech could have been made by a private agent, the courts 
seeking to apply this elusive proposition have engaged in disingenuous 
treatment of the “arising from” analysis.  While paying pious respect to 
 
 
380 In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal.3d 637, 651 (1982). 
381 Citizens United v. FEC (2009) 558 U.S. 310, 324. 
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that requirement, many courts dealing with government anti-SLAPP 
movants have simultaneously ignored its essence and have disregarded 
considering whether the government activity  in  question  actually 
involves exercise of a First Amendment right. 
a. The literal approach—all governmental statements are protected 
Lower California courts have split after Vargas I in addressing the 
requirement that there be an underlying First Amendment aspect to a 
claim for liability against a government agent. The approach by some 
courts has been to skirt the inquiry and instead focus on the language of 
subsection (e) as describing potentially protected  situations.  Post- 
Vargas I decisions finding that the basis for liability asserted against 
government agents does allow anti-SLAPP protection have mostly been 
unpublished. Although they contain no  mention  of  government 
exercising First Amendment rights, they either rely upon pre-Vargas I 
case law that analyzes the question from that perspective or treat the 
“arising from” requirement as satisfied by circular reliance upon the anti- 
SLAPP statute’s examples of First Amendment activity. 
Characteristic of such decisions is a logical mobius strip reliance 
upon the language of the statute as satisfying the “arising from” 
requirement rather than a review of whether the liability in question 
actually implicates real First Amendment speech or petitioning activity. 
The “arising from” inquiry is confined to whether the lawsuit implicates 
statements made in subsection (e) contexts, relying upon the statute’s 
definition of such statements as per se constitutionally protected speech 
or petitioning. In other words, if the activity that incited the litigation fits 
under the statute’s language, it is First Amendment activity. Therefore 
the lawsuit “arises from” First Amendment activity and is subject to a 
motion to strike.  This approach is exactly what was rejected as incorrect 
in Cotati and Navellier.382 
For example, in White v. City of Santa Ana, plaintiffs sued to 
challenge a city’s compliance with the law in its use of automated traffic 
enforcement systems (ATES), complaining that notice requirements had 
not been met and that citations had been and were being issued and 
prosecuted unlawfully.383 What the plaintiffs were really challenging in 
White was whether the City was conducting its affairs relating to the 
 
 
 
 
382 Cf. Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 78 (“[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’ 
means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been 
an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (citation omitted)). 
383 White v. City of Santa Ana, No. G045757, 2012 WL 5412018 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 
2012). 
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ATES system in a lawful manner. The court of appeal treated the 
governmental activities as protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, 
reasoning: 
 
Appellants’ complaint is based on the City’s allegedly improper 
issuance of citations, rather than only warning notices, and the 
subsequent prosecution and conviction of plaintiffs and imposition of 
penalties based upon those citations, all of which constitutes protected 
speech. The citations themselves constitute writings “made in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . 
judicial body” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision 
(e)(2).384 
 
Because the activity that gave rise to the White lawsuit fell within 
the vast range of governmental affairs described in the statute as 
protected, the court found the anti-SLAPP  statute  applied.385  What 
eluded the court’s grasp, however, was that the official issuance of 
citations, failure to give notice and so on, while literally falling under the 
statutory language, is not actually First Amendment-based conduct at all. 
It is just government doing what government does concerning matters in 
which citizens might have reason to participate.386 A citizen challenge to 
the lawfulness of what government does, meanwhile, is First 
Amendment activity. 
Also representative of this tautological approach is Petersen Law 
Firm v. City of Los Angeles,387 holding that a lawsuit challenging a 
government employer’s policy relating to overtime pay involves 
statements made in official proceedings and, therefore, falls within the 
ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute: 
 
 
 
384 Id. at *7 (footnote and citation omitted). 
385 Id. at *8 (“The complaint is entirely directed at the allegedly inappropriate issuance and 
enforcement (or prosecution) of citations. As such it falls within the statutorily enumerated first 
prong grounds in section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) [written statement made in connection with 
official proceeding], and (e)(2) [written statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration before official proceeding].”). 
386 Kapler v. City of Alameda (First Dist., Div. 1, Sept. 6, 2012) No. A133001 (unpublished) 
addressed a public employee’s lawsuit. A city’s fire chief resigned after being photographed putting 
gas into his personal car from a city pump. He sued for breach of contract and wrongful termination. 
Finding that the defendant’s activity giving rise to the liability was “the city’s divulging to the media 
accusations of misconduct and allegedly incriminating photograph” and also “the  city’s 
investigation,” the court held the causes of action “fall squarely within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP 
statute.” This overlooks whether actual First Amendment activity was involved, and instead finds 
anti-SLAPP application because one activity was covered by subsection (e)(2) as implicating 
“statements ‘made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative body” 
and the other by subsection (e)(3) as implicating “statements made in a . . . public forum in 
connection with an issue of public interest.’”(Slip Opn, at 8). 
387 (Second Dist., Div.4, April 13, 2011) No.B220030 (unpublished). 
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Here, the actions at issue in the petition for writ of mandate are 
defendants’ actions of implementing an overtime policy, including 
authorizing investigations of any police officer who brings a lawsuit to 
recover overtime pay. Under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), “any 
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue 
under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial 
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law” is “an act in 
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the 
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public 
issue.” An internal investigation is an official proceeding authorized 
by law. Interviews and written statements made in connection with an 
internal  investigation  are  thus  protected  activities  under  the  anti- 
SLAPP statute.388 
 
The “arising from” inquiry is shifted away from whether the underlying 
basis for liability is First Amendment activity. Obviously a challenge to 
governmental policies is not an assault upon free speech or petitioning. 
The inquiry becomes one of asking whether liability is based upon 
statements falling under subsection (e). Under this approach, anything 
involving a governmental statement in a proceeding or upon a matter of 
public concern has anti-SLAPP protection. The result is no different 
from the pre-Vargas I approach that regarded  all  governmental 
statements as an exercise of First Amendment rights. 
This shift in focus away from whether First Amendment activity is 
the source of the liability sought to be imposed to whether the activity 
that gave rise to the lawsuit is covered by subsection (e) is evident in 
Nesson v. Northern Inyo Cty. Local Hospital Dist. In that case, the court 
of appeal addressed a fired radiologist’s lawsuit against his employer for 
breach of contract, retaliation, and  discrimination.389  The  court 
recognized that “[t]he gravamen of each cause of action asserted  by 
Nesson is that the Hospital somehow acted wrongfully” including that he 
could not be terminated based upon a summary suspension or for a 
disability.390 Nevertheless, the court regarded the improper acts of 
summary suspension and termination as protected.391    This was because 
 
 
388 Petersen Law Firm v. City of Los Angeles, No. B220030, 2011 WL 1380059, at *3 (Cal. 
Ct. App. April 13, 2011) (citations omitted). 
389 Nesson v. N. Inyo Cnty. Local Hospital Dist., 204 Cal. App.4th 65, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012).  
390 Id. at 83. 
391 Id. at 84.; but see Martin v. Inland Empire Utils. Agency, 198 Cal. App. 4th   611, 625 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that although an employee’s discrimination claim against a 
government employer derived from a board meeting, evaluation review proceedings, and other 
official conduct that would have to be considered “official proceedings,” the liability arose from 
“racial and retaliatory discrimination” and denied anti-SLAPP protection). In both cases, however, 
liability was premised upon retaliatory discrimination.  The difference is that in Martin the court did 
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these actions which bear no resemblance to private First Amendment 
activity and, instead, look entirely like employer-employee relations, 
involved “official proceedings” covered by  subsection  (e)(1)  and 
(e)(2).392 
Likewise, a particularly illustrative case is Gallant v. City of 
Alameda,393 where the court distinguished a city’s employment decision 
from cases denying anti-SLAPP protection for private  decisions 
involving termination of an employee because those cases did not 
concern “a municipality’s protected activity as defined in section 425.16, 
subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).”394 The  fact the  firing  was  done by a 
government agency endowed it with anti-SLAPP protection only because 
it involved activity that was “official.” 
A more involved version of this approach to whether a claim arose 
from protected activity was sketched by the court in City of Costa Mesa 
v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC. In finding that anti-SLAPP protection 
applied to city employees’ remarks concerning a commercial property, 
the court set forth a three-part process for concluding they were protected 
by subsection (e)(2): “(a) was there an ‘issue under  consideration  or 
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body’; (b) were the 
employees’ statements made ‘in connection with’ this issue; and (c) did 
the causes of action pleaded by D’Alessio ‘aris[e] from’ the employees’ 
statements?”395 
This involves unnecessary, protracted analysis to arrive at the 
foregone conclusion that subsection (e) covers governmental statements 
concerning governmental matters. Public employees’ communications in 
the course of performing their duties are necessarily going to relate to 
issues of concern to the agency they serve. The issues will be “under 
consideration” and the statements will be made “in connection” to them. 
As far as whether a claim for liability involving such statements is one 
“arising from” those statements, the court engaged in the same circular 
logic we have seen before. It did not ask whether the statements that 
formed the basis for liability actually constituted or furthered First 
Amendment activity, but instead probed whether those statements were 
the basis for the asserted liability, as distinguished from liability 
premised upon other governmental activity involving statements. 
 
 
 
 
not become sidetracked by the fact that the discrimination was manifested in or evidenced by its 
occurrence in official proceedings. 
392 Nesson, 204 Cal. App. 4th at 77-78. 
393 No. A133777 (2013) 
394 Id., at 6 
395 City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Invs., 214 Cal. App. 4th 358, 372-373 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2013). 
85
Andre: Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014
 
 
 
 
 
200  GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
Ultimately, in spite of the extra hoops the court jumped through in 
City of Costa Mesa, it was really just asking whether the governmental 
statements  fall  within  the  contexts  described  in  subsection  (e),  not 
whether they actually involved First Amendment activity. 
On the continuum between a picketer treading on someone’s foot or 
blocking entrance and a violent physical assault or false imprisonment, 
evaluating whether the predominant factor behind a legal action places it 
closer to the exercise of First Amendment rights or an intentional tort is 
not an easy one for courts to make. Removing from the evaluation 
altogether the requirement that there be a First Amendment aspect to the 
activity makes such placement impossible. 
For example, consider a law enforcement officer who encounters a 
criminal suspect. In performing her official duty the officer tells the 
suspect, “Stop, police.” The suspect starts running, so the officer shouts, 
“Stop, or I will shoot.” The suspect keeps running, so the officer shoots. 
When the deaf, innocent, injured individual who was hurrying to catch a 
bus sues alleging excessive force, should the officer’s conduct be 
protected by the anti-SLAPP law in addition to all the other immunities 
and legal protections bestowed upon law enforcement officers?  The 
liability arises from statements made in a subsection (e)  context  and 
would be covered under the approach adopted in City of Costa Mesa, 
Nesson and the other cases. However, the evaluation ignores the fact that 
the activity, like any government activity, has no free speech or 
petitioning aspect to it. 
 
b. The other approach to application of “arising from” by post-Vargas 
I courts 
 
Other post-Vargas I courts have viewed government conduct as 
devoid of First Amendment protection. These courts have critiqued the 
use of anti-SLAPP statutes by government as counter  to  the  petition 
rights the statutes were meant to protect and have located the alleged 
liability in question as based upon some manner of governmental 
misfeasance rather than as arising from government speech. 
In Graffiti Protective Coatings v. City of Pico Rivera, the trial court 
ruled that because maintenance of bus stops was a matter of  public 
interest, a city could bring a motion to strike in response to a lawsuit 
challenging related procedures.396 In reversing, the court of appeal held 
that even if a public issue was implicated by claims that the city violated 
competitive bidding requirements, “they are not based on any statement, 
 
 
396 Graffiti Protective Coatings v. City of Pico Rivera, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1214 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010) 
86
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/4
 
 
 
 
 
2014]        Anti-SLAPP Confabulation & Government Speech 201 
 
writing, or conduct by the city in furtherance of its right of free speech or 
its right to petition the government for the redress of grievances.”397 The 
fact that official proceedings and related communications covered by 
section 425.16(e) occurred relating to the issue was not dispositive.398 
The pertinent  inquiry was  one  of whether  the  city’s  rights  were 
attacked by the lawsuit: “Nor are the claims based on any conduct in 
furtherance of the City’s right of petition or free speech. Rather, GPC’s 
claims are based on state and municipal laws requiring competitive 
bidding.”399 The court reasoned that more was required to afford anti- 
SLAPP protection to government activity than that it concern a matter of 
public interest or communication related to an official proceeding: 
 
Many of the public entity decisions  reviewable by mandamus or 
administrative mandamus are arrived at after discussion and a vote at a 
public meeting . . . . If mandamus petitions challenging decisions 
reached in this manner were routinely subject to a special motion to 
strike . . . it would chill the resort to legitimate judicial oversight over 
potential abuses of legislative and administrative power, which is at 
the heart of those remedial statutes ............ 400 
 
Similarly, in USA Waste of Cal., Inc. v. City of Irwindale, a 
developer sued a municipality to obtain a determination of whether the 
city had complied with enacted land use guidelines.401 Recognizing the 
claims were not based upon any statement or conduct in furtherance of 
the city’s right of speech or petition, the court flatly concluded: “Actions 
to enforce, interpret or invalidate governmental laws generally are not 
subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”402 
The reasoning of the courts in Graffiti Protective Coatings and 
USA Waste, that extending “the anti-SLAPP statute to litigation merely 
challenging the application, interpretation, or validity of a statute or 
ordinance would expand the reach of the statute way beyond any 
reasonable parameters”, warrants examination. 403    These cases represent 
a flat judicial rejection of the idea that the anti-SLAPP statute should 
cover all governmental activity described by section 425.16(e).   Their 
reasoning begs the question whether the traffic citations in White, the 
overtime policies in Petersen Law Firm, the election materials in Vargas 
 
 
397 Id. 1211. 
398 Id. at 1224. 
399 Id. at 1218 (citation omitted). 
400 Id. at 1224-25. 
401 USA Waste, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 56. 
402 Id. at 65. 
403 Id. at 66. 
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I and Peninsula Guardians, or any other governmental activity, is 
covered. 
The courts in Graffiti Protective Coatings and USA Waste were 
simply refusing to apply the provisions of section  425.16(e)  to 
government conduct literally within its scope. In Graffiti Protective 
Coatings the activity in question fell smack-dab within the “official 
proceeding” clauses of section 425.16(e), which the court candidly 
acknowledged apply “without a separate showing that a public issue or 
an issue of public interest is present.”404 Likewise, in USA Waste, the 
activity was encompassed by the “official proceeding” clauses of 
subsection (e). Yet in both cases, the courts balked at applying the anti- 
SLAPP  statute  to  the  government  activity  at  issue  based  upon  a 
substantive concern that has nothing to do with whether the liability at 
issue arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute: “Were we 
to conclude otherwise, the anti-SLAPP statute would discourage attempts 
to compel public entities to comply with the law.”405 
What provided the basis for the decisions in Graffiti Protective 
Coatings and USA Waste was the concern of protecting the ability of 
citizens to challenge government policies, such as the “interpretation, or 
validity of a statute or ordinance.”406 This is a petition rights concern 
that recognizes a fundamental hypocrisy involved in government use of 
anti-SLAPP protections against citizens who seek government 
accountability and take issue with government policies and practices. 
Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. addressed a lawsuit challenging 
an agency’s administrative determination. 407 In holding that anti-SLAPP 
protections did not apply to the government conduct there, even though it 
involved statements  made in official proceedings, the court  of appeal 
stressed Cotati’s requirement that acts underlying a plaintiff’s cause of 
action must “in and of themselves” further free speech or petitioning 
rights.408 Rather than recognizing that government acts are not  an 
exercise of speech or petition rights, the court merely observed that 
government acts “do not necessarily amount to” the exercise of rights.409 
The court sought to distinguish other cases finding that section 425.16 
does apply to such claims. It did so by finding that the government 
action there did not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection because the 
plaintiff’s mandamus challenge to the propriety of the agency’s decision 
 
 
 
404 Graffiti Protective Coatings, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 1217. 
405 Id. at 1210; see also USA Waste, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 65. 
406 USA Waste, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 66. 
407 Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist., 210 Cal. App.4th 35 (2012). 
408 Id. at 55. 
409 Id. at 57. 
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“arose out of his statutory rights under section 1094.5, and is separate 
and different from an action for damages that arose out of the content of 
the allegedly wrongful peer review statements.”410 
The court did not explain why a legal proceeding seeking damages 
should be treated differently than one seeking a remedy in the form of 
judicial review of the administrative proceeding. No doubt both lawsuits 
arise from the same conduct in the same official proceeding and both 
propose the agency did something wrong in that proceeding. In other 
words, the activity giving rise to the cause of action is unchanged. Only 
the remedy sought is changed. The distinction is not valid. The real 
reason the court arrived at this conclusion seems plain enough: The court 
simply could not accept that anti-SLAPP protection should apply to 
governmental activity involving no free speech or petitioning. 
In  Mandurrago  v.  City  of  Carmel,411    the  court  of  appeal, 
realizing the paradox of endowing government with “rights” that counter 
individual constitutional rights - indicated that  subsection  (e)’s 
application should be limited to situations involving government speech. 
It rejected a city’s attempt to secure anti-SLAPP protection from a legal 
challenge to a refusal to certify an EIR for a construction project. Such 
an approach - allowing anti-SLAPP protection for government speech - 
remains fraught with problems. Why single out government activity 
involving speech for special protective treatment?  What is evident here 
is the misguided tendency to equate government speech with First 
Amendment activity. However, government speech is no sacred cow 
beatifying it above all other dreary government activity. It is just another 
government activity. 
The court in City of Montebello v. Vasquez,412  held that elected 
city officials were not able to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute against a 
city’s suit alleging violations of statutory prohibitions against city 
officers having a financial interest in any contract made in their official 
capacity. The court essentially reasoned that the defendants’ speech and 
voting was government speech, not their individual exercise of rights, 
and for that reason it warranted no protection.  Conversely, another court, 
Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & Comm. Services Dist. 
Bd.,413 addressed a lawsuit naming board members of a public agency as 
well as the board, alleging misconduct. Relying upon San Ramon, the 
court held that the agency’s legislative activity was not subject to anti- 
SLAPP protection, but that the voting and other legislative activity of 
individual  board  members  was  protected.  Why  government  actors 
 
 
410 Id. at 58. 
411 (6th Dist. 2010) No. H034439 (unpublished). 
412 (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1084 (Review granted). 
413 (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 899. 
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engaging in government speech or government activity individually 
should receive protection for their pseudo-First Amendment  activity 
while the government agency in toto gets no protection  is  not 
satisfactorily explained by the court’s pat observation that voting is First 
Amendment activity. 
The court in Vasquez seems to have the better argument when it 
reasoned that legislative activity, in contrast to the exercise of the 
electoral franchise, is not really an exercise of individual rights. 
However, Vasquez failed to follow its reasoning to its logical conclusion: 
that governmental activity of any kind involves no exercise of a right 
and, therefore, deserves no anti-SLAPP protection. 
What is apparent from the foregoing decisions is that courts are 
having difficulty ascertaining when, if ever, governmental acts are 
protected by anti-SLAPP provisions after Vargas I. The “arising from” 
analysis that makes sense with regard to ascertaining whether private 
action is rights-based for purposes of anti-SLAPP protection makes zero 
sense when applied to governmental activity—speech or otherwise.  This 
is because such activity cannot be identified as an exercise of First 
Amendment petitioning or speech rights. 
 
D. WHY APPLICATION OF THE “ARISING FROM” REQUIREMENT DOES 
NOT PERMIT ANTI-SLAPP PROTECTION TO GOVERNMENT AGENTS 
 
To search beyond the statements involved in a governmental act to 
find an underlying basis of liability sounding in the First Amendment is 
like trying to find a mirage or locating the pot of gold at the end of the 
rainbow—it is never there. Examining the cases where courts purport to 
engage in precisely such smoke and mirrors and legerdemain shows that 
they do two things: 1) they either give lip service to the “arising from” 
approach and then seize upon a statement falling under subsection (e) 
and treat it as protected purely by virtue of its statutory definition as 
such, or; 2) they characterize the underlying activity that is the basis for 
liability as something other than the statement—e.g., government failing 
to perform a required duty or a dispute over the validity of a policy or 
law. 
The reality is that trying to differentiate between a government 
official’s statements in denying a permit and the denial of a permit or the 
communication of a policy and a challenge to its validity for purposes of 
quantifying it as free speech is an exercise like separating water from 
rain. Applying the approach identified in Cotati and Navellier to  a 
lawsuit brought against a police officer concerning the result or  the 
content of an official police investigation should yield one conclusion 
whether the report contains remarks resembling private speech or not. 
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Because the basis  for liability involving a  statement made in  a 
governmental proceeding is not the exercise of free speech or petitioning, 
section 425.16 cannot apply. Just because an official investigation 
occurred, this fact is not the operative inquiry. Just because a statement 
was made during the investigation, this is not the operative inquiry.414 
Because of this confusion, the courts have been unable to coherently 
and consistently apply  the arising from requirement identified as 
constitutionally compelled in Cotati and Navellier to government speech 
and see beyond its resemblance to the private exercise of rights. For 
example, in Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 
the court held that a developer’s action against a city for inducing breach 
of contract and related claims was subject to a motion to strike. 415 This 
was because it was based on communications among the parties.416 
Meanwhile, in Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, the same 
court held a property developer’s action against a city and others for 
breach of contract, fraud, and related claims was not subject to an anti- 
SLAPP motion to strike because the court could not say as a matter of 
law that liability was based “solely or principally upon protected 
communications” as opposed to other misconduct during the permit 
process.417 In neither case did the governmental communications involve 
the exercise of rights.418   The liability did not “arise from” free speech or 
 
 
414 Let us consider an easy example - a plaintiff suing for injuries sustained while beaten during an 
official police investigation. Obviously liability there has nothing to do with the investigation.  It has to 
do with something related to the investigation – the civil rights violation and battery that occurred 
during that official process. Likewise, the fact statements were made in that official proceeding 
(“confess or we’ll hit you again” or “ouch, stop that”) are not the factual basis for the liability asserted 
against the defendant. The focus is not what “triggered” the lawsuit, strategic considerations 
motivating the suit, the evidence supporting the theory of liability, the mere fact that circumstances 
involving protected activity are implicated or even the fact that statements were made, reports prepared 
or official conduct occurred. It is instead whether the liability is based upon First Amendment 
petitioning or speech. The defendant’s act violating the plaintiff’s civil rights is not First Amendment 
activity entitling the defendant to bring a motion to strike. More importantly, the investigation itself is 
not petitioning or free speech – it’s just government performing a governmental function. 
The governmental activity that forms the basis for liability is always just that – a governmental 
activity, rather than an exercise of free speech. To illustrate, let’s make the governmental 
communication involved resemble private First Amendment speech: an offensive remark in an 
investigative report that incites a lawsuit for defamation. If a private person were sued for making the 
recorded communication, there would be no question – anti-SLAPP protections would apply. But the 
governmental communication merely looks like private speech.  It is not itself petitioning or otherwise 
an exercise of a protected right. It is just government doing its job, albeit perhaps badly. Once we 
penetrate the confusion created by the government speech doctrine, it becomes clear the basis for 
liability is a government communicative act, not any act of First Amendment stature covered by the 
anti-SLAPP statute. 
415 Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 
1226-27. (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
416 Id. at 1228-1229. 
417 Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, 153 Cal. App. 4th 790, 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 
809).  
418 See id. at 808. 
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petitioning.   Hence, anti-SLAPP protection should have been denied in 
both cases. 
This confusion is especially evident when one considers what 
happens when the shoe is on the other foot—when the same type of 
activity that is the basis for government liability is engaged in by private 
actors. Comparable conduct by private sector actors—reports, claims, 
administrative proceedings, and communications and advertisements— 
has been held to not constitute acts in furtherance of speech or 
petitioning.419 
Where a government entity sues for declaratory relief over the 
validity of a law or policy—its action “arises from” its effort to seek a 
determination of its legal duties.420 Where a private citizen sues 
government for the same thing, suddenly the government law or policy 
or activity in question is covered by anti-SLAPP provisions because it 
entails communications relating to government activities.421 The reason 
for this schism is that the “arising from” standard is misapplied to 
government activity by looking at whether statements are made in 
statutorily described contexts, rather than recognizing that government 
activity is never the exercise of First Amendment rights. 
The error in application of the “arising from” requirement to 
government acts is illuminated in a non-government case by the court in 
1100 Park Lane Assocs. v. Feldman.422 The conduct that formed the 
basis for liability and provided anti-SLAPP protection were acts of 
litigation and serving a legal notice.423   The court of appeal distinguished 
 
 
 
419 See supra, n. 273, 295; People ex re. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012) Cal.App.4th 
(alleged fraudulent insurance reports). 
420 City of Riverside v. Stansbury, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1582, 1594 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), 
abrogated by, Mission Springs Water Dist. v. Verjil, 218 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), 
reh’g denied (Sept. 5, 2013), review denied (Oct. 16, 2013) (holding a declaratory relief action as to 
validity of ballot initiative not subject to anti-SLAPP motion); Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 80 (holding 
declaratory relief challenge to constitutionality of rent stabilization ordinance not subject to anti- 
SLAPP motion). Mission Springs departed from Stansbury after reconciling Cotati with City of 
Santa Monica v. Stewart, 126 Cal.App.4th 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) on the basis that the latter case 
involved the public entity’s preelection duties with respect to an initiative. This distinction is of 
questionable significance in view of Cotati’s holding that the activity from which that declaratory 
relief action arose was from a dispute over legal duties with respect to an enactment which exists 
apart from the manifestation of that dispute in a lawsuit. Thus, whether the controversy originates 
with regard to an ordinance, referendum or initiative or when in the process would not seem to alter 
the pertinent activity from which the lawsuit arises. 
421 Santa Barbara County Coalition, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 1237-38; but see San Ramon 
Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Ret. Assn., 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 357-58, 
n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the practical consequence of applying anti-SLAPP protection to 
suits challenging government actions is that “suits to compel public entities to comply with the law 
would be chilled.”) 
422 1100 Park Lane Associates v. Feldman, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1467 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
423 Id. at 1483. 
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Dept of Fair Emp’t & Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Rd. Apartments, LLC, 
where another court held the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a 
landlord who filed and served notices because the basis for liability was 
not those protected petitioning acts, but unlawful discrimination.424 That 
action arose from the landlord’s failure to accommodate the tenant’s 
disability and the communications, notices, investigation, and unlawful 
detainer action were simply evidence of that discriminatory conduct. 425 
The court in 1100 Park Lane Associates recognized the need to look past 
the mere fact that acts covered by subsection (e) may be involved and to 
focus upon the actual basis for liability.426 
The court contrasted the DFEH situation to the situation before it 
and to that confronted by the court in Birkner v. Lam. In 1100 Park Lane 
and in Birkner, the basis for liability was acts by private actors—service 
of a 3 day notice, statements relating to the eviction process and filing of 
an unlawful detainer action—that are protected as in furtherance of 
petitioning. 427 
Government action by definition involves liability that is not based 
upon protected activity. While statements and official proceedings may 
relate to the liability or might be evidence of the liability or might even 
be the basis for the liability, they cannot be the exercise of petition rights 
or free speech.428 
The problem with applying anti-SLAPP protection to government 
acts should now be abundantly clear. The act underlying the asserted 
liability is always for something other than free speech or petitioning. 
The cause of action can never “arise from” First Amendment activity, 
because ab initio government cannot ever engage in such activity.  Even 
a lawsuit brought purely as retaliation for something government said (an 
unkind remark contained in a report) or did (the denial of an application), 
does not involve First Amendment conduct. These situations are just 
government doing something someone does not like. As much as 
government action may resemble private First Amendment participatory 
 
 
424 Id. at 1481-82. 
425 Id. 
426 Id. at 1483 
427 Birkner v. Lam, 156 Cal. App. 4th 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
428 See Beach v. Harco National Insurance Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 82, 94-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003), (rejecting an attempt to apply the anti-SLAPP statute where an insured sued his insurer, 
alleging bad faith and seeking damages due to excessive delay). Although the claim had been 
submitted to arbitration—an exercise of the insurer’s right of petition under the First Amendment 
and therefore protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. Id. at 94. 
While the act that was the basis for liability involved petitioning it was not itself petitioning or even 
tied to advancing petitioning. Id. at 94-95. This was because the cause of action based liability in 
inaction and delays, not in any specific statement or writing by the company, and none of that 
conduct involved the company’s right of petition. Id. at 93 
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conduct or freedom of expression, it cannot actually be furthering 
petitioning or free speech because it is not private agents, properly 
endowed with rights, who are engaging in the activity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The apostasy for broad anti-SLAPP statutes is that they defeat their 
worthy and principled purpose of advancing Petition  Clause  activity 
when utilized by government actors. Judicial interpretation of  those 
statutes to avoid this conflict with the very constitutional rights they were 
designed to protect has occurred in some states. However, California, a 
source of guidance nationally in the anti-SLAPP area, has not followed 
that path. The wake of California’s efforts to reconcile in which 
instances government agents should be able to utilize anti-SLAPP 
protections is a muddle, leaving the lower courts to struggle with the 
impossible conundrum of deciphering when government speech should 
be treated like the exercise of a First Amendment right. 
Even more disconcerting is the predicament left for concerned 
prospective citizen litigants who might contemplate challenging 
perceived government wrongdoing. Because courts already struggle to 
decide when an anti-SLAPP statute applies to protect private actors, the 
indefinite judicial treatment of government actors makes it impossible 
for the public interest litigant to determine when government might avail 
itself of anti-SLAPP protection and obtain early termination and a fee 
award and other sanctions against the concerned citizen. The cautious 
litigant will likely shrink from bringing suit, and careful attorneys will 
counsel such caution. 
To every constitutional law student, it is familiar ground in assessing 
conflicts between the individual and the State that different balancing 
considerations apply depending upon what is placed upon each side of 
the constitutional scale. It is one thing to balance  individual 
constitutional rights. It is another to balance a government interest 
against a constitutional right429 even where the government interest is one 
of   bolstering   a   private   right.    These   involve   entirely   different 
constitutional analyses. Anti-SLAPP statutes were supposed to engage 
in the former weighing, not the latter. Forgetting this and treating a 
government interest on the same par as a paramount constitutional right 
leads to results that do not comport with either the objectives of anti- 
SLAPP statutes or of the First Amendment. California courts - confused 
by  the  government  speech  doctrine  –  became  sidetracked.     They 
 
 
 
429   And this depends in turn upon whether the importance of the government interest and 
whether it directly or indirectly impinges upon an individual constitutional right. 
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mistakenly treated government speech on a par  with  a  constitutional 
right. They have been employing the wrong analysis for years in spite of 
the intent and language of §425.16 and in spite of very clear directives 
from the United States Supreme Court as to how to weigh state interests 
against First Amendment rights. 
Where general petition rights are involved and no First 
Amendment rights appear upon the other side of the scale,  the  anti- 
SLAPP second prong standard (lack of probable cause) does not apply 
any more than the first prong applies (that the basis for the lawsuit arises 
from First Amendment activity). Noerr-Pennington immunity is  the 
proper standard, requiring a defendant demonstrate both that the suit is 
objectively so utterly without merit that  no  reasonable  litigant  would 
have brought it and that it was not brought for a genuine purpose in order 
for the defendant to trump the petition right. 
In view of public policy encouraging and rewarding public interest 
litigation, and in protecting petition rights from being chilled, there is no 
support for the proposition that anti-SLAPP statutes were enacted to 
impose early termination, let alone, a fee-shifting scheme awarding fees 
against unsuccessful public interest litigants differing from the approach 
that has prevailed since Christiansburg. Imputing to state legislatures a 
prerogative of promoting petitioning by rewarding citizens who succeed 
in advancing an important public interest  through  litigation,  but 
punishing efforts that fail, runs counter to the objectives of anti-SLAPP 
statutes, common sense and the judicial decisions considering and 
construing statutes designed to promote civil rights and public interest 
litigation. 
Such a scheme would ultimately discourage such socially beneficial 
litigation. It would undermine and defeat the value of the Petition right 
as a device for holding government accountable and achieving needed 
social change. Nevertheless, the courts in  a  few  jurisdictions, 
particularly in California, have accepted the view that protections for 
government speech trump the petition rights of private citizens. 
The trumpet has sounded for government agencies to charge ahead 
with use of anti-SLAPP statutes to stamp out troublesome citizen legal 
challenges to government action. Counsel for  government  agencies 
herald the Vargas decisions as providing “a powerful tool”  “in 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute”.430 
 
 
 
430 David  Urban,  Anti-Slapp  Motions  As  A  Litigation  Resource  For  Public  Employers, 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC AGENCY LABOR EMPLOYMENT BLOG (Feb. 24, 2012), 
www.calpublicagencylaboremploymentblog.com/first-amendment/anti-slapp-motions-as-a-litigation 
-resource-for-public-employers/. 
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Unfortunately, with a suboptimal judicial rejection of the 
constitutional problems presented in Vargas II, in the event the state’s 
supreme court fails to alter this course when it considers the issue in City 
of Montebello v. Vasquez,431 it may be  left to California’s  legislative 
branch to re-tailor the state’s statute in order to avoid this irony and 
preclude government from using anti-SLAPP procedures to burden 
private litigants who challenge government conduct. It is time for the 
California legislature and other legislatures to revisit that problem. It is 
time to prevent anti-SLAPP statutes from being used to undermine their 
very purpose in protecting participatory First Amendment activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
431 Supra, p. 203. 
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